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Political Science Quarterly

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Contents

The Confidence Gap during the Reagan Years, 1981-1987
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER 1

Campaign Money and the Press: Three Soundings
FRANK J. SORAUF 25

John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress
ANNA KASTEN NELSON 43

The War on Poverty and the Poor and Nonpoor
ROBERT H. HAVEMAN 65

Puzzles and Confusions: Political Realignment in the 1980s
DAVID G. LAWRENCE
RICHARD FLEISHER 79

Pluralism, Elitism, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
ERIC S. MOSKOWITZ 93

Book Reviews 113

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 179

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Claude, American Approaches to World Affairs — THOMAS M. FRANCK — 113

Muskie, Rush and **Thompson**, eds., The President, The Congress and Foreign Policy — LOUIS FISHER — 114

Plischke, Diplomat in Chief: The President at the Summit — ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. — 116

Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options — ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN — 117

Walters, Britain's Economic Renaissance: Margaret Thatcher's Reforms 1979-1984 — JAMES E. ALT — 118

Hersh, "The Target is Destroyed": What Really Happened to Flight 007 And What America Knew About It; **Richelson** and **Ball**, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between The UKSA Countries, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — RAY S. CLINE — 120

Pilat, ed., The Nonproliferation Predicament — AARON KARP — 122

O'Brien and **Langan**, eds., The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition — KENNETH W. THOMPSON — 123

Grassmuck, ed., Before Nomination: Our Primary Problems — FRANK J. SORAUF — 125

Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law — ROBERT J. STEAMER — 126

Rubin, The Supreme Court and the American Family: Ideology and Issues — SARAH SLAVIN — 127

Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power — DORIS A. GRABER — 129

Salomone, Equal Education Under Law: Legal Rights and Federal Policy — JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD — 130

Rostow, The United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific: 1965-1985 — DONALD S. ZAGORIA — 131

Hans and **Vidmar**, Judging the Jury — GERARD J. FITZPATRICK — 132

Lee and **Starr**, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II — RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF — 134

Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao; **Barnett** and **Clough**, eds., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development — WILLIAM T. TOW — 135

Andrews, Poland 1980-1981: Solidarity Versus the Party; **Raina**, Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal — JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD — 137

Adam and **Moodley**, South Africa Without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination — CRAWFORD YOUNG — 139

Nakhleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects — F. GREGORY GAUSE, III — 140

Katz, Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula — YAACOV RO'I — 141

Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership — GEORGE C. EDWARDS, III — 143

Wormuth and **Firmage**, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law — HARVEY ZEIDENSTEIN — 144

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Katznelson and **Weir**, Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal — Mary Ann Dzuback — 146

Kaufman, Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment — Ronald C. Moe — 147

Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam — Bob Buzzanco — 148

Tebbel and **Watts**, The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan; **Leonard**, The Power of the Press: The Birth of American Political Reporting — Samuel Kernell — 149

Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service — Sue E. Berryman — 151

Benjamin and **Hurd**, eds., Making Experience Count: Managing Modern New York in the Carey Era — Leonard P. Stavisky — 153

Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America — Kristine L. Olsen — 154

Agranoff, Intergovernmental Management: Human Services Problem-Solving in Six Metropolitan Areas — Donna Wilson Kirchheimer — 155

Carpini, Stability and Change in American Politics: The Coming of Age of the Generation of the 1960s; **Rapoport, Abramowitz** and **McGlennon**, eds., The Life of the Parties: Activists in Presidential Politics — John R. Petrocik — 157

Nivola, The Politics of Energy Conservation — Laura M. Lake — 159

Kettl, Leadership at the Fed — R. J. Saulnier — 160

Rothstein, Plant Closings: Power, Politics and Workers — Terry F. Buss — 162

Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command — Rosemary Foot — 163

Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy — Arthur S. Link — 164

Cole and **Keddie**, eds., Shi'ism and Social Protest — Richard W. Bulliet — 166

Bruneau and **Macleod**, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and Consolidation of Democracy — Glenda G. Rosenthal — 167

Dawisha, The Arab Radicals — Marvin G. Weinbaum — 168

Lovenduski, Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy; **Vallance** and **Davies**, Women of Europe: Women MEPs and Equality Policy — Mary Ruggie — 169

Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer — Furio Colombo — 171

Camp, Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico — David R. Mares — 173

Anwar, Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System — Donley T. Studlar — 174

Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide — Leo Kuper — 175

Bergquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia — Steven E. Sanderson — 176

Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions — Paul Marer — 178

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue:

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and WILLIAM SCHNEIDER renew their explorations of the feelings of Americans about their major institutions, first reported in this journal four years ago. The authors document the paradoxical findings that under a pro-business president who would sharply reduce the role of the state, the public has regained confidence in government, but continues to distrust major private institutions such as corporations and labor unions.

FRANK J. SORAUF examines the nature of bias in elite newspaper reporting of a particularly complex subject: American campaign finance. He highlights the factors that often shape not only the direction of the reporting but whether the story is even reported in the first place.

ANNA KASTEN NELSON analyzes the efforts at maintaining good relations with Congress of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. She argues that Dulles's liaison with Congress is an often ignored aspect of the Eisenhower administration's success in gaining bipartisan support for its foreign policy.

ROBERT H. HAVEMAN describes the increases in social welfare expenditures which can be attributed to the Great Society's War on Poverty, and estimates what the impact of this increased social spending was on the nonpoor. Haveman concludes that the costs to the nonpoor have been relatively small, which suggests why this group has not supported massive retrenchment of social policies in the 1980s.

DAVID G. LAWRENCE and RICHARD FLEISHER look at conceptual and theoretical problems of realignment that limit our ability to understand the current electoral era. They conclude that the last twenty-five years have produced exactly the kinds of changes in *outcomes* that early realignment theorists looked for, but without evidence of the underlying changes in *process* that later theorists would expect.

ERIC S. MOSKOWITZ compares three competing explanations for U.S. policy making on mortgage disclosure. He concludes that a fuller understanding of that process requires an explanation that is more sensitive to both cognitive and structural factors than is usually found in either pluralist or elitist interpretations.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Confidence Gap during the Reagan Years, 1981–1987

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER

Remember the confidence gap, the lack of public faith in the functioning of major institutions, which started in the late-1960s and seemingly bottomed out in the early 1980s?[1] Since then, the nation's economic recovery and disinflation, presided over by a President who evoked pride in the nation and faith in its promise and achievements, resulted in a sizeable improvement in many of the indicators of public morale. The malaise crisis to which Jimmy Carter called attention when he lectured the nation in mid-summer 1979 about the existence of a "crisis of confidence . . . that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will" seemed to be over.[2] Seven years later, in the midst of a new crisis caused by the Iran-contra scandal, Ronald Reagan tried to convince the nation that during the "past six years, we have done much together to restore the faith and confidence and respect of our people and our country."[3] But even prior to the scandal, the evidence from the opinion polls did not confirm this hopeful conclusion. Confidence in governmental institutions did improve between 1983

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, "The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Fall 1983): 379–402; and *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind* (New York: The Free Press, 1983; rev. paperback ed., Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987).

[2] "Transcript of President's Address to Country on Energy Problems," *New York Times*, 16 July 1979.

[3] "Radio Address by Reagan from Camp David," *The New York Times*, 7 December 1986.

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET is the Caroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Sociology and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has also been the president of the American Political Science Association and the World Association for Public Opinion Research. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER is associated editorially with the *Atlantic*, the Los Angeles *Times*, and the *National Journal*. This article draws on the updated materials in the just published paperback edition of their book, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor and Government in the Public Mind.*

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and 1986, but the major private institutions, particularly big business and organized labor, showed fewer and weaker gains. Ironically, Ronald Reagan had revived faith in government but not in the private sector.

Although the confidence gap first materialized during the prolonged war in Vietnam and the social turmoil and protest associated with that era, Americans repeatedly endeavored to regain trust in their institutions after the end of the Vietnam conflict. Each advance was halted and then reversed, sometimes by scandals such as Watergate or the Iran-contra crisis, but more usually by bad economic news such as an energy crisis, rising inflation, or a recession. A troubled economy, we have found, significantly affects people's feelings about their leaders and institutions. These attitudes also influence electoral outcomes. Incumbent governments, whether of the left or right, tend to be reelected if the "misery index," the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates, is low or visibly improving; they tend to be defeated when the misery index is high. Hence, the malaise that emerged in reaction to the bad news of the late 1960s and early 1970s continued for another full decade into the 1981–1983 recession of the early Reagan years.

Once the economy began to recover, the Reagan era became characterized by a sharp upswing in national morale. The cynicism about politics that so marked the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and early Reagan years seemed almost like a bad memory by the mid-1980s. Magazine, newspaper, and television stories emphasized a rebirth of patriotism, of confidence in the nation. "America is back," proclaimed Ronald Reagan. As historian Alan Brinkley summed up the situation:

> That there had indeed been a change in America's mood over the last few years is hardly open to question. The jubilation over the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the exultation with which Americans celebrated the success of their undermatched athletes at the end of the 1984 Olympics, the extraordinary patriotic demonstrations that accompanied the journey of the Olympic torch across the country, the revival of overt nationalism in popular films and television programs, the opinion polls that report a striking rise in optimism about the future (when only five years ago most Americans claimed to expect both personal and national decline): all suggest that "America's Upbeat Mood" . . . is not as some have charged, a media creation, but a significant change in public perception.[4]

The evidence came from many different sources. In Penn & Shoen surveys, respondents were asked, "In general, do you think that things in the U.S. are going in the right direction, or are they off on the wrong track?" In October 1984, 61 percent thought that the United States was moving in the right direction and 25 percent felt the nation was on the wrong track. These figures represent a substantial improvement from December 1982, the depth of the recession, when only 36 percent reported that things were going well and 51 percent thought the United States was on the wrong track. Similar results are available from the Roper Organization. The wording of Roper's question is slightly different: "Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction today, or do you feel that things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?" One month after Ronald

[4] Alan Brinkley, "America is Back," *London Review of Books*, 1–14 November 1984, 6.

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Reagan took office, a February 1981 Roper poll found that 32 percent felt the nation was heading in the right direction, while 54 percent thought it was on the wrong track. By February 1982, only 27 percent gave the positive response and 63 percent the negative one. In February 1985, however, 49 percent reported that America was moving forward, while the percentage who felt otherwise had dropped to 39, the highest level of optimism in fifteen years of Roper surveys.

The upswing in positive feeling about the country has also been noted in Gallup polls. Respondents are asked, "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the U.S. at this time?" In June 1986, 69 percent reported that they were satisfied, while 26 percent were dissatisfied. This is a major turnaround from November 1982, when only 24 percent were positive and 72 percent were negative in their judgments of the way things were going in the country. Figure 1 reveals the magnitude of this shift from 1979 to 1986. As the chart demonstrates, the mid-1986 results were a complete reversal of the early 1979 findings.

The overall improvement in the public's faith in the nation coincided with an upswing in national pride and patriotism. In a July 1986 Gallup poll, individuals were asked; "How proud are you to be an American—very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?" At that time, 89 percent reported they were very proud, up from 80 percent in 1981. When asked in the same survey: "Do you display an American flag outside your home on national holidays or other days during the year?" 43 percent said they did, a significant increase from the 30 percent reported in 1984.

The strong surge of optimism was also apparent in the results of other surveys. The Cambridge Report (CRI) ladder scales reveal significant improvements in evaluations of the "situation of the country" and of "your life." Jimmy Carter had expressed alarm in 1979, when CRI reported that expectations for the future ("five years from now") had fallen below evaluations of the present. But in polls taken by CRI in the fourth quarter of each Reagan year, 1981–85, expectations for the future were significantly higher than assessments of the present. During this period the average ladder rating for "your life" was 6.5 for the present and 7.5 for five years in the future; for the country, the average scale rating for the future, 6.3, was also a full step ahead of that for the present, 5.1.

Even in the depth of the confidence gap we found evidence of resiliency in public attitudes. Americans want to have confidence in their nation; they look for opportunities to restore their trust. Events and circumstances from late 1983 on—an improving economy and the absence of a crisis atmosphere—appeared to have contributed to a return of faith, one which was then drastically upset in the final months of 1986 by the Iran-contra scandal.

Confidence in Institutions, Particularly Government

If we turn, however, to indicators of confidence in specific institutions, the full story turns out to be more complex than can be revealed by questions about the general mood. As indicated earlier, the components of public morale are highly

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FIGURE 1

Feelings Toward the Nation

"In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the U.S. at this time?"



Source: Gallup Poll. Most recent surveys—June 9-16, 1986. N = 1,004 adults nationwide.

Values for Figure 1

OUTLOOK TOWARD THE NATION: "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the U.S. at this time?"

Date	*Satisfied*	*Dissatisfied*
June 1986	69	26
March 1986	66	30
Nov. 1985	51	46
Dec. 1984	52	40
Sept. 1984	48	45
Feb. 1984	50	46
Aug. 1983	35	59
Nov. 1982	24	72
Apr. 1982	25	71
Dec. 1981	27	67
June 1981	33	61
Jan. 1981	17	78
Nov. 1979	19	77
Aug. 1979	12	84
Feb. 1979	26	69

differentiated. Enthusiasm for the country and satisfaction with one's own situation may occur along with severe criticism of institutions. The confidence gap did not end with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, nor did it disappear during the upbeat era. Confidence in major institutions and leaders, which had fallen dramatically during the Carter "malaise" years of 1978–80, actually reached its lowest

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point in 1982 and 1983. The continued decline during the early Reagan years reflected the worsening economy and the sharp rise in unemployment.

Given our statistical finding that the confidence level varies with the state of the economy,[5] economic improvements should increase faith in institutions. And, of course, they do. The decline in the unemployment rate from 11 percent at the end of 1982 to around 7 percent from 1984 on, while the inflation rate stabilized around 4 to 5 percent, was accompanied by the largest increase in confidence in any two-year period since the Harris poll began to query Americans on the subject in 1966. The expression of "a great deal of confidence" in the leaders of ten institutions moved up from an average of 21 percent in a Harris survey taken in November 1982—an all time low—to 31 percent in a poll conducted by the same organization in November 1984. Similar increases were reported by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), from an average of 23 percent in March 1983 to 28 percent in March 1984; by the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC), for fourteen institutions, using a seven point scale, from a 28 percent high (6–7 points) in June 1983 to 31.5 percent in the summer of 1985; and by Gallup, for six institutions, from 37.5 percent in 1983 to 42 percent in 1984 voicing "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence.

These results resemble those found for presidential popularity and electoral choice. The approval ratings of presidents and their support in trial-heat elections also vary with indicators of economic performance. After a political and economic honeymoon during Ronald Reagan's first six months in office, the electorate turned gradually but steadily against him as the unemployment rate grew. His approval rating in the Gallup poll fell from 60 percent in September 1981 to 35 percent in January 1983, the month in which the recession bottomed out. Democrat Walter Mondale moved ahead of him in presidential trial heats. But as the economy recovered in 1983–1984, Ronald Reagan's standings in the polls—including the definitive poll, the 1984 election—went up. As noted earlier, in the two and a half years that followed, his approval rating reached new highs, close to 70 percent in mid-year 1986, exceeding ratings of other American presidents at the equivalent point in their second terms. However, the Iran-contra scandal of November 1986 brought the ratings sharply down to below the 50 percent mark in December 1986.

Thus far the picture reported for the Reagan years fits the pattern presented earlier. The recent data present two anomalies, however: the average level of confidence did not go up in 1985 and 1986 in the Harris, NORC, and Gallup surveys taken prior to the Iran-contra affair, although it did in the ORC polls; and faith in the different institutions inquired about did not move in the same direction in the most recent polls, as was the case in previous inquiries. In spite of the fact that the economy remained in fairly good shape and Reagan's popularity continued to improve, until the Iran-contra exposé, both Harris and NORC reported a decline in confidence in the leaders of institutions, from an average of 31 to 25 percent between November 1984 and 1985 in Harris, and from 28 to 26 percent

[5] Lipset and Schneider, *The Confidence Gap*, 61–66.

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TABLE 1

Great Confidence in Leaders of Governmental, Nongovernmental, and All Ten Institutions, 1982–1986

	Percentage		
Survey	*Governmental*[a]	*Nongovernmental*[b]	*All Ten*
Mar. 1982 NORC	24	21	26
Nov. 1982 Harris	22	20	21
Mar. 1983 NORC	20	26	23
Nov. 1983 Harris	28	23	25
Mar. 1984 NORC	26	29	28
Nov. 1984 Harris	38	26	31
Nov. 1985 Harris	27	24	25
Mar. 1986 NORC	25	26	26
Nov. 24–Dec. 2 1986 Harris	27	22.5	24

[a] Average of White House (Harris)/executive Branch (NORC), U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and military.

[b] Average of medicine, education, organized religion, major companies, the press, and organized labor.

Note: The data for each of the institutions for 32 surveys taken between 1966 and 1986 may be found in S.M. Lipset and W. Schneider, *The Confidence Gap* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 48–49.

Source: Nine Harris and NORC surveys.

between March 1984 and 1986 in NORC (see Table 1).[6] Gallup also reported an insignificant decline in the average for ten institutions from 44 percent in midsummer 1985 to 43 percent in 1986. Measures of high confidence taken by the Opinion Research Corporation showed a contrary trend. The average level for the fourteen institutions included in the ORC polls rose from 28 percent in 1983 to 31.5 percent in 1985. The differences, which are slight, may reflect variations in the timing of the polls.

One notable feature of surveys taken during the Reagan recovery, roughly 1983 to 1986, prior to the Iran-contra scandal, was that confidence in public institutions improved more than faith in private ones. Ironically, given Ronald Reagan's opposition to state intervention and his commitment to support the private sector, the growth of trust in his leadership apparently upgraded regard for the public sector generally, whereas the coattails for the private sector to ride were short. Comparing a group of items measuring antibusiness sentiment with a set charting antigovernment sentiment reveals that the average percentage of respondents critical of government, which had been much higher during the 1970s than that for business, dropped below it in polls taken during 1984–1985.[7] Surveys dealing with

[6] The large decline in the overall average reported by Harris, from 31 to 25 percent between November 1984 and November 1985, noted in Table 1, is puzzling. It cannot be related to changes in the economy or to any major event except perhaps the 1984 presidential race. The spillover effect of Ronald Reagan's triumphant reelection on the leaders of most public institutions may have been short lived, vanishing shortly after the reelection. Harris's survey was the only one taken in tandem with the election.

[7] Lipset and Schneider, *The Confidence Gap* (1987 edition), 33.

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trust indicated a similar pattern. Table 1 depicts the average level of great confidence in the leadership of private and public institutions as reported in Harris and NORC surveys from 1982 through 1986. Looking first at the Harris surveys, we find an increase of 16 percentage points in trust in governmental institutions, from an average of 22 percent in November 1982 to 38 percent in November 1984. At the same time, the mean level of trust in private institutions moved up only 6 points, from 20 to 26 percent. The NORC results between 1983 and 1984 were similar; the average for public institutions went up 6 percent, twice the proportion as for the nongovernmental sector.

November 1984, the month in which Ronald Reagan was triumphantly reelected with 61 percent of the popular vote, proved also to be the period in which the mean level of great confidence in the leadership of public institutions in the Harris Poll moved up from 28 to 38 percent. Support then dropped back one year later to an average for the same four government institutions of 27 percent. The standing of private institutions also moved up and down in this period, but much less strikingly than government, an increase of three percentage points to 26, then a slight decline a year later to an average of 24 percent.

The situation changed in the last two months of 1986 as the Iran-Nicaraguan aid fiascos were unfolding. A Harris poll taken between 26 November and 2 December 1986, soon after the scandal reached public notice, found that the percentage expressing a great deal of confidence in the leadership supplied by the White House had dropped to 19 percent, a dramatic decline from 30 percent in the late fall of 1985. However, the fall off was largely limited to the presidency, i.e., Ronald Reagan and his staff. The other governmental institutions, whose position had improved during the Reagan "upbeat" years, continued to move up in the Harris poll between 1985 and 1986: Congress from 16 to 21 percent; the Supreme Court from 28 to 32; and the military from 32 to 36, while the average giving a strong vote of confidence in the six private institutions regularly inquired about fell from 24 percent in 1985 to 22.5 in the late fall of 1986. These results indicate that apart from the short-term effect of the Iran-contra crisis on confidence in White House leadership, in 1986 the public continued to feel better about the performance of governmental institutions than about those in the private sector. Harris's poll taken two weeks after the scandal broke suggests that, though the public quickly turned against the presidency as the responsible institution, the crisis had not yet affected faith in the operation of other governmental agencies.

Gallup's three polls taken during the Reagan era, in the summers of 1983, 1985 and 1986, yielded comparable findings to those of Harris and NORC with respect to changes in faith in public and private bodies. As noted, Harris dealt somewhat differently with the issues, inquiring as to confidence in institutions themselves, not their leaders, and offering respondents two positive choices, a great deal of confidence and quite a lot, whereas Harris and NORC presented them only one, quite a lot. Although Gallup did not ask about the White House or executive branch, the average positive confidence ratings of the three federal institutions included in his polls—the military, the Supreme Court, and Congress—moved up signifi-

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cantly under Reagan, from 44 percent in the last two polls taken under Carter in 1979 and 1980 to 52 percent in July 1985 and 1986. Conversely, the mean esteem given to the six private ones—organized religion, banks, newspapers, organized labor, big business, and television—fell, from 47 and 44 percent in 1979 and 1980 to 40 and 38 percent. In other words, according to Gallup, faith in private institutions had declined significantly from Carter to Reagan, while confidence in the major agencies of the federal government had increased greatly. The pattern held true during the Reagan upbeat years, 1983 to 1986.

Finally, similar results were obtained by ORC in 1983 and 1985. Comparing the average level of confidence in four governmental institutions (the military, the president, the Supreme Court, and Congress) with the mean for nine other institutions surveyed yielded noticeable differences. The average level of trust in public bodies climbed from 26 percent in 1983 to 35 percent in 1985; faith in nongovernmental ones showed little change during these years, from 32 percent in 1983 to 34 percent in 1985.

Thus, four different polling organizations report that governmental institutions were the most significant gainers in confidence under Ronald Reagan. The findings in the period 1983–1986 resemble those reported during the Reagan honeymoon, his first six months, which revealed that "the 'good feelings' surrounding the President did not restore a *general* sense of confidence in other institutions."[8] As of the early months of 1987, it is still too early to judge the long-term impact of the Iran-contra crisis. As noted, Ronald Reagan's approval rating dropped sharply, as did the percentage voicing a great deal of confidence in the White House leadership. But as of the November–December Harris confidence poll, the other major public institutions seemingly had not (yet) been adversely affected.

Four years ago, we noted that distrust of government helped fuel the tax revolt that expressed itself in 1978 with the passage of Proposition 13 in California.[9] One would expect, therefore, that improved feelings about government would cause tax resentment to diminish. That is exactly what has happened. Table 2 compares the level of tax resentment in 1986 with the level that prevailed in 1978. Although tax resentment has not disappeared, it has clearly diminished in intensity. In 1986 more Americans felt the income tax system was fair to most people, although a majority continued to label it unfair. People's resentment of their own taxes dropped considerably. This was particularly true in the case of the federal income tax. Obviously, the 1981 tax cut had a great deal to do with this turnaround. But the shift applies to other taxes as well, including social security taxes (which have gone up), state sales and income taxes, and local property and income taxes.

Fewer people in 1986, compared to 1978, believed that middle-income families, wage earners, and homeowners—that is, "average Americans"—paid too much in taxes. There was a slight increase, however, in the feeling that low-income families and small businesses paid too much. In other words, as trust in government

[8] Ibid., 59.
[9] Ibid., 342–46.

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TABLE 2

Tax Resentment Diminishing

	1978	*1986*
	Percentage	
Present federal income tax is		
Fair to most people	29	36
Unfair to most people	67	61
Feelings about taxes you have to pay:		
Federal income taxes		
Excessively high	41	26
About right or low	16	30
Property or real estate taxes		
Excessively high	36	25
About right or low	19	30
Social security taxes		
Excessively high	27	20
About right or low	30	40
Sales taxes		
Excessively high	24	19
About right or low	42	48
State income taxes		
Excessively high	21	17
About right or low	29	42
City or local income taxes		
Excessively high	21	11
About right or low	20	31
Pay too much in taxes:		
Middle-income families	74	62
Low-income families	47	53
People whose income all comes from salary and wages	63	49
Small-business companies	38	42
People who own their own homes	50	38
People who live in rented homes or apartments	37	36
Self-employed people	29	31
High-income families	7	7
Large business corporations	5	6

Source: *The American Public and the Federal Income Tax System* by the Roper Organization, for H&R Block, Inc.

grew during the Reagan years, people became less resentful of their own tax burden but, at the same time, showed increasing sympathy for relatively powerless groups. In policy terms, the tax revolt of the 1970s turned into the movement for tax reform in the 1980s.

Shortly before taking office in 1981, Reagan expressed concern about the "steady decline in public confidence in business" in the opinion polls, which he blamed on the growth of an "adversary relationship between the federal government and

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business" stimulated by his predecessor in the White House.[10] The President tried to carry out his ideological commitment to strengthen the private sector and weaken the federal one. Ironically, his success greatly increased faith in public institutions but did little to reduce the high level of distrust in the major nongovernmental organizations, including business. This situation is especially noteworthy since in the polls taken from the mid-1960s until Reagan's assumption of office in 1981, "anti-government and anti-business sentiment grew virtually in tandem with one another. There was no evidence during the 1970s that either institution was declining in public esteem while the other was growing."[11] Seemingly, by presiding over a striking improvement in economic conditions, which a sizeable proportion of the population credited to new or better federal policies, Ronald Reagan helped to revive trust in government but not in business.

The increased disdain for the press reported in polls taken prior to the Iran-contra crisis was not surprising, moreover, given the finding reported earlier of an inverse relationship between feelings about the press and about the presidency. As indicated in *The Confidence Gap*, the "modest but noticeable see-saw relationship between 'the executive branch' and 'the press' suggests that the public has become conscious of a kind of adversary relationship between the two."[12] The pattern continued in the post-Irangate Harris survey when, as noted, confidence in White House leadership fell sharply, while faith in the press went up from 16 to 19 percent as compared to November 1985.

Although most Americans like Ronald Reagan, and, prior to the Iran-contra crisis, gained confidence in government as a result, they had not moderated their suspicion of private power, nor had they accepted the President's views on most issues, a fact Republican leaders noted, aware of the many findings to that effect in opinion polls. In the fall of 1983, Senator Paul Laxalt, a close friend of the President and general chairman of the Republican National Committee, noted "the strange phenomenon" that most Americans expressed approval of Ronald Reagan although they opposed much of what he supports. As Laxalt pointed out, "People have deep differences with his policies. But they still have trust in him."[13] Republican Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and GOP Representative Newt Gingrich made similar comments in 1986.

Data gathered by Gallup, Harris, the CBS News/*New York Times*, the ABC News/*Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the Center for Political Studies, and NORC polls all showed much greater support for government social welfare and regulatory programs in 1986 than in 1981.[14] Prior to Irangate, Americans ap-

[10] Ronald Reagan, "Government and Business in the '80s," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 January 1981.

[11] Lipset and Schneider, *The Confidence Gap*, 163.

[12] Ibid., 55.

[13] Jack Nelson, "Despite High Popularity, Reagan Faces Tough Race," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 September 1983.

[14] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Beyond 1984: The Anomalies of American Politics," *PS* 19 (Spring 1986): 222–36. A *Washington Post*/ABC News Poll taken in mid-January 1987 found a substantial increase in the liberal trend over the previous year (see David S. Broder, "Reagan Shouldn't Even Ask if Americans Are Better Off Today," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 9 February 1987, 37).

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peared to believe that Ronald Reagan had demonstrated that government can serve the public interest with proper leadership, but they remained to be convinced that the same was true of major private institutions like business and labor.

The brittleness of faith in the way the country is functioning was clearly not eliminated by three years of good times and confident, optimistic leadership. Further evidence that all was not well may be found in poll data suggesting that the sense of alienation in the country has remained relatively high. The Harris survey uses a battery of five items to measure alienation. Employing this index of alienation, the poll found that the number of Americans who felt alienated or powerless stood at 60 percent in August 1986, up 4 points from the previous year. This figure is higher than the average level for the 1980s (58 percent) or for the 1970s (52 percent), and it is well above the 29 percent figure for 1966 and the 36 percent one at the height of the Vietnam protest era in 1969.

Overall, confidence in institutions increased between 1981 and 1986 but still lagged significantly behind the levels of the mid-1960s, when polls on the subject started. Most of the improvement was accounted for by the growth of confidence in government, while faith in business, labor, and most other private institutions had not changed much. Given these findings, there was good reason to conclude the confidence gap still existed even prior to the drop off in feelings about the presidency brought about by the Iran-contra scandal at the end of 1986.

Attitudes toward Business

Since Ronald Reagan has tried to carry out his ideological commitment to strengthen the private sector and weaken the governmental one, it is ironic that the President's success with the economy did little to reduce the high level of distrust of private power, particularly big business, which so troubled him at the start of his administration. Attitudes toward business exhibited improvements in some areas, but these were uneven and not clearly related to economic performance.

Roper has repeatedly surveyed public opinion concerning the degree of favor people exhibit toward large business corporations. In January 1981, 18 percent expressed a "highly favorable" opinion; this number dropped to 12 percent at the depths of the Reagan recession in October 1982. The rating went back up to 21 percent in May 1984, remaining at this level in January 1986. Favorability toward big business apparently reached a plateau in late 1984 and did not increase during the continuing good economic and political conditions of the next two years.

Other attitudes toward business have shown more consistency. ORC reported an overall stability in the public's attitudes concerning the power, profits, and contributions of business in three polls taken between 1981 and 1985. Agreement with the statement "The profits of large companies help make things better for everyone," stood at 39 percent in 1981, 41 in 1983, and 40 in 1985. Two decades earlier, in 1967, 67 percent agreed with the proposition that corporate profits help all Americans. Clearly there has been little tendency to return to the appreciation of big business shown in polls taken in the 1960s.

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The one item in the ORC scale that showed a change appears to have reflected actual experience. In the 1981 and 1983 ORC surveys, 53–54 percent agreed that "for the good of the country, many of our largest companies ought to be broken up into smaller companies." By 1985, the figure had dropped to 45 percent. During this period, the effects of the breakup of one very large company, AT&T, became a reality. A 1985 CRI cross section opposed deregulation of the telephone and telecommunications industry by 56 percent to 30 percent. A Harris poll taken for *Business Week* magazine asked people whether they thought it was a good idea or a bad idea for the Bell System to have been broken up. The response in February 1986 was a decisive "no" (63 to 26 percent), almost as much so as it had been in November 1984 (64 to 25 percent). Americans might have found that breaking up a monopoly could make things worse for consumers, not better.

Another indicator of public attitudes toward business may be found in reactions to government regulation. The polls suggest little increase in support for deregulation in principle during the Reagan years and a steady increase in opposition to specific actual efforts at deregulation. A Cambridge Survey Research summary of findings in 1986 notes that the polls taken during the year revealed "growing public *criticism of the deregulation of the banking and airline industries* and continuing negative feelings about the deregulation of the telecommunications industry." Basically, the mid-1980s poll data suggest that the actual deregulation measures have not impressed most Americans favorably. And when asked about the effect of such changes in general in a July 1985 CRI poll, 43 percent answered that "recent deregulation has hurt consumers," while only 32 percent felt that it had helped them. A year later, the negative responses rose slightly to 45 percent, while the proportion with a positive view remained the same.

Trends reported by Roper from 1978 to 1985 show that business improved its reputation in several areas of economic performance—prices, profits, advertising, product quality, safety and innovation (see Table 3). It appears that the recovery enhanced business's reputation for economic performance. But the ratings for social responsibility—cleaning up pollution, being good citizens, hiring minorities, or paying a fair share of taxes—had not improved; they remained low, except where it is in business's economic interest to be socially responsible. Three-quarters of those interviewed in a 1985 ORC survey agreed that "many of the problems facing our society have been neglected by business." A May 1986 CBS News/*New York Times* poll found that 56 percent of respondents gave big businesses "only fair" or "poor" marks in contributing to the well-being of the communities where their plants and factories are located. That figure was noticeably worse than the 45 percent who felt that way in an August 1980 Harris survey.

Given such views, it is not surprising that in 1985 ORC found that almost three-quarters, 73 percent, believed that "there is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation." Positive responses to this statement have hovered around the three-quarters mark since the mid-1970s, considerably higher than the 52 percent who felt this way in 1965. CRI found that the percentage saying that "business has too much say in the way the government

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TABLE 3

How Business Performs

"Now here's a list of things people have said are or should be responsibilities of business in this country . . . . For each one, tell me whether you think business fulfills its responsibilities fully, fairly well, not too well or not at all well?"

	Fully/fairly well			
	1978	1980	1982	1985
	Percentage			
Developing new products and services	88	84	89	92
Producing good-quality products and services	66	64	73	76
Making products that are safe to use	65	66	76	76
Hiring minorities	74	67	72	70
Providing jobs for people	71	68	53	71
Being good citizens of the communities in which they operate	70	69	75	70
Paying good salaries and benefits to employees	69	70	71	69
Charging reasonable prices for goods and services	33	33	39	48
Keeping profits at reasonable levels	36	36	40	46
Advertising honestly	33	37	38	41
Paying their fair share of taxes	40	42	39	39
Cleaning up their own air and water pollution	40	40	42	38

Source: Roper Organization, polls taken in December of each year.

is run" actually rose from 42 in 1980 to 48 in 1985, well above the 31 percent level reported in 1978.

Further evidence of the continued high level of antagonism to big business may be found in studies of attitudes toward the tax system. Commenting on polls taken during 1985, CRI noted, "There is a reservoir of public support for the general idea of overhauling the tax system but the main thrust is in *making business carry a greater share of taxes.* Fueling public support for higher business taxes was the widespread perception that *individual taxpayers are overtaxed and business is undertaxed.*"[15] Three-fifths of those interviewed by CRI rated the record of business in paying its share of taxes as only fair or poor. A June 1986 H&R Block tax study, conducted by the Roper Organization, found that 78 percent thought large business corporations paid too little taxes, up from 72 percent in 1978. A 1984 Yankelovich, Skelly & White survey sponsored by the Internal Revenue Service reported that 82 percent of taxpayers believed that "the present tax system benefits

[15] Cambridge Reports, Inc., *Trends and Forecasts 1985 Annual Review* (1986), 2-3. (Emphasis in original.)

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the rich and is unfair to the ordinary working man or woman." These results provide evidence of the endurance of anti-elitist sentiments among Americans, feelings that apply particularly to big business and to the wealthy.

The public has long been suspicious of the ethical practices of executives, and it continued to feel this way in the 1980s. ORC polls reported fluctuations in responses rating the ethical and moral practices of corporate executives as excellent or as good, 33 percent in 1981, 29 in 1983, 39 in 1985, and 31 in a special poll taken in July 1986. The percentages judging them as only fair or poor were 54 percent in 1981 and 53 percent in 1986. Clearly a majority continued to view corporate leaders as unethical or immoral during the Reagan era. One reason for the continuing high level of distrust lies in the frequent reports in the news media of corporate and financial scandals. These appear to reinforce the public's belief that corruption and inside dealings are prevalent. This is reflected in the wording of and responses to a CBS News/*New York Times* question posed in May 1986: "There's been a lot of news recently about individuals and corporations committing white collar crimes to make a dishonest profit for themselves and their companies. How often do you think this happens in American business—very often, occasionally, or hardly ever?" More than half, 53 percent, felt that it occurred very often. This survey also found that 60 percent evaluated big business as doing only fair or poorly in seeing that its executives behave legally and ethically. About the same response pattern was found to this question in an August 1980 Harris survey.[16]

As we judge the record, there has been a slightly positive trend in evaluations of business under Reagan; but it clearly has not been substantial, which is particularly surprising since, as we noted in *The Confidence Gap*, Americans "repeatedly acknowledge that business deserves much of the credit for the nation's high standard of living and for the steady growth in productivity that, until recently, has kept the United States in the forefront among industrial nations."[17] This judgment is reinforced by the results of three Roper polls taken during the 1980s, which indicated that support for the statement "What is good for business is good for the average person" had not increased (Table 4).

Part of the explanation for the failure of major corporations to improve in public appreciation during the economic upturn is the weakening of a major factor contributing to their past reputation, namely, the sense that business is efficient and competitive. In commenting on earlier polls, we concluded that the strongest positive evaluations for American business were for its technological and economic performance: "developing new products and services through research, improving the production process, developing new markets, and expanding growth opportunities."[18] But it is precisely in these areas that the American public, the media, and even the Reagan administration have come to see domestic business as falling

[16] See also Burns W. Roper and Thomas A. W. Miller, "Americans Take Stock of Business," *Public Opinion* 8 (August/September 1985): 14–15.

[17] Lipset and Schneider, *The Confidence Gap*, 164.

[18] Ibid.

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TABLE 4

Trust in Business

	June 1981	*June 1983*	*June 1985*
		Percentage	
"What's good for business is good for the average person."	57	61	58
"What's good for business is bad for the average person."	20	16	18
Mixed feelings (volunteered)	18	20	19
Don't know	5	3	5

Source: The Roper Poll.

behind foreign competition, particularly Japanese, and even West European.[19] Seeing American industry lose out in electronics, automobiles, photography, steel, clothing, and numerous other fields has produced a strong countereffect that has overwhelmed the positive implications of a sharp fall in unemployment and inflation.

There is evidence for this interpretation. In a January 1985 CRI poll, 71 percent reported that American business and industry did only fair or poorly in competing with foreign companies on quality and price. In the same survey, 72 percent gave negative responses in evaluating the ability of these institutions to provide leadership in improving the economy. A CBS News/*New York Times* poll taken in May 1986 found a majority, 54 percent, stating that American products "are not made as well as they used to be," whereas only 41 percent thought they are as well produced as in the past.

Trade Unions

The third major institution, trade unions, is the only one whose strength can be measured objectively. Unions are membership organizations, and, as such, gain or lose members over time. The American labor movement began to grow in the mid-1930s, when the percentage of the nonagricultural labor force who belonged to unions stood at 14.7. The figure rose to 30.4 percent by the end of World War II, and more gradually to 32.5 percent by 1953. Since then it has been declining, down to 17.5 percent in 1986.[20] While part of the loss is attributable to the fall-off

[19] During 1986, a number of high-level administration officials blamed business for "lacking American competitiveness." The *New York Times* reported: "Richard G. Darman, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, says many of the nation's major corporations are 'bloated' and 'inefficient,' Labor Secretary Bill Brock calls them 'sloppy,' and Budget Director James C. Miller 3d accuses them of flocking to 'Uncle Sugar' for protection against imports rather than dealing with their own inefficiency." Peter T. Kilborn, "Insider Scandal Stirs Ethics Debate," *New York Times*, 28 November 1986.

[20] Leo Troy, "The Rise and Fall of American Trade Unions: The Labor Movement from FDR to RR" in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century* (San Francisco: ISC Press, 1986), 81.

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in employment in traditionally unionized industries—steel, mining, automobiles, printing, and others—much of it is clearly related to a lessening of the appeal of labor organization to workers.

This decline is also evident in the increased inability of unions to win labor board certification elections, contests initiated at the request of labor organizations. Union victories dropped from 74.6 percent in 1947 to 65.6 in 1954, 60.8 in 1965, 56.1 in 1970, and then they fell below 50 percent for the first time, to 49.6 percent, in 1975. As of the last fully reported year, 1984, the percentage won by unions was 46.4. Given this record, it is not surprising that there has been a steady decline in the ability of unions to recruit enough support to apply for union representation elections in unorganized companies. There were around 3,500 such elections in 1983 and 1984, down from close to 9,000 in 1973.

Labor organizations do much worse in decertification contests, elections called in unionized companies at the request of groups of workers or employers. During the early 1980s, trade unions lost over three quarters of these contests. More damaging from a union perspective is the fact that the number of such elections per year increased from under 300 in the 1960s to around 500 in the mid-1970s and to close to 900 by the mid-1980s. The ratio of certification elections to decertification ones was roughly thirty to one in 1960; it was around twenty to one in the early 1970s; it had fallen to seven to one by 1980 and stood at four to one in 1984.

Perhaps even more troubling for the union movement is that the 1980s have witnessed an almost steady retreat in its collective bargaining strength. In industry after industry, unions have signed contracts involving concessions with respect to working conditions and wages, including, in some cases, provisions for newly hired employees that are significantly less beneficial than those received by the existing labor force.

Not surprising, then, are the poll data demonstrating that unions continued to drop in public esteem during the 1980s. They remained among the least appreciated groups in American society, regardless of whether the question refers to the reputation of union members, their organization, or their leaders. In September 1986, the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll reported that 53 percent said that "people who belong to unions" do not work as hard as "nonunion people." Only 17 percent thought the reverse was true, while 26 percent replied that there was no difference between the two groups. These responses are quite similar to those given to the same question in 1982.

Trade unions continued to fall in public regard in Opinion Research Corporation and Gallup surveys taken during the Reagan era. In the ORC polls, the percentage expressing high confidence in unions (6–7 on a seven point scale) declined from 19 in 1981 to 15 in 1985. Labor organizations placed well below the average of 33 percent high approval ratings of fourteen institutions assessed by ORC in 1985.[21] In five Gallup surveys taken between 1981 and 1986, unions usually ranked

[21] For a more comprehensive report on opinon toward trade unions, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Labor Unions in the Public Mind," in Lipset, ed., *Unions in Transition*, 287–321.

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ninth, next to the bottom of a list of ten institutions in which people felt "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. The level of confidence remained almost unchanged at 28 percent in these polls, down significantly from the 35–39 percent recorded during the Carter years.

Also, labor leaders stood lower than the heads of nine other institutions in ten polls completed between 1981 and 1986 by Harris and NORC. The two organizations varied somewhat in their estimates of the levels of confidence in business executives of major companies and labor officials, but corporate leaders stood well above union officials in each survey. In the most recent one, taken by Harris in November–December 1986, only 11 percent expressed a great deal of confidence in leaders of organized labor, down two points from the level reported a year earlier, while 16 percent had the same judgment of the heads of major companies, one percent fewer than in 1985.

Consistent with these results are the repeated findings during the 1980s that labor leaders were near the bottom in comparisons of occupational groups ranked by honesty and ethical standards (Gallup and Roper) or ethical and moral practices (ORC). Gallup's 1985 findings were the most negative for any year since he began inquiring on the subject in 1976. In July 1985, labor leaders placed next to the bottom in evaluations of twenty-five occupations. As in previous queries, car salesmen constituted the only category judged as having lower standards of honesty and ethics. Stockbrokers, realtors, building contractors, insurance salesmen, and advertising practitioners all did better than labor leaders. In the fall of the same year, the Roper Organization repeated the Gallup question, this time inquiring about seventeen occupations, and obtained almost identical findings. Car salesmen once more were the one group regarded more negatively. ORC also reported that labor leaders rank below almost all other occupational groups in judgments of their "ethical and moral practices." In comparisons of assessments taken in 1981, 1983, and 1985, ORC found that, on average, about a quarter of those polled evaluated the ethical practices of labor leaders as poor, another two-fifths said fair, a fifth marked them as good, while only 3 percent said they were excellent. None of the eighteen other groups tested received such low ratings, as can be seen in Table 5.

The picture for labor becomes even worse when viewed over the length of the Reagan era. The proportion of those interviewed by ORC evaluating the ethical and moral practices of labor leaders as only fair or poor moved up from 59 percent in 1981 to 65 in 1985, while those with similarly negative views of corporate executives fell from 54 to 47 percent. As with the confidence ratings, judgments about the ethics of public officeholders, from the president through members of Congress and federal and state officials, improved more than others. Thus, the growth in public confidence affected government most of all, business somewhat, and labor not at all.

Despite a very low level of confidence in organized labor and strong criticism of its operational practices, the majority of Americans continue to approve of unions in general terms and to believe that unions are essential, that they do more

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TABLE 5

Ratings of Occupational Groups on Ethical and Moral Practices

"How would you rate the ethical and moral practices of [specific category] (1) Excellent, (2) Good, (3) Only Fair, (4) Poor, (5) No Opinion?"

	Excellent or Good			Only Fair or Poor		
	1981	1983	1985	1981	1983	1985
Categories	Percentage					
Labor union leaders	23	21	23	59	65	65
Average workers	72	72	74	27	24	25
Small business proprietors	75	68	76	23	25	21
Corporate executives	33	29	39	54	51	47
Corporate board members	28	27	35	58	54	51
Stockbrokers	31	34	34	45	41	43
Bankers	56	49	57	39	41	35
Advertising executives	31	35	38	59	48	50
Lawyers	45	44	43	52	50	53
Physicians	75	70	76	24	25	23
College professors	60	66	69	27	20	20
Scientists	69	64	75	20	19	14
Media news reporters	57	58	51	41	38	47
The President	53	48	65	44	46	32
Supreme Court	56	49	57	39	41	35
Military leaders	55	47	48	38	42	42
U.S. senators & representatives	36	33	42	60	52	52
Federal government officials	23	25	33	72	65	60
State & local govt. officials	31	31	37	66	59	57
Average	48	46	51	45	42	41

Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

good than harm, and that without unions, employers would mistreat workers.[22] The polls vary somewhat in their estimates of trends. The Gallup poll, which reported an all time low level of approval of trade unions in 1981—55 percent approving, 35 percent disapproving—then noted an upswing when it asked the question again in 1985, 58 percent to 27 percent. But CRI, which put the issue in terms of how favorable or unfavorable respondents felt toward organized labor, found that favorability fell from 49 to 45 percent between 1984 and 1985, while unfavorability rose from 45 to 49 percent. In 1984, Harris repeated an assessment made in 1975, soliciting reactions made to the statement, "Big unions serve as a check on the power of big business." He found that positive versus negative reactions had changed from 66 percent to 20 percent agreement to 61 to 29 percent a decade later. ORC findings also suggested declining general support. In 1982, less than a third, 31 percent, agreed with the statement, "Overall, unions in this country

[22] For detailed documentation, see ibid., 299–302.

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are no longer necessary to protect the interests and well-being of the average worker." By 1986, the percentage voicing agreement had risen to over two-fifths, 42 percent.

More troubling, perhaps, to trade union supporters is the fact that in spite of the decline in the inflation rate and the contracts unions signed giving back earlier gains, the majority supporting corporate resistance to union demands did not diminish. When cross sections were asked by ORC to react to the statement, "Employers should start taking a harder line with unions than they have in the past," the proportions agreeing remained constant, 58 percent in 1982 and 57 four years later. Even most blue collar workers agreed, 52 to 42 percent early in 1986. Not surprisingly, given these results, in a survey taken in September 1986 the ABC News/*Washington Post* polling organization found that a majority of Americans felt that the decline in union membership density was a good thing. It posed the question: "In the past 20 years, there has been a large reduction in the percentage of the work force that belongs to a union. Do you think this is good for the country or not?" Over half, 53 percent, replied the fall-off is good; 40 percent said it is not good.

Clearly, labor unions did not benefit from the overall improvement in the national morale or the increase in confidence in governmental institutions that occurred prior to the Iran-contra affair. The relatively prosperous economy of the mid-1980s did not lead Americans to think better of major private institutions, large corporations, or the trade union movement. Since the latter is dependent on membership for strength, these results do not bode well for efforts to reverse the decline. Richard Freeman, a sympathetic student of organized labor, estimates that unless current trends are reversed by "the year 2000 unions will represent only 13 percent of all non-farm workers."[23] And nothing suggests that the negative feelings about organized labor reported here are changing.

Improvement, Yes—Recovery, No

The first edition of our detailed report, *The Confidence Gap*, was published in spring 1983, which happens to have been exactly the point at which the confidence gap seems to have bottomed out. In early 1983, the unemployment rate, having peaked at over 10 percent in the country's most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression, began to reverse direction. Even more dramatic was the fact that the inflation rate reached zero for the first time in thirty years. Only then did Americans start to believe that the country was on the road to recovery. Approval of President Reagan and his leadership began to surge, a trend that culminated in the President's forty-nine-state reelection victory on 6 November 1984.

As was widely noted at the time, however, the President's coattails were rather short. The reelection was a personal triumph for Ronald Reagan, but he managed to bring in a net gain for his party of only fourteen seats in the House of Represen-

[23] Quoted in John Hoerr, "Beyond Unions: A Revolution in Employee Rights in the Making," *Business Week*, 8 July 1985, 12.

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tatives, and the Democrats continued to control that branch; in the Senate, the Republicans actually suffered a net loss of two seats. In spite of an extensive campaign by the President in 1986 on behalf of GOP candidates, the Republicans suffered a much greater defeat in the Senate. These failures reflected public insecurity about the economic recovery—thin, uneven, and tenuous. The huge federal budget and foreign trade deficits made ordinary citizens as well as economists skeptical about the fundamental health of the nation's economy, a skepticism that the polls reported had increased sharply by the 1986 midterm elections. And in many parts of the country—notably the primary producing areas of the heartland, manufacturing, agriculture, and energy—the economic recovery was either short-lived or nonexistent.

The confidence gap followed this same pattern. Things definitely improved, but as of the mid-1980s, there was far from a complete or convincing recovery. The increase in public trust was concentrated in the person of President Reagan and, more broadly, in the institutions of government. The country's eagerness to see a president succeed was understandable. The United States had experienced four troubled presidencies in a row. The previous two decades had been marked by an unrelenting sequence of crises—assassination, racial and social conflict, foreign policy disaster, political scandal, and economic disruption.

The public turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s in many ways resembled the crises of the 1930s and 1940s, with one major difference. The New Deal and World War II entailed triumphant assertions of federal power. They demonstrated that, given the right leadership and a sense of collective purpose, government could be made to work. And so Americans came out of those decades with a sense of renewed confidence in institutions over all and in government specifically. Vietnam, Watergate, the energy crisis, recession, and hyperinflation demonstrated just the opposite point: our institutions generally, and the federal government in particular, had failed to perform. The result, as documented in our studies, was a collapse of confidence in those running our institutions.

We argued that confidence in institutions was mostly a response to events, a reaction to the way things seemed to be going in the country. Good times or, more precisely, good news leads to renewed confidence. That is exactly what happened during the 1983–1986 period. The result was a marked improvement in political trust. Nevertheless, the improvement was limited mostly to government, and even in that case we did not come near recovering the level of political trust that had prevailed in the early 1960s. Why was the recovery of confidence so limited?

In the first place, the "boom" did not last very long. Our prediction was that an *extended* period of good news would be required to reverse the confidence gap. The economic recovery of the mid-1980s did last longer than most, and there were no major political scandals or foreign policy setbacks to counteract it. Still, as of 1986 there had not been enough time to reverse a twenty-year downturn in public trust. And already by 1986 the economic recovery had begun to stall as the trade and budget deficits continued to worsen. Subsequent public exposés of White House deceit in supplying arms to Iran and sending monies to the Nicaraguan contras are likely to send the confidence ratings of governmental institutions down again.

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Our earlier analysis also pointed to a ripple effect: the decline of confidence first affected government, the most central institution in society, and then spread gradually to more peripheral institutions like business, labor, religion, education, and science.[24] This same disjuncture can be detected in the pattern of improvement. The public sector enjoyed the most pronounced recovery, with the President, the core of the institution, doing the best of all. Prior to the Iran-contra scandal, Reagan's personal popularity remained very high during the early years of his second term. In effect, the President served as a kind of public relations man for government, demonstrating, like Franklin D. Roosevelt before him, that the federal government responds well to proper leadership. It may be counted as a major unintended consequence of President Reagan's leadership that until the Iranian arms scandal he managed to restore the American public's faith in government as an agent of change.

The ripple effect, however, was barely discernible for institutions outside of government. In *The Confidence Gap* we argued that the news media are primarily responsible for conveying to the public an impression of how the nation's institutions are performing. Until the last two months of 1986, the news about government was good. President Reagan's success in achieving his policy objectives overcame efforts by the press to criticize the administration and discredit its accomplishments—which, of course, is what the press tries to do to every administration. On the other hand, no one seemed to be saying that business and labor were doing especially well, and there was no "Reagan figure" to stimulate faith in the private sector. (Chrysler Corporation Chairman Lee Iacocca came closest, perhaps, but he promoted a view that was often critical of other corporate leaders.) The public appeared to be impressed more often with news of business fraud and the fact that American business could no longer stand up to foreign competition; that organized labor still bore the burden of public scandals, stemming in particular from the officers of the most powerful union, the Teamsters; that military spending was beset with waste and corruption; that drug abuse and pornography were undermining the nation's moral standards; and that medicine could not cope with epidemics of sexually-transmitted diseases.

When the economic news was good, as between 1983 and 1987, much continued to be reported that reinforced the anxieties many Americans had about their institutions. Meg Greenfield, serving on a committee for the 1985 Pulitzer Prize press awards, noted that the hundreds of stories she read from every part of the country focused on bad news, "the maltreatment of the powerless, the corruption of the establishment, the feebleness and decay of institutions. The world according to journalism is a surprisingly bleak place."[25] Greenfield rejected, as we did in our earlier analysis of media influence, the assumption that this emphasis is largely a reflection of a liberal press bias. She stressed the desire of journalists to find exposés, to get the story behind the official report. There is a story in reporting

[24] Jack Citrin and Ronald Philip Green, "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (October 1986): 432.

[25] Meg Greenfield, "Why We're Still Muckraking," *Newsweek*, 25 March 1985, 94.

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the "failure of . . . institutions"; the version that reports successes is viewed as public relations.

We have argued that the confidence gap never amounted to a full-scale legitimacy crisis. Americans retained their faith in the country's basic institutional order. The poll findings always showed a deep-seated allegiance to the values of democracy and free enterprise. The resurgence of patriotism in the mid-1980s is, therefore, not surprising. Patriotism never disappeared or even substantially weakened. What emerged in the post-recession, pre-Irangate, Reagan years was the *occasion* for expressing national pride and a leader who expressed it very effectively. The theme, "It's morning in America," worked very well for Ronald Reagan in his 1984 reelection campaign. It would have rung very false, however, during the dark days in 1982, just as Hubert Humphrey's "politics of joy" seemed totally out of place under the conditions that prevailed in 1968. It may sound a very hollow note in Reagan's last two years in office, unless he can overcome the belief of a goodly majority expressed in different polls that he lied to the American people about Iran.

Finally, it should be noted that the "Reagan Revolution" itself was a product of the confidence gap. We have shown that the revolt against government, beginning with the tax revolt of 1978, was essentially populist rather than ideological. The survey findings from the late 1970s on do not reveal any significant shift to the right in the American electorate's ideological views or policy preferences. There is evidence, however, of a populist reaction against big government resulting from the great inflation of the 1970s.

Beginning with the tax revolt, Americans rebelled against the excesses and abuses of government power—overspending, waste, and fraud. There was never much support for dismantling the welfare state, however, and that is not what Ronald Reagan was elected to do. The same argument applies to the assumptions underlying the 1986 tax reform act. The public wanted to curb the abusive influence of special interests, but the opinion polls indicate little sentiment for reducing progressive taxation or eliminating the use of taxation as an instrument of social policy. Reviewing the evidence from the opinion polls at the end of 1986, historian Robert S. McElvaine also emphasized the irony that prior to the unfolding of the Iran-contra scandal in the last two months of the year, "Ronald Reagan's anti-government program restored the people's faith in government. In the spring of 1986, the President's pollster, Richard Wirthlin, found that Americans once again have faith that our public institutions can cope with problems."[26]

While the antigovernment revolution appeared to have run its course prior to Irangate, the confidence gap had not closed. Americans remained dissatisfied with the performance of their leaders in the powerful nongovernmental institutions. It seemed increasingly likely that the populist energy that fueled President Reagan's assault on government was about to be turned against concentrations of private

[26] Robert S. McElvaine, "Why the Debacle Shouldn't Hearten Liberals," *New York Times*, 9 December 1986. The London *Economist* has also emphasized that "the man who had made a career out of attacking government had done more than anyone else to restore faith in it," 3 January 1987, 19.

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power. With the renewed confidence in the public sector, the continuing confidence gap could easily give rise to an era of progressive policies aimed at reforming the structure of private power in the United States. The drastic downswing in the President's popularity resulting from the Iran-contra crisis may appear to increase this possibility, since it improves the chances that liberal Democrats will sweep the 1988 elections. On the other hand, as McElvaine noted in commenting on the latest fiasco, there is a good possibility that "the public's realization that there is another gang that can't shoot straight in the White House may once more undermine confidence in the federal government."[27] During the last three weeks of November, according to Harris, the percentage who rated Ronald Reagan excellent or pretty good "on inspiring confidence in the White House" fell from 66 to 48; it declined further to 34 percent in January 1987. *The New York Times*/CBS News, *Los Angeles Times*, and Gallup polls reported almost identical results in the President's approval rating, a decline from the mid-60s to the high 40s. Those who responded favorably to the 1986 Gallup question on feeling about "the way things are going in the U.S. at this time" (reported in Figure 1) dropped from 69 percent in mid-summer to 47 percent the first week in December. In mid-January 1987, the *Washington Post*/ABC News Poll reported that a "56–39 percent majority said things 'have gotten pretty seriously off on the wrong track,' rather than 'generally going in the right direction'—the worst measure on that basic question since October 1982."[28] Like Watergate, the scandal may result in the election of another populist outsider opposed to big government, big business, and big labor, although the record of outsiders Carter and Reagan may counteract such efforts and help a congressional candidate. There seems to be no end to the series of events that create and sustain the confidence gap.

[27] McElvaine, "Why the Debacle."
[28] Broder "Reagan Shouldn't Even Ask," 37.

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Campaign Money and the Press: Three Soundings

FRANK J. SORAUF

Bias in the media is one of those issues that won't go away. It may not be as flashy or current an issue as it was when A. J. Liebling was writing his celebrated pieces on "The Wayward Press" for *The New Yorker*,[1] but it still pops up regularly and frequently, at least in part because of the ever replenished supply of grievances and aggrieved that the media seem to generate. Its persistence owes, too, to the importance of the issue underlying it: a fully informed citizenry in a democracy.

When the public information in question is unusually complex or arcane, the issue of bias surfaces even more frequently. Extensive reporting on campaign finance is actually fairly new, dating generally from national and state legislation in the 1970s requiring full reporting of the flow of money in campaigns. The resulting coverage of money in politics has offended, even outraged, some candidates and contributors. The burden of their charge is direct and clear: the media display a deep and pervasive bias against the solicitation and contribution of campaign contributions, and their reporting more generally overstates the importance of campaign money in campaigns, in election outcomes, and in eventual legislation.[2]

[1] A. J. Liebling was not the first to write under the *New Yorker*'s rubric of "The Wayward Press," but he was the most productive of the contributors. Many of his reports from that magazine have been collected; see *The Wayward Pressman* (New York: Doubleday, 1948); *Mink and Red Herring* (New York: Doubleday, 1949); and *The Press* (New York: Ballentine, rev. ed., 1964).

[2] The best known critic in the PAC movement is Richard A. Armstrong, president of the Public Affairs Council. One of his most celebrated feuds, that with CBS's "Sixty Minutes," has been set on

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As Liebling and "The Wayward Press" showed us, there is no end to the supply of anecdotes about the failings of American journalism with which to trigger outrage or amusement. But pleasures and diversions aside, the problem is really one of approaching media coverage of public life somewhat more systematically. If there is bias, is it general and pervasive? What are its sources, and what is the mechanism by which it affects the images of reality the media transmit? Above all, what are its immediate consequences? In what way, that is, does it color or shape the image of political reality?

"Bias" is, however, a word with too many meanings and resonances. In effect it suggests a single explanation—one of conscious, even willful preference—for a range of instances in which the message misinterprets or misconveys the reality. But very few observers of the reporting of campaign finance would argue that these conventional kinds of biases—those of ideology or partisanship, for instance—are operating here. There is no singling out of Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives. All political action committees (PACs) and all campaign contributing and spending tend to be treated more or less alike. Rather one has to look to more intrinsic and ingrained forms of bias, especially to the "structural biases" of American newspapers and the "political assumptions" of their reporters, editors, and headline-writers.

Structural biases. These are the biases rooted in the very nature of newspaper journalism—in the professional norms of its practitioners, in the imperatives of the newspaper's marketplace, and in the demands of communicating impressions of a complicated world to an unsophisticated mass audience. Thus stories ought (if they are to be read) to have identifiable actors, understandable activity, and, if at all possible, elements of conflict or even threat or menace. They cannot be very long, and they must avoid excessive complexity, both of structure or argument and of language. Any statistics beyond a few dollar totals and a percentage or two are generally out of the question. Those characteristics, among others, define the "good" news story, the one that readers will read and understand.

Political assumptions. All observers bring a fundamental understanding, a "cognitive map," to American politics. For some Americans it may be as simple as "all politicians are crooks," but for others it involves a complicated understanding about the distribution of political power and influence in American society. As both Austin Ranney and Herbert Gans have pointed out, the mass media in the United States widely reflect a view of politics and the political system that is "a revised and updated version of the 'progressive' outlook that dominated American politics from the 1890s to the 1920s."[3] As Ranney explains:

> Progressive journalists and political activists believed that the decent core of America consists of the ordinary good citizens who genuinely seek what is good for the general

the public record in his article, "Give PAC Proponents a Hearing," *Campaigns and Elections* 5 (Fall 1984): 44–48.

[3] Austin Ranney, *Channels of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 52; see also Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Vintage, 1980).

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> welfare. The great enemies of society are the big political machines, the business "trusts," and the other special interests that try to advance their selfish goals at the public's expense by buying elections and corrupting public officials.
>
> The way to save America, the progressives proclaimed, is to reform our political system: First, let the muckraking press dig up and publish all the sordid facts about the greed and lawlessness of the special interests so that honest citizens will know the full extent of the evil they do. . . . Finally, when the system is thus reformed and purified, it will no longer be the tool of the special interests but will become what it was meant to be: the people's instrument for promoting the general welfare.[4]

In short, the media bring a particular understanding to the events and relationships in American politics and to the ways of influence and decision making in American government. Their political world-view, moreover, colors the way they view and describe political reality. It also defines the political responsibility of the press in reporting that reality; contemporary investigative reporters are in many ways the grandchildren of the Progressive muckrackers.

What little survey data we have on the attitudes and outlooks of journalists support these observations. A 1979–1980 survey of "media elites" (240 journalists and broadcasters at "the most influential media outlets") provides systematic evidence of these persistent Progressive values. Their perceptions of the relative influence of seven groups in contemporary America identified two clusters of groups: three very influential (business, the media, and unions, in that order) and four "relatively disadvantaged" (consumer groups, intellectuals, blacks, and feminists). When the respondents were asked what pattern or distribution of influence they would prefer, the ranking was quite different. They

> would strip both business and labor of their current perceived power, while raising the status of all the other groups. In the media's preferred social hierarchy, business leaders fall from first to fifth position, and unions drop to the very bottom of the ladder. Feminists would move up only slightly, but blacks, intellectuals, and consumer groups would all have more influence than either business or labor.[5]

Very few aspects of the American political process reinforce the Progressive world-view as effectively as the American way of campaign finance. Its cash is an easy measure of influence, and its PACs are perfect embodiments of the special, vested, or selfish interests. (It is indeed usual for newspapers to define PACs as "special interest groups.") If one makes the simple assumption that public officials defer to their campaign contributors more easily than they do to their party, their own values, or their voting constituency, one has the perfect scenario for the triumph of the wealthy special interests over the will of electoral majorities and the general or public interest.

[4] Ibid., 53.

[5] S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman, "Media and Business Elites," *Public Opinion* 4 (October-November 1981): 59–60.

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Systematic bias and political assumption, finally, meet in an analytical conundrum. The systematic bias of newspaper publishing dictates that newspapers print stories that their readers want to read. But then does the press publish the story because readers have been conditioned by previous reporting to accept and believe such accounts, or does it publish the story because of its conviction that it represents political truth and reality. And is there in fact really any difference? Ultimately the Progressive view of reality becomes a part of—or is at the very least reinforced by—the imperatives of publishing a newspaper.

With that as analytical background, I propose to examine the way in which America's three elite newspapers covered three recent stories on American campaign finance. To be sure, the stories have not been chosen at random, but rather for their importance and the good test they provide of the alleged biases of the press. The three newspapers (the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Washington Post*) have not been chosen at random either. They are by general consensus the three best and most influential general daily newspapers in the United States. Moreover, their stories appear in many other daily papers. And both because of their status and the availability of indexes to them, they are the newspapers of record in the United States these days. Their reporting of American political events is also among the best funded in American newspaper journalism. A test of them is, therefore, the fairest test of newspaper performance with the widest impact.

The Case of Section 9012(f)

When the Congress rewrote the statutes regulating campaign finance in the aftermath of Watergate, it constructed a set of limits on both political contributions and political expenditures.[6] In the great test case of 1976, *Buckley v. Valeo*,[7] the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the former—the limits on the contributions individuals, PACs, and party committees make to candidates and parties—while it held the limits on expenditures to be unconstitutional burdens on First Amendment freedoms of political speech and association. Suddenly removed from that web of regulation, thus, were the limits on how much candidates' campaigns could spend, how much candidates could spend on their own campaigns, and how much individuals and PACs could spend independently—that is, without the cooperation or knowledge of a party or candidate—to urge the election or defeat of candidates.

Left unexamined—at least in the hundreds of pages the justices wrote in *Buckley*—was an obscure clause on the public funding of the presidential campaigns after the conventions. Congress had provided that in the event a candidate chose public funding and invoked spending limits on himself, individuals and PACs

[6] Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Public Law 92-225, 7 February 1972; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Public Law 94-443, 15 October 1974.

[7] *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

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would be limited to $1,000 worth of independent expenditures to urge his election or defeat.[8] That part of the statute, section 9012(f), was clearly intended by the Congress as a way of closing off an alternate avenue of spending in the event the main route—that of direct spending by presidential candidate—was limited.

Even though the Court was silent on 9012(f) in *Buckley*, most observers concluded that it could not survive in light of the Court's explicit invalidation of limits on independent expenditures in congressional elections. While there were differences between the two clauses—one in the context of private funding, the other in public funding—the First Amendment argument that applied to one seemed to apply to the other. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), however, was not persuaded; it took the position that no part of any statute of the Congress can be assumed to be unconstitutional until the Supreme Court explicitly says it is. It had not attempted to enforce the clause in 1976, but as the 1980 campaigns approached, it announced its intention to do so. And so began a puzzling sequence of litigation.

The FEC's announcement galvanized a number of PACs organized with the single purpose of spending independently in support of the Reagan candidacy. One of them, Americans for Change, sought a declaratory judgment in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. A three-judge panel of that court, following the *Buckley* precedent, held in September 1980 that the clause was unconstitutional. That decision prevented the FEC from enforcing it in the 1980 election, but the commission appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. In January 1982 the Court surprised virtually all onlookers by deadlocking 4-4 on the case, *Common Cause v. Schmitt*. In a few terse words it divulged only the deadlock (without revealing names), the nonparticipation of Justice O'Connor, and the consequent affirmation of the decision below.[9] The 4 to 4 division gave rise, of course, to speculation that some justices were rethinking the *Buckley* precedents.

Undeterred, the FEC pressed forward, refusing again to accept the unconstitutionality of the section without explicit word from the Supreme Court. In June 1983 it brought suit against two PACs with plans to spend independently in the 1984 presidential elections—the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and the Fund for a Conservative Majority—seeking a declaration that 9012(f) was constitutional. Again a three-judge panel held the section invalid, once again forestalling its enforcement in a presidential election. In March 1985 the Supreme Court held section 9012(f) unconstitutional on the same grounds it had nine years earlier used to void the limits on independent spending in congressional campaigns.[10]

So, what had appeared to be a rethinking of the *Buckley* position turned out merely to be a restatement of it. Moreover, the decision altered nothing of the status

[8] The citation to the statutes on the funding of presidential campaigns is 26 U.S.C. sec. 9001 *et seq.*

[9] *Common Cause v. Schmitt*, 512 F. Supp. 489 (1980) and 455 U.S. 129 (1982). It is widely thought that Justice O'Connor recused herself in the case because of her husband's activity in a PAC spending on behalf of the Reagan candidacy in 1980.

[10] *FEC v. NCPAC*, 578 F. Supp. 797 (1983) and 105 S.Ct. 1459 (1985).

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quo in American campaign finance, since the statutory clause in question had never been in force in three presidential campaigns. But one would scarcely have thought so from the reporting in the country's print and broadcast media.

To begin, all three television networks carried reports of the decision on their prime-time evening news shows. Most of the major newspapers of the country not only carried reports of the decision, but displayed them prominently. On 19 March 1985, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* all gave the story front-page coverage. The media saw the decision as major news, but why? Because it represented an opportunity lost to curb campaign spending? Or because it vibrated with popular fears about money in politics, especially organized money? One gets some clue by looking at the coverage.

All three networks and all three papers made the story a PAC story. The newspaper headlines provide an ample illustration. The two headline banks on the front page of the *Los Angeles Times* read: "Court Voids Curbs on PAC Spending; Two Conservative Groups Win Ruling Allowing Unlimited Political Outlays." The same page of the *New York Times* also featured two heads: "Court Voids Limit on PAC's Spending; $1,000 Ceiling in Presidential Race Ruled Curb on Speech." One headline did the job on the first page of the *Washington Post*: "Court Bars Limit on Spending by PACs in Presidential Race." The decision to feature PACs, of course, involved no license; while individuals and groups other than PACs may spend independently, PACs do in fact make more than 90 percent of all independent expenditures. Nonetheless, the selection of the PAC emphasis suggests why the story deserved the front-page play it got.[11]

Even in the elite news sources there was a good deal of error or, at the most charitable, misimpression. The three headlines quoted above provide one illustration—the fall from grace of a headline writer at the *Los Angeles Times*. Its front-page headlines certainly suggested that all limits on PAC money had been struck down ("Unlimited Political Outlays"). The *New York Times* and the *Post*, on the other hand, did make clear the far more limited scope of the decision. Among the television networks, there too was one fall from grace. CBS and ABC had things in order, but on the NBC nightly news Tom Brokaw struck far off target:

> In this country, PACs are political action committees, and they were organized to end the practice of individuals giving huge amounts of money, sometimes millions of dollars, to presidential campaigns. Under current law, PACs are limited to contributions to individual campaigns of $1,000, but today the Supreme Court ruled that is a violation of free speech. Now the PACs can give as much money as they want to campaigns.[12]

None of those three sentences, of course, is even remotely true.

If one of the country's best daily newspapers failed the accuracy test, one can imagine the troubles other papers had. Reports of wildly inaccurate coverage were common. The problems of the *Washington Times* cannot have gone unnoticed in that city. Its 19 March headline read: "Court voids limit on PAC donations";

[11] All three newspaper stories appeared on 19 March 1985.

[12] Quoted in Larry Sabato, "PAC ruling misunderstood," *Baltimore Sun*, 24 March 1985.

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and its story missed both the distinction between contributions and independent spending and the fact that presidential candidates accepting public funds cannot accept private contributions. In response, the Federal Election Commission and Common Cause were led to take heroic measures to counteract the mistaken reporting. On 21 March 1985, the FEC's press office issued a "Memo to Editors, News Directors, Reporters," saying that it had received "many calls" about the Court's decision, noting "several" incorrect reports of the decision, and making two chief points: that contributions to presidential candidates accepting public funding are still prohibited, and that all contribution limits in congressional races remain in force. Then on 29 March, Common Cause issued a press advisory to attempt the same task of clarification in ways very similar to the FEC press release.

The point here is not to berate the media, especially its all-purpose headline writers, for falling into the traps that ensnare anyone not fully initiated into the mysteries of American campaign finance. The importance of their errors rests in the nature, especially the direction, of the error. In the instances here and in those instances to which the FEC and Common Cause were responding, the direction of the error was toward bigger money and unbridled spending in campaigns—it was to magnify the scope of the decision and thus the scope of its permissive consequences. And since the reporting had been in all cases in terms of PACs (rather than, say, the phenomenon of independent spending itself), the message was clear: the specter of unlimited PAC influence loomed very large. In short, the direction of the errors was exactly the one of the Progressive world view.

When Good News Is No News

March 1985 was also the month in which final spending totals for the 1984 congressional elections began to emerge, and with them the second story of interest here. Common Cause, the self-styled "people's lobby," issued its unofficial but largely accurate totals in that month. (The Federal Election Commission began to issue its official data on the 1983–1984 totals in May). Embedded in all of the data was unmistakable evidence of what many scholars considered one of the big stories of campaign finance in 1983–1984: the leveling off of the growth in sums of money spent in congressional campaigns.

The period from 1976 through 1982 was one of astounding growth in the cost of campaigning. The expenditures of congressional candidates in the general election, for instance, increased by 194 percent from 1976 to 1982—from $99,012,705 to $291,015,308.[13] Well before the 1984 elections, however, it was clear that the curves of getting and spending had turned down. In fact, the *Los Angeles Times* reported the emerging trend on page 24 of its edition of 27 October 1984 under the headline "Money for House Candidates Levels Off." The article relied on data compiled by Common Cause from reports to the FEC for the first twenty-one

[13] These data and all other data not noted are from the official reports of the Federal Election Commission.

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months of the 1983–1984 election cycle. The opening paragraphs of the story, written by Paul Houston, are worth quoting:

> After years of astronomical growth, money given to House candidates for this election has dramatically levelled off from the last one, according to the latest financial reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.
>
> Not only have overall contributions flattened out after quadrupling in the last decade, the reports showed, but the previously enormous growth of contributions by political action committees (PACs) has come to a halt.
>
> "I'm stunned. This is a remarkable, sharp break in the historic pattern," Michael J. Malbin, a campaign finance scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, said in an interview Friday.
>
> However, the surprising new House trend contrasts sharply with the Senate, where contributions to candidates continue to soar. Malbin attributed much of the difference to the large number of hot Senate races and the small number of competitive House contests this year.

In the remaining paragraphs of the story Houston and Malbin speculated on the reasons for the shift in trend and addressed more fully the slowed growth of PAC contributions to candidates.

Early predictions about 1984 campaign spending proved very accurate. Depending on what one measured, spending in House campaigns either dropped a bit or rose a bit (Table 1). More important, any growth was well below the 7.6 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index from 1982 to 1984 and certainly a very sharp break with the steep curve of climbing expenditures between 1976 and 1982. Expenditures in races for the Senate, on the other hand, continued their climb, although at a considerably reduced rate of increase.

The tale of how these stories were and were *not* told begins again—with one exception—in mid-March 1985, when Common Cause brought out the first set of complete data on campaign spending in the 1983–1984 election cycle. Using well-organized volunteer workers, it had mined the reports at the Federal Election Commission and beat the FEC to publication. (The obligation to provide a far greater range of data and to achieve the greatest degree of accuracy for the historical record inevitably slows the data publishers of the FEC.) In reaching the media first, Common Cause was especially free to put its own twist on the interpretation of the data. Its first press release, dated 14 March 1985, dealt exclusively with spending by candidates for the Senate. The first sentence sounded the theme of growth: "The 65 Senate candidates in the November general election raised a total of $145,804,755 from January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1984—26 percent more than the $115,716,696 total raised by the 66 Senate general election candidates in 1982." In the nine pages of the release there was no mention of spending on campaigns for the House.

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TABLE 1

Campaign Spending for House and Senate Candidates, 1982 and 1984

	1982	% Change from '80	1984	% Change from '82
House: $$ Spent by: (*)				
All candidates	$205.4m	+50.1	$205.1m	−0.1
Cands. in Gen. Election	176.3m	+49.9	179.0m	+1.5
Senate: $$ Spent by: (*)				
All Candidates	140.0m	+34.2	170.6m	+21.9
Cands. in Gen. Election	114.7m	+50.1	143.7m	+25.3

(*) "All candidates" includes the reported spending of all primary and general election candidates in the two years of the election cycle; the spending of the candidates in the general election includes the spending for the full two years of the cycle of all candidates appearing on the general election ballot.

That morning's *Washington Post* reflected the Common Cause agenda almost perfectly. In a piece by-lined by George Lardner Jr., the *Post* dealt only with the Senate. Its headline proclaimed "1984 Senate Candidates Raised $145 Million," and then, "Common Cause Says Spending up 21%." The first two paragraphs reported:

> Senate candidates in November's election raised a record $145.8 million, a 26 percent increase from 1982, Common Cause reported yesterday.
>
> A study by the self-styled citizens lobby showed that spending by the 65 Senate candidates in the general election was $136.9 million, 21 percent more than two years earlier.

The remainder of the piece also included doleful comments by Common Cause's president, Fred Wertheimer, and descriptions of the most expensive Senate races. Nowhere was there any reference to the House campaigns.

Common Cause dropped the other shoe—its report on House campaigns—about a month later with a release dated 12 April 1985. The first sentence was again the key: "Incumbents running for re-election to the House of Representatives in 1984 raised a total of $133,114,287 for their campaigns, with a record 44 percent ($58,093,104) coming from political action committees (PACs), according to a Common Cause campaign finance study released today." The emphasis again was on growth and new records of lavishness in fundraising. It was not until midway on page 3 of the release that Common Cause revealed the decline in "average spending" by House candidates. "Several factors contributed to the decline in spending": fewer open-seat races, more unopposed candidates, and fewer close races than in 1982.

The *Post* again responded with same-day coverage, but this time without Common Cause's twist. The headlines proclaimed the downturn in House spending: "House Election Outlays Down" and "1984 Reversal First in Memory; Fund-Raising Rate Slows." The article, again by George Lardner Jr., began:

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> Spending for House election campaigns was lower in 1984 than in 1982—the first time in memory such a decline has occurred. In addition, fund-raising by congressional candidates last year slowed dramatically, barely outpacing inflation.
>
> The seeming leveling-off comes after a string of elections in which House campaign receipts jumped enormously, by as much as 48 percent. Experts yesterday offered a number of explanations for the drop—such as more incumbents seeking reelection and fewer closely contested races than in 1982—but some contended that the change was too sharp to understand without closer study.

The remaining sixteen inches of the story attributed the data to Common Cause and quoted the Common Cause explanations: fewer open-seat races, absence of close races, and uncontested races. But the *Post* story extensively quoted scholar Thomas Skladony of the American Enterprise Institute for a different view. The declining rate of increase in campaign expenditures was too "dramatic," he observed, not to have explanations beyond those of Common Cause, speculating that perhaps the party role in campaigning was also increasing. In any event, Skladony added, the "arms race may be over."

The Federal Election Commission's data and news releases appeared in the next month: 16 and 19 May 1985. The first release presented the overview of the 1983–84 campaigns, the second focused on PAC activity in the campaigns. In its page-and-a-half (legal size) summary, the FEC press office selected six points for emphasis, each highlighted with an asterisk and bold type. The first three bear on this story:

* Total spending in Congressional races rose only 9.3% over 1982 levels.
* Spending in Senate races increased 23.1% over spending in 1982.
* By contrast, spending for House races decreased by .2%.

Each point was followed by a short explanatory paragraph. The release then concluded with ten large-page sides of detailed data.

The *Washington Post* reported the FEC release on 16 May without byline and under its rubic "The Federal Triangle," a conglomerate heading reserved for administrative agency news. It appeared under the headline "Hill Candidates' Spending Hits $374 Million," a headline much more in the spirit of the Common Cause releases. But while the heading sounded the theme of expanding campaign money, the body of the story reported the FEC points:

> Senate and House candidates spent $374 million during the 1983–84 election cycle, a 9.3 percent jump over the previous election but considerably less of an increase than in the past, the Federal Election Commission reported yesterday.
>
> By comparison, spending jumped 43 percent from 1980 to 1982 and 23 percent from 1978 to 1980.
>
> The report showed that while the cost of winning the average Senate seat went up in 1984, the cost of winning the average House seat fell. Total spending in Senate races increased 23.1 percent in 1982, while spending in House races decreased .2 percent.[14]

[14] In the original story the name of the Federal Election Commission appeared in boldface.

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The remainder of the story repeated FEC speculation about the reasons for the drop in House campaign costs, ending again with details about a few of the more expensive Senate races. Two final comments on the story should be noted. It quoted no authorities or observers other than the FEC release. Second, the reporter or rewrite person at the *Post* misinterpreted the data on the winners. Contra the first sentence of the third paragraph, the average cost of *winning* campaigns for the House rose a bit from 1982 to 1984. The FEC press release had it right, if a bit loosely: "The cost of winning a seat in Congress continued to increase in 1984. Similar to overall spending, increases were found more in Senate races than in House contests."[15] It was the only reporting in these three cases that erred in the direction of minimizing the growth of campaign money.

The *Los Angeles Times*—not having reported the Common Cause releases—reported each of the FEC releases. Its article of 16 May 1985 (without by-line) followed the FEC lead under the headline "Congressional Candidates Spent 9% More in '84, FEC Says":

> Candidates spent a record $374 million on last year's congressional races, up 9.3% over the 1982 elections, the Federal Election Commission reported Wednesday.
>
> But that was a markedly smaller rate of increase than in the previous two elections, when spending rocketed upward at rates of 43% and 23%.

The story went on to note the rise in the cost of Senate campaigns and the drop in costs of House campaigns. It did not report the reactions of any groups or individuals, and it was, of course, consistent in theme with the paper's earlier report of 27 October 1984.

The *New York Times* coverage is less easy to describe. In fact, it seems not to have reported final totals for 1983–1984 at all. It ignored both of the May press releases of the FEC. It did report from the 12 April 1985 press release of Common Cause—the one on House campaigns—but only to report that PAC contributions to House campaigns were at an all-time high. The release's paragraphs on the decline in overall spending in House campaigns went unmentioned—as, apparently, did the entire Common Cause release on Senate spending in March.

The *Times* had, however, suggested the decline in spending for House campaigns—sort of—in the first of the post-election articles. On 4 December 1984, Adam Clymer wrote a piece headed "Cost of Winning a House Seat Rose in '84, but at a Slower Rate." The story dealt only with spending by winners and the reasons for the slowing of the rate of increase. There was no mention of the overall drop in spending for all House campaigns (winning and losing), and indeed Clymer appears to have had before him only the data on winners. The data, according to the article, was mined from FEC reports by Edward Roeder, a Washington freelance reporter who functions as the Sunshine News Service; the article reported projections of total expenditures based on actual reports to the FEC through October. Though limited in its scope, the article drew heavily on observers and scholars

[15] In the release the first sentence was in boldface and was preceded by an asterisk.

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TABLE 2

Reporting on the Decline of Campaign Spending for the House: October 1984 to May 1985

Date	*Newspaper*	*Source(*)*	*Downturn Reported*	*Scholar Cited*
Oct. 27	*L.A. Times*	Common Cause	yes	Malbin
Dec. 4	*N.Y. Times*	Roeder	in part	Jacobson
March 16	*W. Post*	Common Cause	no	none
April 12	*W. Post*	Common Cause	yes	Skladony
April 12	*N.Y. Times*	Common Cause	no	none
May 16	*L.A. Times*	FEC	yes	none
May 16	*W. Post*	FEC	yes	none

(*) This column reports the immediate source of the data; in the end, of course, all data come from the reports made to and available through the FEC.

of American politics. Several political consultants attributed the slowing to a decline in the rate of inflation. Gary Jacobson, a professor of political science at the University of California at San Diego, attributed it to a shortage of strong challengers, and Martin Franks, executive director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, singled out the reduced pace of technological innovation in campaigning.

A fascinating pattern emerges in the reporting of the "decline" story in the three newspapers (Table 2). There were seven separate stories between 27 October 1984 and 16 May 1985; four originated with Common Cause releases, two with releases from the FEC, and one with Edward Roeder. The two relying on the FEC reported the downturn; the two relying exclusively on Common Cause did not. The three quoting expert authorities, even though two of them originated with Common Cause, also reported the downturn.

Zero Growth among the PACs

Twice each year the Federal Election Commission announces the number of PACs registered with it. Those counts, taken every 1 July and 31 December, date back to the last day of December 1974 and mark the growth of political action committees in national campaign politics. From a total of 608 PACs at the end of 1974, PAC registration grew to a total of 4,009 just ten years later at the end of 1984. To be sure, the growth curve had begun to moderate before the apex was reached (Table 3). But in 1985 the curve leveled off and took a little dip—to an even 4,000 in mid-1985 and 3,992 at the end of the year. After the PAC explosion of the preceding decade, the sudden flattening of the curve surprised a number of PAC observers. The data were clearly set out in FEC press releases on 19 August 1985 and 20 January 1986.

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TABLE 3

PACs Registered with the Federal Election Commission(*)

Date	*Number of PACs*	*Date*	*Number of PACs*
31 December 1974	608	1 July 1982	3,149
24 November 1975	722	31 December 1982	3,371
10 May 1976	992	1 July 1983	3,461
31 December 1976	1,146	31 December 1983	3,525
31 December 1977	1,360	1 July 1984	3,803
31 December 1978	1,653	31 December 1984	4,009
1 August 1979	1,840	1 July 1985	4,000
31 December 1979	2,000	31 December 1985	3,992
1 July 1980	2,279		
31 December 1980	2,551		
1 July 1981	2,678		
31 December 1981	2,901		

(*) The FEC reports also list number of PACs by various kinds (e.g., labor, corporate, etc.); those columns are eliminated here.

The *Los Angeles Times* reported neither the mid-year nor the end-of-year count. The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* reported one of them apiece—briefly and somewhat skeptically, even contentiously. It was the *New York Times* that began the reporting. Responding to the FEC news release of 19 August 1985, the *Times* in its grouping of news from the nation's capital ("Washington Talk") offered a two-paragraph item on 24 August:

> Political action committees, those special interest groups sponsored by business and labor that help finance campaigns of favored political candidates, declined in number in the first six months of 1985, from 4,009 to 4,000, according to a report by the Federal Election Commission. While the decline was modest, it was the first since the commission began keeping records of these groups in 1974.
>
> The figures also show, however, that more members of Congress are accepting and spending more PAC contributions in order to win re-election, so the drop in committees should probably be regarded as only a seasonal blip.

So, the first paragraph gave the story, and the second paragraph took it away. That second paragraph, indeed, bears some comment. While PAC contributions were indeed increasing, they were doing so at a decreasing rate. PAC contributions to general election candidates in 1984 showed an increase of 27 percent against increases of 54 and 63 percent two and four years earlier. Moreover, there had never before been a "seasonal blip" in the count of PACs, not even in the growth years (Table 3).

The *Washington Post* confronted the news with no greater joy. It reported the FEC year-end totals on 20 January 1986. After reporting the drops from 4,009

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and 4,000 to 3,992 "following a decade of rapid growth," the *Post* rushed in the third paragraph to set the story in perspective.

> The slight retrenchment does not mean PACs are spending less. In fact, they set a record in the last congressional elections by providing House and Senate candidates $105 million, 26.5 percent of all the money raised. PAC contributions have tripled since the 1978 elections.

Again, no intimation that the growth in PAC contributions was moderating. Then, after a paragraph recording recent changes in numbers of different kinds of PACs, the *Post* returned to the bad news:

> Fred Wertheimer, president of Common Cause, which is lobbying to abolish PACs, said he took no comfort from the new figures.
>
> He predicted that PAC contributions will climb again in this year's elections. The FEC did not say which PACs folded, but Wertheimer speculated they were "not significant givers."[16]

There was no attempt to explain—even to speculate—why the growth in the number of PACs had so rapidly stopped. Nor, it might be added, had earlier stories on the growth of PACs ever pointed out that many of the new ones were not "significant givers."

The rapid growth of PACs in the 1970s and early 1980s had been very big news in the American media. Curiously, the end of that growth was not. Common Cause issued no releases on it, and the *Los Angeles Times* conveyed no hint of it. In the two papers that reported the story, for all the interpretation it was subjected to, one would hardly know there was even a story there. The interpretations, significantly, never involved a scholar of campaign finance.

The Information Brokers

From the case studies above, it is clear that there is another set of actors in the reporting of these campaign finance stories—the information brokers. They are of two kinds—the sources of data and the expert commentators. Of the two, the sources are potentially the more important, both because they are the source of the story itself—the data being the story in many instances—and because their mastery of the data gives them the first opportunity to interpret their meaning. In these stories there are three such data sources: Common Cause, the Federal Election Commission's press office, and Edward Roeder.

As its leading biographer, Andrew S. McFarland, has written, Common Cause "can be placed within the reform tradition of the Progressives. . . ." It is "a recent manifestation of the mobilization of elements of the American middle class who

[16] One observation on the penultimate paragraph of the quote: To the best of my knowledge, Common Cause has not sought to "abolish" PACs. It has sought to limit the amounts of their contributions and the amounts candidates can receive from PACs collectively.

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attempt to enhance democracy and effective government through the adoption of procedural reforms supported for reasons other than clear-cut economic gain."[17] Indeed, he notes the tradition as the source of the rapport that Common Cause enjoys with the press:

> The major national newspapers and television networks have a concept of the government reform agenda that is similar to the Common Cause definition. Items such as public financing of elections, reforming the congressional seniority system, permitting public attendance at almost all legislative committee meetings, and requiring top government officials to disclose financial holdings get mentioned repeatedly in the press.[18]

One can even note that they share similar symbols and cliches—special interests, the public interest, and campaign war chests, for instance.

But the source of Common Cause's influence on the reporting of campaign finance is more than just a matter of shared values. Common Cause has also established a reputation for expertise in campaign finance. It was one of the leaders in the successful battle for campaign reform and public funding of presidential elections in the early 1970s. Indeed, it furnished the first reliable set of data on national campaign finance in the period between the expanded filing of reports and the ability of the Federal Election Commission to aggregate and publish the data. And it continues to beat the FEC in the race to disclose campaign finance totals.

The political assumptions of Edward Roeder are not nearly so well known, but they also appear to be squarely within the Progressive tradition. One needs only to look to the Roeder writings:

> The bribery aspect of PAC money offends "good government" lobbies such as Common Cause precisely because they *are* lobbies. In lobbying against legislation that benefits a narrow special interest instead of (as they see it) the general public interest, the good government lobbyists often lose legislative fights because the lobbies for the other side are armed with PAC money.[19]

> As surely as if local ballots were cast by citizens of another state, the power of citizen-voters is diluted when it is mixed with the power of alien financiers for influence in local elections. Few states have respected opinion leaders, kingmakers, or political bosses with as much clout and effect upon their elections as the Washington-based PACs.[20]

Indeed, Roeder's specific views on the decline in spending for House campaigns (that is, the second story above) are on the record. He published an article in summer of 1985 that took as its point of departure the one bit of *Washington Post* reporting on the FEC data.

[17] Andrew S. McFarland, *Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), 23.

[18] Ibid., 82.

[19] "PACs dilute vote with cash," *Baltimore Sun*, 25 August 1985.

[20] Ibid.

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> The only reduction in money in politics was a drop in the amounts challengers were able to raise. The amounts winners raised and spent shot up, meaning that it cost a lot more to get elected. Incumbents in particular relied on vastly increased campaign chests, with a much higher proportion of that money coming from PACs. Far from receding, the special interests simply have gotten more efficient in targeting candidates they wish to have stay in office.[21]

The tone, the emphases, the strategy might differ from those of Common Cause, but certainly not the fundamentals.

The second set of information brokers, the expert commentators, are a diverse group. In the coverage of the three stories discussed above they have included political consultants, interest-group representatives, and scholars. In understanding the press coverage here it is the scholars—Gary Jacobson, Michael Malbin, and Thomas Skladony—who seem especially important. Their comments in the pages of these three newspapers place them squarely within the approach of the great majority of their fellow scholars of campaign finance. The structural biases of the scholarly craft are apparent and professionally ingrained: a commitment to rigorous analysis, a detachment from partisan or ideological preferences, a dependence on empirical data, and a search for causal explanation. More significantly, perhaps, the political assumptions of the scholars of campaign finance are not often those of latter-day Progressivism. They tend to a more pluralistic view of power and influence, to a more complex and dispersed concept of political influence, to one that even differs greatly from issue to issue and public official to public official. It is also less moralizing and less reformist than the neo-Progressive creed.

The contrast between sources and commentators thus seems clear—with the exception of one anomaly: the press office of the Federal Election Commission. It shares far more of the structural biases and political assumptions of the scholars than it does those of its fellow sources. The press releases it issues, both in these instances and in other stories, follow a straight-forward, underinterpreted, detached pattern that is at considerable distance from both the Common Cause style and the preferences of American journalists. One can speculate on the reasons—the delicate political position of the Federal Election Commission, the scholarly and analytical preferences of the FEC data experts, the imperatives of maintaining a historical record, and the longer view that comes with knowing and understanding the whole sequence of data. But whatever the reasons, the FEC publicists reflect or share the world view of the scholarly authorities.

[21] Edward Roeder, "The 'Good News' is All Wrong," *Washington Monthly*, July/August 1985, 47. It is not my intention to deny that Roeder's point of view is substantial, although I see no reason why one cannot consider both Roeder's observations on winners and the story of overall decline important.

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Conclusions

There is substantial evidence in these three instances of the effect of both systematic professional bias and a pervasive neo-Progressive outlook on the reporting of American campaign finance. Indeed, the two appear to work in tandem. The conflicts between narrow, special interests and those of the broader public that are the essence of the Progressive view provide precisely the drama, conflict, and reader appeal that successful journalism demands. Reports of campaign finance tend generally to be abstract, impersonal, and beset with numbers; they are not good copy unless one finds knaves, buccaneering PACs, or lavish campaign spending in them. But stories about declining numbers of PACs or stabilizing spending levels also conflict with the fundamental understandings of the Progressive vision—with the long-term reality of the corrupting capacity of money in the hands of special interests.

The operation of those journalistic imperatives and visions are, however, sometimes mediated by third parties in these cases. These third parties are of two types: sources of information (the FEC press office, Common Cause, Edward Roeder) and sources of commentary (scholars, professionals, other observers). The effect of the former is to select the data and thus to frame the story; the effect of the latter is to give it interpretation or meaning. While those brokers do not affect the systematic journalistic biases intrinsic to newspaper reporting and publishing, they do in some instances reinforce and even modify the neo-Progressive political biases. At least in reporting on campaign finance one must include them in the process by which political reality is translated into images for the public.

In two of these stories the effect of the intermediaries was not great. In the coverage of *FEC* v. *NCPAC* the dominant journalistic view went unchallenged by any intermediary for whatever reason—deadlines, perhaps, or the relatively straightforward nature of the single event story. It was, moreover, a story out of the courts rather than campaign finance. Nonetheless, the directions of the errors in reporting and the front-page display of the story reflected without challenge the political assumptions of neo-Progressivism. In the story on the number of PACs, however, journalists had to rely on a data source—the FEC press office—not quite in tune with that Progressivism. Its challenge was implicit in the story itself, and in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* reporters or editors made determined, even strenuous, efforts to minimize the good news, to bring it into greater consonance with the Progressive assumptions. Their stories were, indeed, exercises in the conflict of political world views. And possibly the failure of the *Los Angeles Times* to report the story reflects the ultimate power of political assumptions.

It is the story on the declining cost of contesting a House seat that illustrates the most intricate interaction of journalists and brokers. On that point, a series of related conclusions emerge. When newspapers relied on Common Cause as their broker, its world view strengthened and reinforced their own very similar assumptions about politics. Reliance on information brokers with another set of

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assumptions—the FEC press people and scholarly authorities, in this instance—introduced an important challenge to the usual journalistic picture of reality. Where that happened in this particular story, the neo-Progressive assumptions yielded in part or in whole. In a very real sense the nature of the newspaper reporting depended, therefore, on a competition between two different pictures of reality.

The competition between the two is not, of course, decided in hand-to-hand combat or some form of Darwinian selection. In fact, the process by which the choice is made between them is probably many processes reflecting many considerations—the assignment decision of an editor, the time and resources available, the political world view of the reporter, the intrinsic newsworthiness of the story, for instance. At some point, however, someone makes a decision that adds to the reporting an intermediary who challenges the prevailing assumptions of the world of journalism. In these cases it appears to make a difference how and when that challenge is introduced. When the challenge comes passively from an FEC press release (cursed also by the stigma of officialdom), there is some tendency for journalists to rebut or dismiss it. The introduction of expert commentators, however, appears to have a far greater effect.

These three studies in reporting American campaign finance in the nation's elite newspapers suggest once again the usefulness of the marketplace of ideas. At least in sources of information and interpretation, "more" really is "better." But that truth also suggests two troublesome corollaries. If the country's greatest newspapers find it difficult with all of their talent and other resources to sort out competing world views, lesser papers and media will certainly find it vastly more difficult. More important, perhaps, is the manifest importance of even the elite media being aware that their world view is not the only credible one. Indeed, in their neo-Progressive commitments they run a certain risk of succumbing to the failing of the Progressives themselves: their inability to see "interest" anywhere but in the most powerful circles of American politics and, consequently, their inability to see it within themselves and their friends.*

* I am indebted to my research assistant, David Linder, for his great help in the preparation of this article.

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John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress

ANNA KASTEN NELSON

Shortly after the 1954 election, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told a press conference that bipartisanship "is a principle to which I am dedicated. Modern bipartisanship began at a meeting which I had with Secretary Hull ten years ago. Almost continuously since then, I have practiced it."[1] Whether or not bipartisanship began the day Dulles met with Cordell Hull, his statement to the press acknowledged the emergence of a substantial new role for Congress in the American foreign policy process. The global battle against communism necessitated support for the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO, Mutual Security Acts, and American troops in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon and vast numbers of other locations around the world. In short, the Cold War required substantial appropriations from Congress. Certainly after 1947, if not before, the impact of congressional action on foreign policy moved far beyond the traditional role of "advise and consent."[2]

Although the events and legislation that produced the changes in American foreign policy occurred during the administration of President Harry Truman, the procedures for implementing that policy were institutionalized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower established the first congressional liaison staff in the White House and hired the first media director, events not totally unrelated.

[1] Draft, For the Secretary's Press Conference, 16 November 1954, 15 November 1954, Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter DDEL.)

[2] According to newspaper accounts of a study published by the Brookings Institution the United States deployed its military forces for political impact a total of ninety-three times from 1946 to 1961. *Washington Post*, January 1976.

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Throughout his eight years in office, he also presided over regularly scheduled meetings with the Republican leadership of Congress and convened a number of special bipartisan congressional meetings on foreign policy. Like every other president he also held private meetings with individual legislators: breakfast with Republican Senator William F. Knowland, for example, bourbon and branch water in the late afternoon with Democrats, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and Representative Sam Rayburn.[3]

Meanwhile, quite on his own and without so much as an occasional gesture toward the organized efforts of the congressional liaison staff in the White House, John Foster Dulles was tireless in his efforts to "consult" with Congress. His notes and telephone memoranda indicate a continual attempt to inform, discuss, and negotiate. In spite of the orderly processes in the White House, it was largely through his personal efforts that individual members of Congress were involved in the foreign policy process. The efforts of Dulles brought Senator Knowland to the view that during the Eisenhower administration, Congress was consulted in a manner unknown to Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson.[4]

To emphasize the successful domestic diplomacy of Dulles is not to denigrate the contributions of President Eisenhower to that success. Eisenhower brought to the presidency a commitment to contain communism through military and economic support of western European countries and other "free world" allies. However, he was the leader of a political party with no such certain commitment. As a result, even before he was faced with a Democratic Congress, Eisenhower encouraged efforts toward bipartisan support of foreign policy and national defense.[5] Eisenhowever also allowed and even encouraged the special relationship enjoyed by his secretary of state. Dulles always had entree to the Oval Office, access to the President by telephone, and a privileged position among foreign policy advisers. This indication of mutual respect and reliance allowed Dulles to speak to congressional leaders with authority. Of course, it also allowed Dulles to circumvent the more orderly processes of legislative liaison. To Bryce Harlow, a member of the congressional liaison staff, Dulles was an "uncontrollable force."[6]

[3] The Eisenhower Library contains summaries of both the legislative leadership meetings and the bipartisan leadership meetings. Breakfasts with Knowland are usually listed in the President's daily schedule. Meetings with Johnson and Rayburn are not. Bryce Harlow, oral interview with Richard Baker and Anna Nelson, 13 December 1985 (hereafter Harlow interview). For an account of Eisenhower's governing style see Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Among other books that contain information on Eisenhower as a legislative leader are Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Gary W. Reichard, *The Reaffirmation of Republicanism* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975); and Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

[4] William Knowland Oral History Interview, DDEL.

[5] Legislative leadership meeting, 26 January 1953, supplementary notes, Box 4, DDE Diary, Whitman File; also Richard Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1 (1979): 21–38.

[6] Harlow interview.

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Although the foreign policy of Dulles and Eisenhower continues to be the focus of countless articles and monographs, little attention has been given to the considerable time and effort devoted by Secretary Dulles to Congress. It is a subject worth examining, however briefly, for two reasons. First, it serves to illuminate a rather neglected facet of Dulles as secretary of state; second, it further informs our understanding of the evolution of congressional involvement in foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War.

The Dulles Approach

John Foster Dulles began his courtship of Congress even before he became secretary of state. For example, in the State Department during the Truman administration as he began negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty he also began discussions with members of the Senate Far East Subcommittee to ensure acceptance of the treaty. Dulles briefed the subcommittee members on the course of the negotiations and asked for their advice and comments. He drove to the Capitol to have breakfast with committee members and worked closely with the subcommittee chairman, Senator John Sparkman. He effectively devoted a great deal of energy and effort. With the support of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Japanese treaty was accepted by the Senate with only ten opposing votes.[7]

In early January 1953, before the inauguration of Eisenhower, Dulles sent a telegram to assure Republican Senator H. Alexander Smith, who was expected to be the next chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee, that he looked forward to working with him. Although hardly a novice, he also asked the staff director of the Foreign Relations Committee, Francis O. Wilcox, to give him pointers on improving executive-legislative relations. Wilcox later remembered that he "put down a number of things, including what I would do with respect to consultation, and taking care of the chairman and the ranking minority member, and what I would do with the Senate as a whole."[8] There is no reason to believe that Dulles needed those suggestions, but plenty of evidence that his categories of important items were identical to those of Wilcox. He assiduously consulted with appropriate committees, and took uncommon care of chairmen and ranking minority members. Meanwhile, the Senate (or House) "as a whole" was handled through leadership meetings at the White House.

Dulles spent countless hours testifying before congressional committees. Sometime in May 1957, the State Department at the request of Senator Knowland prepared a list of the formal meetings between the secretary and bipartisan congressional groups. The list revealed that in the three years and one month that John Foster Dulles had been secretary of state he had met formally with congressional

[7] Pat M. Holt and Francis O. Wilcox, Oral History interviews with Donald Ritchie, Senate Historical Office, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter OH,LC).

[8] Telegram to H. Alexander Smith, 5 January 1953, Box 75, Selected Correspondence, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.; Wilcox interview, OH,LC.

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groups 160 times. This impressive list perhaps accounts for Knowland's assertion that whereas the Truman administration "had the tendency to consult the Republican leadership of the Senate after the event," President Eisenhower consulted bipartisan leaders before the event, even when there was some risk to national security interests.[9]

Far more impressive was the way in which Dulles "took care" of the chairmen, ranking minority members of committees, and those in other positions of leadership. His correspondence files and telephone memoranda tell the story of perpetual courtship. It is possible to give only a few examples. Each time New Jersey Senator Smith said something flattering about Dulles on the floor of the Senate or to the press, he received a thank you note. Each time Dulles made a speech, it was sent to Smith. When Smith sent Dulles a three-page letter on the Middle East crisis of August 1956, Dulles responded warmly: "You can be sure that I am taking your letter with me when I leave tomorrow for London." Senator Smith was on the Steering Committee of "The Committee of One Million." He shared with Senator Knowland the dubious distinction of attracting correspondence from every American (and a few non-Americans) obsessed with Yalta, the "loss" of China, and appeasement in the Far East, yet Smith remained a devoted supporter of Dulles and the administration's foreign policy. He felt free to meet with Dulles when he was troubled about policy, rarely asked embarrassing questions during committee meetings, and publicly rushed to the secretary's defense whenever he was attacked on the floor of the Senate.[10]

As might be expected, even more extensive was the communication between Knowland and Dulles. In addition to his position as Republican majority or minority leader, Knowland served on both the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees. Dulles and Knowland had countless breakfasts together, met informally, (at least once on Saturday afternoon in the Dulles home), and spoke to each other on the telephone so often that a continuous dialogue can be assumed. Knowland sent Dulles a copy of each of his speeches as well as copies of letters and articles he received from his own correspondents, almost all of which reflected deep disagreement with administration policy. Nevertheless, Knowland had a high regard for Dulles and ultimately supported his foreign policy in the Senate.[11]

[9] Meetings and Appearances of Dulles with Bipartisan Congressional Groups, Carton 5, State Department Series, William Knowland papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. William Knowland Oral History Interview. DDEL, 47; Memorandum for Knowland from Roderic L. O'Connor, 11 May 1954, Box 83, Dulles Papers, Princeton. Noting the reluctance of his brother, Allen Dulles, to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Foster told Allen that he could not make speeches around the country and decline to meet privately with the committee. Holt interview, OH,LC.

[10] Dulles to Smith, 13 August 1956, Box 126; Smith Diary, 11 February 1955 and 16 July 1958, Papers of H. Alexander Smith, Princeton. For other examples see items in Boxes 111 and 114 of the Smith papers.

[11] Almost any box of telephone memoranda or memoranda of conversations in the Dulles Papers includes some conversations with Knowland. See for example, memoranda of conversations J-K, Box

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Only after the Democrats recaptured Congress did Dulles begin to establish a close relationship with the chairmen of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. Of course, when Congress is in the hands of the opposite party, there is a greater need to pay attention, but in this instance the personalities involved also played a role. Neither of the Republican chairmen, Senator Alexander Wiley nor Representative Robert Chiperfield, inspired a Dulles friendship.[12]

Democratic Senator Walter George was a different matter. As early as July 1953, his support as ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee brought a warm thank you note by special messenger from the secretary of state. Indeed, the Eisenhower administration bore some responsibility for Walter George assuming the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. After the election of 1954, George had to choose between the chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee, a position of much greater value to his Georgia constituency, and that of Foreign Relations. The administration was not eager to see the elderly and independent Senator Theodore Green become chairman, so Senator George was encouraged to take the more "prestigious" committee, perhaps to the detriment of his senatorial career. The senator finally agreed to be chairman with the stipulation that he would not be required to attend official dinners.[13]

One close observer of the Senate has noted that some senators can command votes because what they say and do is of great importance to other members of the Senate. Walter George was one of those senators. After George became chairman of Foreign Relations in 1955, Dulles evidently decided to use his influence as much as possible. For the duration of his chairmanship, Walter George had breakfast with Dulles in his Mayflower Hotel apartment at least every other Wednesday morning. In addition, Dulles often stopped by his apartment for conversations late in the afternoon or early evening. The overworked secretary always had some time for a conversation with Senator George. As a result, George was firm in his support of bipartisan foreign policy, telling the President at one point that he was "sometimes ashamed of myself when I have to vote against you."[14]

1, Correspondence and Memo Series and Box 94, Selected Correspondence, Dulles Papers, Princeton. Knowland Oral History Interview, DDEL.

[12] Wilcox states that Dulles was very reluctant to consult with Wiley because the senator really was not interested in the substantive issues of foreign policy. According to Boyd Crawford, former staff director of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Chiperfield was about to decline the chairmanship, but the Illinois delegation found out and insisted he take the prestigious job. John M. Vorys was the active Republican leader of the committee. Author's telephone interview with Crawford, 27 March 1986; Wilcox interview, OH,LC.

[13] William McComber, Dulles Oral Interviews, Princeton. Walter George did not run for reelection in 1956 after receiving information that he no longer had the financial support he had enjoyed in previous campaigns. Wilcox and Holt interviews, OH,LC. Carl M. Marcy, Oral History Interview, OH,LC. Letter to George from Dulles, 15 July 1953, Box 70, Dulles Papers, Princeton; call to George in Vienna, 4 November 1965, Box 3, Telephone Conversations; Memorandum of conversation with George, 17 November 1954, Box 5, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

[14] Thruston B. Morton, Dulles Oral History Interviews, Princeton. Memorandum of conversation with George, 4 January 1954, Box 5, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. There are many memoranda

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The domination of the Senate in foreign policy often leads to the neglect of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, or at least to the perception of neglect on the part of committee members. Evidently, even Dulles did not initially appreciate the importance of giving the House committee equal time. Congressman James P. Richards, a Democrat from South Carolina who became chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1955, was initially unimpressed with Dulles and resented the fact that Dulles spent too much time in the Senate to the neglect of the House. But since the passage of Mutual Security Acts were a top priority of President Eisenhower and these foreign assistance acts required hefty appropriations, Dulles carefully developed a close friendship with "Dick" Richards. For example, the busy, globe-trotting Dulles agreed to deliver the graduation address at the University of South Carolina on 5 June 1955 and, along with Congressman Richards, received an honorary degree. He and his wife then joined the Congressman and his family for a weekend at Richards's country retreat. Two months later, Dulles arranged a hasty dinner party for the Richards family at his home one evening so that he and Richards could "chat." His friendship paid off handsomely. The Congressman's respect for Dulles grew until he "got to love him." More important, perhaps, Richards also became a firm supporter of administration foreign policy.[15]

In vain Dulles sought to cement bipartisanship through the appointment of an important Democrat to a foreign policy position. Since the leadership of the Democratic party was divided between Truman and Adlai E. Stevenson who, Dulles noted, "are considerably divided from the southern Democrats who hold the key positions in the Senate," it was hard to find someone to serve the cause of bipartisanship. Stevenson, for example, declined an invitation to serve as delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Dulles had appointed David K. E. Bruce as a special consultant and assigned him to the European Defense Community Treaty, much as Dulles had served the Truman administration as a negotiator for the Japanese Peace Treaty. But although Bruce had served a Democratic administration, he was not associated with the leadership of the party.[16]

This was a problem that weighed heavily on Dulles as he dealt with the politically explosive issues of the Middle East. In the fall of 1955, consulting with Vice President Richard Nixon, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, and Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, he suggested a meeting to discuss the possible

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of conversations with George in the Dulles Papers, especially Box 5, Subject Series. Also Holt Interview, OH,LC; Confidential note, 23 March 1956, Box 13, DDE Diary, Whitman File, DDEL.

[15] Dulles speech delivered at University of South Carolina, 6 June 1955, Box 89; Dulles letters to Richards, 7 February 1955 and 8 June 1955, Box 97, Selected Correspondence, Dulles Papers, Princeton; Call to Richards, Call to Mrs. Dulles, 2 August 1955, Box 4, Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, DDEL; James P. Richards, Dulles Oral History Interviews, Princeton. Also see Dulles letter to Richards 29 October 1954, Box 86, Dulles Papers, Princeton. Dulles and Richards had lunch about six days after this letter.

[16] Dulles Memorandum for Eisenhower, 29 June 1953, Box 1, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; letter from Robert Cutler to Dulles, 22 June 1954 and letter to Cutler from Dulles, 24 June 1954, Box 1, White House Memoranda, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

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political ramifications of the "Arab-Egyptian problem." Basically, Dulles explained, the Middle East presented complicated problems that could not be solved if it were necessary to keep "looking over their shoulder [s] at political consequences here at home." Therefore, he told them, "Unless we create some kind of bipartisan position on this matter, we may lose the whole Arab world." The appointment of someone who could represent the Democratic party could diffuse a situation that "could be as dangerous as the loss of China. . . ."[17] A few months later, Dulles suggested to Senator George that Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.) might serve as an informal bipartisan liaison between the administration and the Senate committee. Mansfield came to mind, he explained, because he seemed least likely to interject "a partisan note" in the vital Middle East problem.[18]

Unable to find a cooperative Democratic leader, the President and Dulles concentrated instead on a close bipartisan relationship with the Congress. In a confidential memorandum prepared after the 1954 election, Eisenhower reminded those officials responsible for foreign policy to increase bipartisan consultation and maintain congressional contacts, since "much will depend upon the personal touch." Picking up on one of the President's favorite themes, the memo suggests that if their efforts are successful, an enduring pattern will be set for the future.[19]

Meanwhile, in his post-election press conference, Dulles noted the many meetings held with congressional leaders, the contributions of David Bruce, and the bipartisan delegations to international conferences and the UN General Assembly. The President, he continued, "has set a notable precedent in the number and intimacy of foreign affairs consultations between his Administration and the Congressional leaders of both parties." And, he might have added, so had the secretary of state.[20]

Bipartisan groups of congressional leaders were briefed by the White House even before the Eighty-fourth Congress was organized. Like other meetings before and after, the legislators were impressed with the importance to the nation of the administration's defense policies, mutual security needs, and upcoming treaties. The President opened the meetings with a few remarks, but Secretary Dulles provided the lengthy briefing while other members of the cabinet and White House staff stood by to answer questions. These bipartisan briefings were long, two hours and three hours respectively, but not otherwise unusual. Bipartisan congressional meetings with similar formats continued on an irregular basis throughout the administration, and their success did impress future administrations.[21]

[17] Calls to the Vice-President, Brownell, Humphrey, 17 October 1955, Box 4, Telephone Memoranda, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

[18] Memorandum of conversation, 30 March 1956, Box 10, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. George agreed to call Mansfield who evidently declined.

[19] Eisenhower memorandum, 16 December 1954, Box 8, DDE Diary, Whitman File, DDEL.

[20] Draft, For the Secretary's Press Conference 16 November 1954, 15 November 1954, Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; also see draft statement sent to the President in November (n.d.) 1955, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

[21] Memorandum of Bipartisan Briefing of Congressional Leaders on Foreign Policy, 17 November 1954 and Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, 14 December 1954, Box 1, Legislative Meeting Series, Whitman

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What was the impact on foreign policy of all this activity? Did it ensure support for the administration's foreign policy? Did it enhance congressional influence? A brief article cannot provide definitive answers to these questions, but summarizing two examples of the Dulles approach to congressional relations can provide some tentative answers as well as stimulate new questions.

The Formosa Straits

The Republican platform of 1952 had pledged to "end neglect of the Far East, which Stalin has long identified as the road to victory over the West." The platform castigated the Democratic party for sacrificing Asia at Yalta, needlessly provoking the Korean War, and then failing to pursue a war plan that would lead to victory.[22] After the election of a Republican president and Congress, the most vocal critics of the Truman-Acheson policy toward Asia were now members of the Republican leadership of the House and Senate, firmly embracing two basic policies of their party: first, the nonrecognition of "Red China" (Peoples Republic of China or PRC) and its continued exclusion from the United Nations; second, the protection of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa from invasion by the PRC.

Neither Dulles nor Eisenhower disagreed with these policies. During an early meeting with the Republican leadership, Eisenhower conceded that since the presidency of Woodrow Wilson the United States regarded recognition as a sign of official approval. Therefore, he assured them of his continued opposition to recognition and the admittance of the PRC to the UN.[23]

Implementing the policies was a different matter. Six months after the Republicans took control, a special rider was placed on the United Nations appropriations bill that required the United States to withdraw its financial support if the PRC were admitted to that international body. The President hastily called a special conference with congressional leaders to point up the ramifications of their position. Finally, Senators Knowland, Styles Bridges, and their supporters agreed that there were other ways for the Congress to express its disapproval of admission and the rider was withdrawn.[24]

The President and Dulles also agreed with party leaders on the defense of Formosa. Unfortunately, geographic as well as political factors made that issue rather complicated. Between the island of Formosa (now Taiwan) and mainland China lay several other groups of islands including Quemoy, Matsu, and the Tachens. Some of these islands were no more than two miles off the coast of mainland China.

File, DDEL. Summaries of all legislative meetings are contained in this file series. Harlow describes Dulles's as using a sonorous tone. His briefings were "pronunciamentos" full of legalise. Harlow interview.

[22] Text of the foreign policy provisions of the Republican platform can be found in Box 63, Dulles Papers, Princeton.

[23] Supplementary Notes, Legislative Leadership Meeting, 19 May 1953, Box 1, Legislative Meeting Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

[24] Notes on Special Legislative Conference, 2 June 1953, Box 1, Legislative Meeting Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

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When Chiang Kai-shek fled to Formosa in 1949, he stationed troops on these islands so that he might use them to launch a future invasion of the mainland.

On 3 September 1954, the Communists began shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, opening a period of considerable uncertainty vis-à-vis the situation in the Formosa Straits. The U.S. Executive Order that sent the fleet to the Formosa Straits in 1950 provided only for the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Did the American commitment to the defense of Formosa include the defense of Quemoy and Matsu? That question and others were discussed at length in a National Security Council (NSC) meeting of 12 September. Dulles suggested that while the loss of Quemoy might be a psychological blow, it was not essential to the defense of Formosa. As a result the President's authority to act in the Formosa Straits, which rested on the Executive Order of 1950, probably did not include the defense of the offshore islands. Thus the President and other NSC members were concerned over the constitutional issue. Could the President presume to defend the offshore islands without returning to Congress for direction?

NSC members seemed to agree that Quemoy could be defended only at the risk of war, but could not be abandoned because of the psychological effect upon the Nationalist Chinese forces. No doubt the psychological effect on congressional members of the "China lobby" was also a factor. Dulles suggested a solution to the dilemma. The UN Security Council would be asked to issue "an injunction to maintain the status quo." Action taken under a UN directive would automatically assure support from Congress while obviating the need for further authority from Congress.[25]

At a subsequent NSC meeting, after it was decided to ask New Zealand to raise the issue of the offshore islands in the Security Council, Dulles sought further assurance from both the Vice President and the President that there was no need for a bipartisan consultation with Congress before proceeding in the UN. Both agreed that it was unnecessary, although Nixon offered the opinion, with which the President agreed, that Senator Knowland might be consulted.[26]

The situation changed when it was decided to couple the UN action with a mutual defense treaty. This decision brought on a flurry of activity. Plans were quickly made for consultations with Senators Knowland, Wiley, Smith, Johnson, George, Sparkman, and Mansfield. By the time Dulles initialed a draft of the defense treaty with Formosa on 23 November, he could assure the President that he had been

[25] Memorandum of Discussion of the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, 12 September 1954, NSC Series, Whitman File (hereafter NSC Discussion, [date], Whitman File). Dulles was also concerned about the reaction of U.S. allies. Going to the UN was a good idea because even if the UN injunction were vetoed, the U.S. would gain support from allies if war developed. For a discussion of the foreign policy decisions see Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Fall 1981): 465–480.

[26] NSC Discussion, 24 September 1954, Whitman File, DDEL; Memorandum, 5 October 1954, Box 2, White House Memos; call to Nixon, 5 October 1954, Box 3, Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

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in touch with the Far Eastern Subcommittee throughout the negotiations and they were in full accord with the treaty.[27]

But while a mutual defense treaty reassured the Nationalist Chinese and their congressional supporters, it would protect only Formosa and the Pescadores. It did not address the problem of Quemoy, Matsu, and other offshore islands. There continued to be disagreement within the administration on the strategic importance of these islands, but Eisenhower and Dulles agreed early on that Quemoy and other offshore islands were not essential for the defense of Formosa and were not worth a war. Understandably, neither was in a position to state this publicly. To do so would not only encourage the PRC to capture the islands but bring down upon their heads the wrath of all those Americans who supported the Nationalist Chinese as an act of faith.[28]

A new crisis developed on 18 January when the PRC captured Ichiang, an island just a few miles north of the Tachen Islands where Nationalist Chinese troops were stationed. Dulles began to have second thoughts about the various offshore islands and suggested that he and Admiral Arthur Radford have lunch with the President to discuss the situation. At the luncheon Dulles proposed that the United States encourage Chiang to evacuate the Tachens, with the understanding that the United States would support the continued occupation of Quemoy. Radford supported Dulles's decision, noting that it was time to make the American position absolutely clear. The President then inquired how Dulles thought they should proceed. The secretary suggested that he would see the Chinese foreign minister and the British ambassador. According to his notes, he then suggested "the President should have a meeting with the congressional leaders. The President, after some reflection, indicated he thought it might be better for me to meet with them in the first instance with Admiral Radford to get a feeling of the situation."[29]

[27] Memorandum of Conference with Eisenhower, 18 October 1954, Box 1, White House Memos, Dulles Papers. Evidently it was later decided that consultations with Knowland and George would suffice. Memorandum for Herbert Hoover from J. W. Hanes, Jr., 20 October 1954, 793.00/2054, RG 59, National Archives (hereafter NA). Memorandum for Eisenhower, 23 November 1954, Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL. A few days earlier Dulles realized that Smith had still not seen the prospective treaty. This was a serious omission because Smith was very sensitive to the fact that he did not have enough seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee to attend leadership meetings. Dulles made sure Smith got his copy. Call to Mr. [Walter] Robertson, 19 November 1954, Box 3, Telephone Conversations, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Also, Smith Diary, 21 November 1954, Smith Papers, Princeton.

[28] Memorandum for Record, Conference at State Department, 29 October 1954, Box 9, International Series, Whitman File, DDEL. Searching for other options Dulles suggested "fuzzing up" the wording of the treaty to take into account the offshore islands, but National Security Assistant Robert Cutler pointed out that Knowland would just take the occasion of Senate hearings to push the secretary to agree to their defense. NSC discussion, 2 November 1954, Whitman File, DDEL. A discussion of the opposition of Eisenhower and Dulles to the use of force in the Strait can be found in Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to the Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954–1962," *Journal of American History* 72 (December 1985): 637–660.

[29] Memorandum of Luncheon Conversation with the President, 19 January 1955, Box 3, White House Memoranda, Dulles Papers, DDEL. This was not the first time that Dulles and Radford were

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Dulles met with a bipartisan congressional group the following morning. The notes of the meeting illustrate the skill with which he handled the controversial situation. He gradually led Senators Knowland, Wiley, and Saltonstall to approve the abandonment of some Nationalist territory while gaining support from the Democrats and Republicans alike for an unprecedented congressional resolution supporting, before the fact, whatever action the President chose to take. Dulles and Radford began the meeting with a geography lesson, pointing to the various islands held by the Nationalists and their proximity to mainland China. Dulles then noted the strategic value of regrouping Nationalist forces on the more important islands, a move that could only be carried out with the help of the United States forces. Various questions on the logistics of the regrouping brought Dulles to admit that "this would involve some risk of tangling with opposing planes." He then stated that the administration was also considering "a parallel move" to the UN to see if it would call for a cease-fire. Dulles, however, offered the opinion that the Soviets would probably veto such a proposal and the Chinese Communists would not comply even if it occurred.

Finally Dulles reached the point of the meeting. If the program of evacuating the Tachens while defending Quemoy were adopted, the President would need "some authority from Congress to use the armed forces of the United States in the area for the protection and security of Formosa and the Pescadores." The orders to the Seventh Fleet stemmed from the authority of the President during the Korean War. There was some question whether the President still had that authority after the signing of the Korean armistice.

Dulles then assured the group that if the defense treaty with Formosa were ratified and the President were given this power to respond to an attack, there would be far less danger of hostilities since it was often "miscalculation" that leads to war. There was no real dissent among the assembled congressmen. Most of the comments indicated support for clarifying the U.S. position in the area. After a number of questions, primarily concerned with logistical problems in both the Congress and Formosa Straits, it was agreed that the resolution would go to Congress immediately since the mutual defense treaty would require more time.[30]

The congressional meeting was held on a Thursday and the President was scheduled to send up his resolution the following Monday, 24 January. Over the weekend drafts of the resolution were circulated to congressional committee chairmen as well as administration officials, but the resolution that finally emerged represented Eisenhower's position. It did not mention which islands would be defended and which would not, thus properly fuzzing the question, rather than clarifying it.[31]

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instructed to learn the views of the congressional leadership. See for example, George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited," *Journal of American History* 71 (September 1984): 353.

[30] Meeting of Secretary with congressional leaders, 20 January 1955, Box 2, White House Memoranda, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

[31] Knowland asked Eisenhower to present the resolution to Congress in person. Senator George thought it unnecessary and Eisenhower evidently agreed. Telephone calls from Knowland and to George,

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Before he left the State Department to testify for the resolution, Dulles held a background briefing for the press. Again, he emphasized that the resolution should lead to peace not war and explained the necessity for congressional authority. With the resolution and treaty in place there will be no miscalculation like that preceding the Korean War, he explained. He repeated many of the same ideas in his testimony before the Senate committees, adding the additional point that the resolution would let other nations of the world know that now the President can act. "They have been taught by some experiences," he stated, "that the President is very much limited in what he can do."[32]

The House of Representatives quickly passed the resolution and Dulles called Congressman Richards to say he had done a wonderful job. Things did not go quite so well in the Senate, because the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated a divergence from presidential policy. The staff director of the Foreign Relations Committee was no less concerned about this snag than Dulles himself. Fortunately, it barely delayed the proceedings. The foundation of support was secure enough for an overwhelming vote of approval. The resolution passed the Senate on 28 January. Approval of the mutual defense treaty followed on 9 February.[33]

For a few months the situation continued to get worse instead of better. At the end of March Eisenhower held two bipartisan luncheon meetings, one for members of the Senate, the other for members of the House. The previous day he and Dulles had agreed that at the luncheon meetings they would "adhere to the position that the relevancy of Quemoy and Matsu to the defense of Formosa was a matter to be decided only by the President when the necessity arose." However, in greeting his guests, the President again emphasized his desire to conduct foreign policy on a bipartisan basis. After opening the meeting, the President immediately turned to Dulles, who provided the briefing — fifty minutes worth — to the senators. Questions from the members apparently were short while answers were long. Nevertheless, it was another of a long line of successful bipartisan meetings. Senator Lyndon Johnson assured the President that the Democrats appreciated "being taken into the President's confidence." He continued, "We are going to do everything we can to be helpful to the President and to assist him when he asks assistance."[34]

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21 January 1955; Telephone calls to Bowie, Morton and from Knowland, 22 January 1954, Box 3, Telephone conversations, Dulles papers. It would appear from the summary of the meeting that Dulles specifically guaranteed the defense of Quemoy at the congressional meeting 20 January.

[32] Press and Radio Background News Conference, 24 January 1955, Box 96, Dulles Papers, Princeton. In the Senate the resolution was considered jointly by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, (Historical Series) vol. VII, 84th Congress, 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 87 (hereafter *Exec. Sess. Sen.* and volume).

[33] Dulles telephone calls to Richards and from Morton and Wilcox, 25 January 1955 and call from Knowland, 26 January 1955, Box 3, Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, DDEL; *Exec. Sess. Sen.* vol. VII, especially 65, 285.

[34] Memorandum of Meeting with the President, 29 March 1955, Box 3, White House Memoranda, Dulles papers, DDEL. Bipartisan Congressional Luncheon Meetings, 30 and 31 March 1955, Box 1, Legislative Meeting Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

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The skillful handling of the Formosa resolution gave the President, as well as his principal foreign policy adviser, an unprecedented blank check. The resolution ensured that any unforeseen development surrounding the Formosa issue could be met without fear of political reprisals on the domestic front. Congress had been consulted and had formally given its approval. Meanwhile, as they relinquished their war powers, the bipartisan congressional leaders were convinced they not only had been consulted but had been taken into the President's confidence.

The Aswan Dam

Unlike the Formosa Resolution, the decision in July 1956 to abandon support for construction of the Aswan Dam seems to provide an example of congressional influence over administration policy. In the relatively brief discussions of the Aswan proposal in books and articles on the Suez crisis, congressional opposition usually is cited as one of the most important reasons for the precipitous turnabout in U.S. policy. The notes and words of John Foster Dulles are largely responsible for the underlying assumption that Aswan was a shared decision or even one that primarily bore the imprint of Congress. Although Dulles tended to revise and extend his explanation of the decision not to fund the dam at Aswan as the Suez crisis unfolded, he continued to emphasize the responsibility of congressional opposition to the funding proposal. For example, in answer to a question in a press conference in April 1957 he explained, "There was, perhaps first of all and most imperative, the fact that the Appropriations Committee of the Senate had unanimously passed a resolution providing that none of the 1957 funds could be used for the Aswan Dam."[35]

The completion of a high dam at Aswan was a priority item on the Egyptian agenda several years before it became a matter of recrimination between Dulles and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian officers who forced the abdication of King Farouk in 1952 were intent on land reclamation to gain agricultural self-sufficiency for Egypt. The enormous cost, they argued, would more than pay for itself in the production of rice, winter wheat, and electric power for Cairo.[36]

Eisenhower, rather than Dulles, may have been responsible for the initial United States involvement in Aswan. When he learned that Eugene Black, the president

[35] Dulles's News Conference of 2 April 1957, Box 113, Dulles Papers, Princeton. Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 259–261; Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950–1957," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Spring 1982): 85–88; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*. Exceptions can be found in those books or articles that are particularly eager to lay all the blame or praise on Dulles. For example, Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (New York: Little Brown, 1973), 329–344; John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles, A Biography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 252–261. The most thorough discussion of the Aswan High Dam decision can be found in Kenneth Love, *Suez, The Twice Fought War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 297–327. Love's account, largely based upon interviews, lays responsibility for the decision squarely on the shoulders of Dulles.

[36] Despatch from Randall S. Williams, 12 March 1953 and from Perry Ellis, 13 April 1953, Cairo, 874.2614/3-1253 and 874.2614/4-1353, RG 59, NA.

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of the World Bank, was planning an extensive trip through the Middle East, Eisenhower invited Black to lunch. He asked Black to add to his agenda an unofficial and informal search for possible solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On his return, Black offered two suggestions: first, that the United States deal in a more evenhanded fashion with Israel and the Arab nations and, second, that the United States seriously consider sharing in the financing of the Aswan Dam if the World Bank found it a feasible project. Black emphasized the important position of Egypt in the Middle East and its potential for leadership in the search for better relations between Israel and the Arab states. However, he noted, Egypt had to solve its more serious internal economic problems before it could risk settling international issues. Therefore, the Aswan Dam was very important to Egypt. It would increase farm acreage by as much as one-third and would provide much needed electric power and fertilizers.

In a memorandum to the President, Black recommended that the United States and Britain suggest to the Egyptians a joint venture with the World Bank in return for "Egyptian support for a settlement of the urgent political issues mentioned." Impressed with Black's suggestions, Eisenhower sent the memorandum to the State Department with a note that it "represents rather accurately my current thinking."[37]

Egypt and the World Bank continued their discussions throughout 1955, while the bank ensured that the project was technically sound and negotiated the financial package to everyone's mutual satisfaction. The projected cost of the dam was $1.2 billion. It was estimated that Egypt would need a total of $400 million in foreign exchange. The World Bank would provide a loan of $200 million and the United States and the United Kingdom would grant Egypt another $200 million of which the U.S. would contribute 75 percent over a period of ten to fifteen years ($15 million for a ten year period). Egypt would be responsible for the rest of the amount. On 16 December 1955, the United States publicly announced its support for the Aswan project and offered to furnish $54.6 million toward the first stage of its construction.[38]

It may be that Dulles was never very enthusiastic about funding the dam, but was influenced by the enthusiasm of others and the course of events. Israeli raids on Egypt escalated in August and continued throughout the fall of 1955. Tensions mounted when Egypt announced on 27 September that it had completed an agreement with Czechoslovakia to exchange Egyptian cotton for Czech arms. While the significance of this arms agreement was reinterpreted after the events of 1956, at the time it reinforced concern over Soviet intrusion into the Middle East. Then, in early October, after announcing that the USSR would provide a variety of aid to any underdeveloped country in need, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt told Nasser that Russia would be willing to finance the dam at Aswan. Later Dulles would

[37] Eugene Black, Dulles Oral History Interviews, Princeton; memorandum from Eugene Black, 22 April 1953, Box 8, International Series, Whitman File, DDEL; memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, 22 April 1953, Box 1, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

[38] *Exec. Sess. Sen.*, vol. VIII, 1956, 44–72. Another source of information on the Aswan loan is the *Congressional Record*, 14 August 1957, 13394.

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declare that the Egyptians forced the United States to its decision to withdraw funding by trying to play "both sides," but at the time the Soviet offer was a source of great concern.[39]

Nevertheless, Dulles continued to remain somewhat removed from the decision to fund the high dam. It was Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. who met with the British ambassador in November 1955 and Hoover who participated in the final discussions in Washington between the Egyptian delegation, the British ambassador, and Eugene Black. It was also Hoover who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee and replied to criticism of the project. Hoover's engineering background and enthusiasm for the project was a factor in his high visibility. Furthermore, Dulles could not personally handle every issue before the State Department. Nevertheless, considering his tenacious hold on other foreign policy decisions, especially those requiring the approval of a reticent Congress, his distance from this one was unusual.[40]

From the very outset Dulles and other members of Eisenhower's cabinet were concerned about congressional approval of appropriations for the Aswan Dam. In early December 1955, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey raised the issue at a luncheon meeting with the President, Dulles, and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Humphrey was convinced that if Congress were asked specifically to authorize the Aswan project it would reject it. Not only would the dam "ultimately increase agriculture production," he argued, but "every congressman who wanted a dam for his district would press against giving a big dam to the Egyptians."

Dulles suggested a different approach to the issue. Congress, he argued, should be asked to give the President discretionary authority over $100 million a year for ten years, subject to annual appropriations. In that manner the United States could support major projects that would catch the popular imagination and produce psychological results. Aswan could be one of those projects.[41]

As usual, on 12 December, a few days before the public announcement, the Republican congressional leadership had an opportunity to discuss the decision to fund the Aswan Dam. This time the group was called to a 5:00 P.M. meeting

[39] Dulles's news conference, 2 April 1957, Box 113, Dulles Papers, Princeton; Donald Neff states that "the Czech arms deal was the act that finally galvanized Washington" into backing the Dam. Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 125–126; Love, *Suez*, 302. In an interview with Hubert Humphrey on 30 April 1957, Nasser explained that the army gave him his power and by 1955 he could no longer hold their support without some arms. He had asked and been turned down by the U.S., U.K., and France before taking the Soviet arms. Memorandum of Conversation, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Senator Humphrey, Ambassador Hare, 30 April 1957, Correspondence, Capehart-Green, S85A-F7, RG 46, NA.

[40] Call to the President, 29 November 1955, Box 11, Telephone conversations, White House, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Letter to George Humphrey from Herbert Hoover, Jr., 14 December 1955, Box 70, White House Confidential Files, DDEL; cable to Secretary from Acting Secretary, n.d. (folder, December 1955), Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Love, *Suez*, 304–305. Robert Bowie has no recollection of reluctance on the part of Dulles and suggested Hoover was in charge because of his engineering background. Author's telephone conversation with Robert Bowie, 11 July 1986.

[41] Memorandum of Conversation at Luncheon, 8 December 1955, Box 3, White House Memos, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

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at the home of Herbert Hoover, Jr. The discussion that afternoon also covered the Arab-Israeli question and the foreign aid program in general, including the proposed $100 million discretionary fund. Dulles was present, as were a few future foes of the Aswan project, including Senator Knowland. Again, Hoover must have been the primary supporter of the dam and discretionary fund. Later that evening over dinner, Senators Smith and Saltonstall agreed that Dulles "seemed to be tired and not very forceful about his program." Dulles had every reason to be tired, but the senators' comments highlight the fact that it is difficult to find any forceful statement by Dulles in support of the Aswan Dam project.[42]

Before Black returned to Egypt for final negotiations in late January 1956, Dulles called to assure him that both he and the President had talked to Senator George and Representative Richards, "and they give every possible assurance that we don't need to feel any concern about going through with it." Dulles even suggested that Black could tell Nasser privately of these conversations, although such assurances were not binding. Three weeks later, on 9 February, a final agreement was reached between the World Bank and Egypt for the financing of the Aswan Dam. Yet, some years later Black acknowledged that even before his return to Washington he had received intimations that Secretary Dulles had had a "change of feeling."[43]

He was right. Dulles and Eisenhower had virtually abandoned the Aswan project by the end of March 1956. But congressional opposition was a very small part of that decision. The President proposed the financing of Aswan as part of a solution to the Israeli-Arab problem. That is, in return for support of the project Nasser was to begin negotiating with the Israelis. In January 1956, a few weeks after the United States had agreed to participate in the funding group, Eisenhower sent Robert Anderson to the Middle East as his personal envoy to persuade Nasser to take the lead in negotiations. But Anderson reported on his return that Nasser was quite unwilling to do so since such action would certainly jeopardize his position within Egypt as well as his potential leadership of the Arab world. Anderson's pessimistic report may have been a turning point.[44]

Meanwhile, also in January, Herbert Hoover testified on behalf of the high dam at Aswan before the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the Senate. The response to the proposal for a $100 million discretionary fund as well as the financing of the Aswan Dam was far from friendly. But surely this came as no surprise to the administration. Ten days before Dulles wished Black a bon voyage, Senator George had warned him that an election year was no time for new ideas on economic aid and had urged him not to press the issue at the coming

[42] Smith Diary, 19 December 1955, Smith Papers, Princeton.

[43] Telephone call to Eugene Black from Dulles, 23 January 1956, Telephone Calls, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Black, Oral Interview, Princeton; Biographical Material, Henry Byroade, Box 119, Smith Papers, Princeton.

[44] Diary, 13 March 1956, Box 13, DDE Diary, Whitman File, DDEL. As late as 27 February, Eisenhower wrote Nasser that the dam at Aswan "represents in finest form the policy of peaceful development for your people. . . . " Eisenhower to Nasser, 27 February 1956, Box 8, International Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Love, *Suez*, 309.

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session of Congress. One can assume from his strong public statements that Knowland also expressed his opposition at one of his private breakfast meetings with the secretary. In addition, three of the members of the Appropriations Committee—Saltonstall, Knowland, and Bridges—were present at the initial discussion at Hoover's home in December. It seems unlikely then that the rather ordinary give and take of the committee hearings were a decisive influence in Dulles's change of heart, especially since he had assured Black of congressional support in spite of the warnings.[45] What had changed between January and March probably was the perception that going to the mat to fund the Aswan Dam was no longer worth the effort since it would not lead to a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Turning away from Aswan and Nasser, the President pressed instead for "some kind of comprehensive program." The result was a meeting in the Oval Office and a memorandum on "Near Eastern Policies." This paper presented an alternative course of action in view "of the negative outcome of our efforts to bring Colonel Nasser to adopt a policy of conciliation toward Israel. . . . " It stated that Nasser must be shown that he could not cooperate with the Soviets and enjoy special treatment from the United States. Yet it was also important to avoid "for the time being" the kind of action that would irrevocably tie Nasser to the Soviets. To achieve this end, a series of potential actions to be coordinated with the British were presented to the President and subsequently agreed upon. Included was the suggestion that the U.S. and U.K. "continue to delay the conclusion of current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam." Clearly, Eisenhower finally had been persuaded that one of the major problems in the Arab world was the growing ambition of Nasser.[46]

Moving with alacrity, Dulles invited Senator George to his house the following Saturday to brief him on the new policy decisions. He explained to the senator that Nasser would not forego further arms acquisitions or respond to American efforts to reduce tension with Israel. Nasser, he told George, was convinced he could have the best of both worlds and was "playing with the Soviets on the one hand and trying to extract more aid from us on the other." He explained the unobtrusive steps that were planned, including the decision to delay the "current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam."[47]

[45] "Report on the Aswan Dam," 17 January 1956, Exec. Sess. Sen., vol. VIII, 1956; Hearings, "Financing of Aswan High Dam in Egypt," 26 January 1956, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. Hoover testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 20 March. Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1956, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. For examples of questions asked Hoover see pp. 19, 25, 28–29, 158, 160–168, 564–565. Memorandum of Conversation with Senator Walter F. George, 13 January 1956, Box 5, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

[46] Memorandum of Conversation with Hoover, 27 March 1956, Box 4, Telephone Calls, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Memorandum for the President, 28 March 1956, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; *Memorandum of Conference with the President, 28 March 1956*, Box 13, DDE Diary, Whitman File, DDEL; Anderson's views are reflected in a call from Allen Dulles to his brother, 4 April 1956, Box 4, Telephone Calls, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

[47] Memorandum of Conversation, 30 March 1956, Box 10, Subject Series, Dulles papers, DDEL.

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Although privately the negotiations were being delayed, publicly the dam was still on the administration's congressional agenda. Hearings on the Mutual Security Act the following month continued to air the proposal for long-term commitments to certain kinds of projects. The hearings allowed Knowland to urge Dulles to concentrate on short-term rather than long-term projects, and made testifying a little more difficult for John Hollister, the head of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA).[48]

Finally, about a month after Egypt announced its recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Senate Committee on Appropriations held final hearings on mutual security appropriations. Dulles was asked several specific questions on the Aswan Dam, which he answered as briefly as possible. He assured the committee that the $54.6 million that had originally been reserved for the dam from the 1956 budget had been appropriated for other purposes and that there was no further commitment to the project at that time. He explained to the committee that the entire situation had become so complicated that he did not foresee any early "utilization" of U.S. funds for the dam. "It is possible," he continued, "that the Soviet Union may move in." Nevertheless, the committee wanted written assurance that the administration would not use discretionary funds for the Aswan Dam without committee knowledge. Dulles quickly wrote the committee to that effect, assuring them that none of the funds would be committed to Aswan without prior consultation with the committee.[49]

The committee report, however, did not use his carefully chosen language. The report stated that no funds were to be used for Aswan without the "prior approval" of the committee. Dulles expressed concern over the potential constitutional issues presented by this language. But he conceded that it made little difference to the Aswan project, since United States support was no longer a possibility. Three days later, on 19 July 1956, he informed the Egyptian ambassador that the United States was withdrawing its support. Reporting to Knowland on his conversation with the ambassador, he commented that it will "be interesting to see what happens."[50]

What happened—the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the ensuing crisis as Israelis invaded Egypt and British and French paratroopers floated out of the sky over Suez—was that the decision *not* to fund Aswan ultimately returned to haunt the administration. Yet it did not become a recriminating political issue. Instead, as events unfolded over the next nine months, Dulles emphasized the op-

[48] Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1956, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess., 30 April and 7 May 1956. Pages 35, 73, 99, 109–110, 135–136, 149–150, 162, 168–169 contain material relevant to the Aswan Dam.

[49] Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations, 1957, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. 19 June 1956, 23–25; memorandum for the President, 16 July 1956, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

[50] Memorandum for the President, 16 July 1956, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Telephone Call to Mr. Barnes, 16 July 1956, Box 5, Telephone Calls, Dulles Papers; Telephone Call to Gov. [Sherman] Adams, 17 July 1956, Box 11, Telephone Calls to the White House, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Telephone Call from Knowland, 17 and 19 July 1956, Box 5, Telephone Calls, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

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position of the Senate Appropriations Committee and reaped the rewards of bipartisanship.

Ruminating over the crisis in August, Eisenhower placed the blame squarely on the Egyptians, the unreasonable conditions they set at the beginning of negotiations, their purchase of military equipment from the Soviets so that "we did not believe they would have a sufficient balance of resources left to do their part," and the fact that the situation had "changed markedly . . . " by the time Nasser withdrew his objections and was ready to proceed. In September Eisenhower must have had second thoughts. In a note to Dulles he suggested that the withdrawal from the Aswan project might have been too abrupt. Dulles reminded the President that, among other things, there was mounting congressional opposition and that the Appropriations Committee had passed a resolution opposed to the funding. Dulles repeated that statement to the press the following April.[51]

There was vocal congressional opposition to funding the Aswan Dam, but its pervasiveness is a matter of question.[52] In any case, issues raised by the Appropriations Committee in July 1956 were no different from those raised the previous January. At that time Hoover emphasized the point that land reclaimed from the Nile would not be devoted to cotton production, but questions and comments indicate various members of the committee were not convinced. Among the members of the Appropriations Committee were ten senators from states that grew cotton, including three from states in the southwest that grew the very kind of long-staple cotton that competed on the world markets with Egyptian cotton. Hence the intense questioning of Hoover by Arizona Senator Carl Hayden and the extreme opposition of Senator Knowland.[53]

In addition, the funding package of the dam was opposed by some western Democratic senators who could not get administration support for the construc-

[51] Diary, 8 August 1956, Box 17, DDE Diary, Whitman File, DDEL; Letter to the President from Dulles, 15 September 1956, Box 3, White House Memos, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Confusion over the role of the Congress is evident in the account given by Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution," 87 and Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 329. In his discussion of Dulles and Aswan, Hoopes lists "responsiveness to congressional feeling" as the first of his defenses against criticism of the decision. Hoopes, *Devil and J. F. Dulles*, 342.

[52] Ibid., 331; Love, *Suez*, 323–324. In a recent interview J. William Fulbright could not recall any overt interference from the American Jewish community which, he pointed out, did not have a very strong Washington presence at that time. Fulbright continues to believe that the Senate could have been persuaded to fund the project if the administration had so desired. Author's interview with J. William Fulbright, 18 June 1986. The Dulles Oral History Interviews at Princeton illustrate the lack of consensus on this question. Richard maintains that if Dulles and Eisenhower had asked for support Congress would have gone along. Black also thought Eisenhower could have convinced Congress. George V. Allen, on the other hand, states that Dulles was greatly influenced by Knowland's opposition.

[53] Knowland, of course, was opposed to Nasser for a variety of other reasons. Hearings, "Financing of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt," 26 January 1956. As Aswan was being discussed, the U.S. growers of American Egyptian cotton were forming an organization, The Supima Association of America, to promote the use of American long-staple cotton. Letter from Earl Butz to Gabriel Hauge, 27 January 1956, Letter from Butz to Eisenhower, 1 February 1956, Letter from Arthur Woodside to Gabriel Hauge, 6 February 1956, Box 94, Subject Series, Confidential Files, White House Central Files, DDEL.

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tion of the Hells Canyon Dam in Idaho and other comparable projects close to the hearts of their constituents. Senator Mansfield, for example, questioned giving Egypt a grant for a multipurpose project that would ultimately produce revenue. In the United States, he noted, these projects were funded by low-interest loans scheduled for repayment within a forty-year period.[54] The opposition was not sudden, however. The administration knew of congressional opposition before Black even signed the agreement of February 1956. Yet as Senator J. William Fulbright later noted in an attack on the Aswan decision, there was no attempt to persuade the opposition that the project was sound.[55]

Instead, the Senate leadership was well aware that the administration no longer thought the Aswan Dam a feasible project. Senator George had been told as much in March, six months before the Egyptians were told, and even though there is no memorandum of a comparable discussion with Senator Knowland, he also must have known that the dam was no longer being considered.

What then of the hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee in June? Clearly the hearings and report were very useful to all concerned. The senators were able to demonstrate to their constituents their strong support for American cotton and their independence from the foreign policy of the executive branch, well aware they were not antagonizing Dulles or undermining their position with the President. Meanwhile, Dulles was able to use the strong language of the hearings and report to defend his prior decision to withdraw from the Egyptian project. While there is absolutely no evidence that Dulles encouraged the language in the report, it is not difficult to see that the action of the Senate Appropriations Committee served a useful purpose.

The decision to renege on the Aswan Dam resurfaced in early 1957 as a result of the proposal to Congress for a Middle East Resolution. Unlike the Formosa Resolution, this one not only requested the authority to use military force but gave the President discretionary use over $200 million in mutual security money. In addition, the President requested the authorization of another $200 million for 1959, although it was understood that the appropriation of this sum would come the following year. In his meeting with the congressional leadership Eisenhower noted that as a result of the events of 1956, including the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent Israeli, British, and French invasion of Egypt, neither Britain nor France were now in a position to act as a counterweight to the Soviets in the Middle East. Therefore, the United States had to fill the vacuum and assure friendly countries of support and economic aid.[56]

Although this time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee held extensive joint hearings and there was a "great

[54] Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1956, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong. 2nd sess. 7 May 1956.

[55] *Congressional Record*, 14 August 1957, 13394.

[56] Presidential-Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting, 1 January 1957, Box 2, Legislative Meeting Series, Whitman File, DDEL; *Exec. Sess. Sen.*, vol. IX, 1957, 1–35. Love uses the word "renege" in the title of his chapter on Aswan, *Suez*, 297–327.

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buzz saw of questions, trouble and opposition," the Middle East Resolution was never in serious difficulty.[57] Nevertheless, embarrassing questions were once again asked about the Aswan Dam decision, especially by Senator Fulbright. Fulbright was not a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and thus had not been included in the bipartisan meetings on foreign affairs during the first Eisenhower administration. With the retirement of Senator George and the elevation of the elderly Theodore Green, Fulbright was closer to reaching the chairmanship but still devoting most of his attention to the Senate Banking Committee. Indeed, it was a friendship formed with the banker Eugene Black that led to Fulbright's attack on the Aswan decision.[58] Suggesting that the Senate did not have the information to proceed on the Middle East Resolution, he formally requested the State Department to supply a white paper with supporting documentation tracing the course of administration policy in the Middle East. His intent was clear, and Dulles was especially concerned over this renewed interest in the Aswan decision.[59]

The documents from the State Department were delivered to Fulbright and his staff in stages beginning in May 1957. The information they contained was classified and thus could not be publicized. Nevertheless, in August 1957 Fulbright gave a lengthy speech on the Senate floor in which he concluded that the documents substantiated the view that the disastrous decision had been made by Dulles and that little attempt had been made to convince Congress of the necessity for funding the dam. The speech made the front page of *The New York Times* and called forth a lengthy reply by Senator Knowland—a reply apparently written in the State Department.[60]

Knowland placed congressional opposition seventh in his list of reasons for withdrawing funding and accurately noted that the opposition was expressed in the Appropriations Committee Report. However, in a news conference two days later, Eisenhower reemphasized congressional responsibility. Asked about the charges that Dulles blundered over Aswan, Eisenhower answered that by the time Egypt

[57] Quote from Holt Interview, OH,LC. The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 72–19 on 5 March after twelve days of debate. *Exec. Sess. Sen.*, IX, 87.

[58] Fulbright interview, 18 June 1986.

[59] Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 219, 302, 305; Telephone message from Knowland to Dulles, 28 January 1957, Box 5, Subject Series; Dulles Telephone Call to Mr. [Herbert] Phleger, 15 May 1957, Box 12, Telephone Conversations, White House; Memorandum for Mr. Meeker, 22 May 1957, Box 5, Correspondence, Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Fulbright interview, 18 June 1986. In answer to charges of partisanship, Fulbright amended his request and asked for documents from 1946. After examining the material, the documents were returned to the State Department Historical Office where they were compiled. This file is still classified so it is difficult to know just what was released to Fulbright and his staff. Holt Interview OH,LC. *Exec. Sess. Sen.*, vol. IX, 1957, 101.

[60] Fulbright's speech can be found in the *Congressional Record*, 14 August 1957, 13394. *New York Times*, 15 August 1957. Knowland's speech can be found in the *Congressional Record*, 21 August 1957, 14071. Knowland's speech was a verbatim rendering of a speech prepared in the State Department. Box 113, Dulles Papers, Princeton.

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accepted, conditions had changed and that Egypt was devoting too much of her economic strength to purchasing arms. According to news accounts, he then continued with the third point that "Congressional opposition to the use of foreign aid funds for this purpose had been expressed in a Senate resolution.[61]

Like so many other decisions, the decision to fund the Aswan Dam was made by the executive branch with the full knowledge that it would take sustained persuasion to get the Congress to go along. However, as Senator Fulbright learned when he tried to reopen the issue, a bipartisan foreign policy meant sharing the failures as well as the successes of that policy. In spite of the disastrous consequences, the Aswan decision never became the subject of partisan attack.

Conclusion

Throughout Eisenhower's first administration the President and Dulles were quite successful in gaining congressional support for their foreign policy. The support weakened a little after 1956, but it did not disintegrate until 1959, when the Democrats once again saw control of the White House around the corner.

However, supporters of the thesis that congressional influence is enhanced by bipartisan consultation on the one hand and bipartisan support on the other should look very carefully at the Dulles-Eisenhower model. As these very brief examples illustrate, the continuing dialogue between Dulles, Eisenhower, and the legislative leaders served to increase the influence of the administration, not the Congress.

The efforts of Dulles and Eisenhower, as well as the demands of their foreign policy, did mark a turning point in congressional involvement in foreign policy. It clearly answered an earlier remark of Senator Arthur Vandenberg who complained of being consulted "after the crack-ups rather than on the take-offs."[62] Certainly Dulles and Eisenhower were very careful to consult before the take-offs—before firing back at the Chinese or supporting Nasser's economic projects, for example; but it was not necessarily to receive flying instructions. Instead, Congress was consulted on the take-offs so that it could share the responsibility for the crack-ups. It was the sharing of responsibility that inspired the time-consuming domestic diplomacy of John Foster Dulles.[63] For the most part, it was very successful. The lessons learned were not forgotten by some of those who participated: Lyndon B. Johnson, for example.*

[61] *New York Times*, 22 August 1957. In the transcript of the news conference, Eisenhower replied to a question, "I think there has been a resolution in the Senate, or a provision in one of our bills" that money couldn't be used.

[62] Knowland Oral History Interview, DDEL.

[63] Another example of consultation for this purpose is the 3 April 1954 meeting to discuss possible U.S. support for the French at Dienbienphu. See Herring and Immerman "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu."

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The War on Poverty and the Poor and Nonpoor

ROBERT H. HAVEMAN

The early 1960s witnessed a large and sudden increase in the concern of Americans about problems of economic poverty and disparities among blacks and whites, old and young, rural and urban, sick and well, South and North. Stimulated by the writings of Michael Harrington and John Kenneth Galbraith, President John F. Kennedy proposed and President Lyndon B. Johnson pursued legislation designed to fight poverty and create a "Great Society." As a result of these initiatives, new programs targeted at the poor were begun; existing social welfare programs were expanded and tilted more heavily toward the poor. As Robert Lampman stated so aptly, national policy after 1965 was heavily influenced by the question: "What does it do for the poor?"[1]

These efforts were undertaken with optimism that poverty could be reduced, racial inequalities diminished, and efficient investments in human productivity made. That optimism has faded in the 1980s. Disappointment with past efforts, a desire to scale back existing programs, and a reluctance to embrace new social initiatives characterize the current mood. To be sure, the current view is not without basis. Poverty-related education and training efforts cannot be graded "outstanding"; "satisfactory with flashes of good" is about the most that can be said. Advances in health care and access to education for the poor have occurred, and few would doubt a decrease in employment and housing discrimination. Central

[1] Robert Lampman, "What Does It Do for the Poor? – A New Test for National Policy," *The Public Interest* 34 (Winter 1974): 66–82.

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cities seem better places in which to live, and the ghettos of the poor seem less harsh than in the 1960s, but in neither case would a judicious observer claim a revolution. And because some of these improvements must be attributed to general economic growth and other economic and demographic factors, many people wonder just how many of these gains are attributable to the programs designed to reduce poverty and create a Great Society.

Research about the effect of these policies on the poor is voluminous. The flow of income transfers and in-kind benefits to poor people has been documented, and the substantial contribution of antipoverty programs to the well-being of low income families is now accepted.[2] The magnitude of the impacts of income transfer policies on the decisions and choices made by the poor—on labor supply, saving, migration, family size and structure, and fertility—has also been extensively assessed.[3]

Relatively little attention has focused on the overall impact of these propoor policies on the much larger segment of the nation's population that was not targeted for benefits—the nonpoor.[4] Without such an assessment, the ongoing debate over social policy will continue to be imbalanced and poorly informed, resting far too heavily on prejudice and predilection in place of evidence. To make such an overall assessment is difficult, however. The impacts of some social and antipoverty policies on recipients can be traced in a fairly direct way; welfare benefits or food stamps are examples. Other effects of these measures are largely in the form of welfare losses from additional taxes; assignment of such costs to specific individuals is difficult. Still other of the impacts are in the form of nonmarket or spillover effects; improved health and longevity due to welfare transfers, education programs, or Medicaid are examples.

I shall attempt to identify the numerous impacts on the nonpoor of the post-1965 surge in social welfare expenditures (SWE) that can be attributed to the antipoverty, Great Society initiative. It is clearly impossible to attribute a precise share

[2] See Robert Haveman, ed., *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[3] See Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick, "How Income Transfers Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review," *Journal of Economic Literature* 19 (September 1981): 975–1028.

[4] To be sure, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward in *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon, 1971), have stressed the political functions of the War on Poverty and the Great Society, viewing them as the price paid by the nonpoor for the benefits of political and social stability in the low-income (largely, black) community which were being "purchased." Other participants in the debate over social policy have cited the efficiency costs of the higher taxes borne by the nonpoor as a result of these initiatives, and of the deterioration in family and social structures, which might be causally related to social welfare expenditures and which has spilled over to the nonpoor community. See Martin Anderson, *Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); and Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984). None of these discussions, however, has attempted to systematically analyze and measure these negative and positive effects.

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of the rapid growth in SWE over the 1965–1980 period to a single cause such as the antipoverty theme. Yet, some amount of the post-1965 surge in SWE is properly attributed to this federal initiative. As Robert Lampman has stated:

> No other nation had set out a performance goal so explicit with regard to "the poor." The question, "What does it do for the poor?" served as a flag for the great onrush of social welfare legislation commencing in 1965 and the consequent expansion in the role of the federal government. This movement was manifested by the enactment of such measures as Medicare and Medicaid, and aid to elementary and secondary education. It led to uniform national minimum guarantees in the food stamp program, in cash assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled (under the title of Supplemental Security Income), and in stipends for college students in the form of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants. Other interventions—notably equal opportunity legislation, the provision of legal services for and on behalf of the poor and "community action"—reflected new efforts by the federal government to be an integrative force in national life. If the import of the antipoverty theme was to expand the broad set of "social welfare expenditures under public programs" and to get more cash and in-kind benefits for the poor, then it must be identified as a huge success.[5]

First, I have adopted two scenarios—a generous one that attributes about 50 percent of the 1965–1980 growth in SWE to the War on Poverty and Great Society initiative, and a conservative one in which only about 30 percent of the rapid growth over this period is so attributed. Second, I set forth the rationale for these two scenarios. Third, I present a catalogue of the manifold ways that the growth in SWE can have an impact on the economic well-being of citizens, both poor and nonpoor. The impacts on the nonpoor are emphasized. Finally, I present some crude estimates of the magnitude of the gains and losses to the nonpoor from the growth of SWE induced by the War on Poverty. Estimates of the impacts are partial, reflecting the limits of social science in measuring important social impacts even crudely. The framework and the estimates form the first consistent attempt to analyze the effects of this major policy shift on the nonpoor, although the importance of this distributional issue has been suggested in recent contributions to the public-choice literature.[6]

Growth in SWE, With and Without the Antipoverty Initiative

To estimate the impact on the nonpoor of the 1965–1980 surge in SWE attributable to the War on Poverty initiative, it is first necessary to decide how much of the increase in SWE can be legitimately attributed to the antipoverty effort. This amount will clearly be less than the actual increase in SWE. In fact, from 1965 to 1980, SWE grew by an average of 12.9 percent per year (see Table 1).

One possibility—call it Scenario A—is to assume that, in the absence of the

[5] Lampman, "What Does It Do for the Poor?," 67–68.

[6] See Julian Le Grand, *The Strategy of Inequality* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); and Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

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TABLE 1

Total Social Welfare Expenditures under Public Programs
(millions of current dollars)

	1965	*1980*	*Average Annual Percentage Rates of Change*
Social Insurance	28,123	229,552	14.8
OASDI (excl. Medicare)	16,998	117,118	13.5
Medicare	—	34,992	16.8('70–'80)
Unemployment Insurance	3,003	18,326	12.6
Workers' Compensation	1,859	13,253	13.7
Other	6,263	45,863	13.9
Public Aid	6,283	73,385	17.5
Public Assistance[a]	4,508	17,298	9.2
Medicaid	1,367	27,394	21.7
Supplemental Security Income	—	8,226	5.9('75–'80)
Food Stamps	36	9,083	43.7
Other	373	9,601	23.7
Health Programs	6,246	28,119	10.4
Veterans' Programs	6,031	21,466	8.7
Education	28,108	120,588	10.0
Elementary and Secondary	22,358	86,773	9.3
Higher	4,826	26,091	11.7
Vocational/adult	854	7,375	15.2
Housing	318	7,209	22.7
Other Social Welfare	2,066	14,036	13.4
TOTAL	77,175	493,354	12.9

[a] Includes categorical cash transfers under the Social Security Act, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and General Assistance from state and local funds.

Source: Tabulated from *Social Security Bulletin*, various issues.

War on Poverty initiative, SWE would have grown at the same rate as the economy as a whole over the post-1965 period. This rate of growth was 8.9 percent, which implies that over the period the ratio of SWE to gross national product (GNP) would have remained constant. The difference between 12.9 percent and 8.9 percent implies a substantial impact of the War on Poverty initiative on the growth of SWE. To see the impact of this assumption, we can compare the actual level of SWE in 1980 to the level that it would have attained if this scenario had held. Table 1 indicates that from 1965 to 1980 actual SWE grew from $77 billion to $493 billion; Scenario A suggests a growth in SWE in the absence of the antipoverty initiative from $77 billion in 1965 to $287 billion in 1980. In 1980 then, *$206 billion* of the actual level of $493 billion of SWE represents growth in SWE that is attributable to the War on Poverty.

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TABLE 2

Growth in SWE, 1965–1980, With and Without the War on Poverty and Great Society Initiatives

	Scenario A	*Scenario B*
Actual growth rate of SWE, 1965–1980	12.9%	12.9%
Growth rate of SWE, 1965–1980, *without antipoverty initiative*	8.9%	10.7%
Growth rate of SWE, 1965–1980, attributable to antipoverty effort	4.0%	2.2%
Actual 1980 SWE	$493 billion	$493 billion
1980 SWE without antipoverty initiative	$287 billion	$372 billion
1980 SWE attributable to antipoverty effort	$206 billion	$121 billion

A far more conservative possibility would assume that the demographic trends and equity-based concerns that were already in evidence in the period before 1965 continued apace in the post-1965 period. In Scenario B then, we assume that in the absence of the effort to build a Great Society the growth in the *ratio* of SWE to GNP observed in the period 1950 to 1965 would have continued until 1980. This implies a growth rate of SWE of 10.7 percent as compared to the actual growth rate of 12.9 percent. If Scenario B had held, annual SWE by 1980 would have totaled $372 billion as compared to its actual level of $493 billion. In 1980 then, *$121 billion* of the actual level of $493 billion of SWE would be attributed to growth in spending that was caused by the War on Poverty-Great Society initiative.

These comparisons of Scenario A and Scenario B are summarized in Table 2. They indicate the implications of alternative paths of SWE growth in the *absence* of the antipoverty initiative for the level of SWE spending *in 1980*, the year for which we attempt to estimate the gains and losses of antipoverty policy on the nonpoor.

The Impacts of SWE on the Nonpoor

Social welfare spending has numerous impacts on both the poor and the nonpoor. These expenditures generate benefits of value to people in the form of health, education, income support, and social services. Some of these are what economists would call consumption benefits: they increase the general level of economic well-being of recipients, whether poor or nonpoor. Income support payments—both welfare and social insurance—are of this sort. Other benefits are more investment-like in character: because of them individuals are more productive both in the work place and at home. Education, health, and nutrition benefits are of this human capital form. The provision of these public benefits has a wide variety of other impacts in a complex market economy—relative prices and wages, incentives for work and savings, inequality in the distribution of income, and the rate of eco-

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nomic growth will all be affected when a major shift in social policy occurs. And the expansion of public spending must somehow be financed, implying an increase in the level of taxation.

All of these impacts affect different groups differently. For any group, each impact will imply some gains and some losses. Overall the changed level of public spending on social welfare activities will create both winners and losers among the population. In the following paragraphs I catalogue the primary ways in which the increased social welfare expenditures of the 1965–1980 period attributable to the antipoverty initiative will affect one particular group—the nonpoor population.

Gains to the Nonpoor

Increased Social Benefits to the Nonpoor. Some portion of the growth in public expenditures on cash and in-kind benefits that are attributable to antipoverty policy provide benefits directly to the nonpoor. Increased spending on education, for example, has also benefited the children of the nonpoor. For example, Robert Plotnick has estimated that about 80 percent of total SWE on education in the 1965–1980 period has gone to the nonpoor.

Increased Nonpoor Income from More Rapid Economic Growth. Because of the War on Poverty, education, training, and economic security increased in the U.S. economy. These increases contributed to a more productive work force and, in turn, more rapid increases in GNP. This economic growth will result in a larger economic pie which will, in some proportion, be shared by both the poor and the nonpoor. The economic growth gains from effective social welfare expenditures trickle up as well as down.

Increased Economic Security of Nonpoor. The increase in effective income guarantees from expanded social welfare expenditures induced by antipoverty policy provides a safety net protecting both the poor and the nonpoor. The nonpoor would be willing to pay some amount for this increase in their own security. These expenditures also convey benefits to the nonpoor in the form of reductions in crime and, perhaps most importantly, the defusing of civil unrest. These latter effects have been discussed extensively by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward.

Increased Nonpoor Well-Being from Improved Lot of the Poor. Antipoverty policies improve the nutrition, health, education, and housing of the poor and decrease the insecurity that poor persons bear due to income loss or irregular and extraordinary expenditure. To the extent that nonpoor individuals value these improvements, their own well-being increases. This effect has been referred to in the economics literature as the benefits from "Pareto-optimal redistribution."[7]

Increased Nonpoor Leisure Time and Home Production. The reduction in desired work effort induced by the higher tax and benefit reduction rates (and higher taxes and benefits) increases the time that the nonpoor have available for leisure and

[7] See Harold Hochman and James Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," *American Economic Review* 59 (September 1969): 542–557.

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home production. The value of this time partially offsets the reduced earnings that are recorded below as a loss to the nonpoor from the induced increase in SWE.

Losses to the Nonpoor

Increased Tax Burden of the Nonpoor. Because the policy changes motivated by War on Poverty-Great Society concerns led to public spending that did not substitute on a dollar-for-dollar basis for expenditures for other purposes, aggregate public expenditures and taxes are to some extent higher than they would otherwise be. The bulk of the required increase in taxes is borne by the nonpoor. This increased tax burden entails slower growth in the disposable income and, hence, the economic well-being of the nonpoor than would have otherwise occurred.

Reduction in Nonpoor Earnings. The higher tax and benefit reduction rates (and higher taxes and benefits) faced by the nonpoor resulting from increased SWE attributable to the antipoverty effort cause some reduction in the labor supply of the nonpoor and, hence, some reduction in their earnings. It is these negative supply-side impacts of social spending that has provided much of the rationale for the retrenchment in social policy observed since 1980.

Reduction in Nonpoor Income from Increased Job Competition. Antipoverty education and training policies increase the productivity of low income workers. These productivity increases stimulate competition for jobs and in the process erode the wage rates and earnings of those affected or displaced by the competition. The burden of these labor market shifts will be borne largely by the nonpoor; indeed, largely by the lower income segment of the nonpoor.[8]

Decrease in Nonpoor "Status Rewards." As Charles Murray emphasized in *Losing Ground*, the use of public benefits by the nonworking poor to achieve levels of living comparable to those achieved by working, nonpoor people has made this latter group feel like "chumps." The satisfaction they obtain from securing independence and escaping poverty through work is eroded.

A difficulty in discussing the impacts of policy measures on the nonpoor population is the identification of who is nonpoor. In any given year this identification is straightforward. For example, the official poverty measure can be used to separate the total population into pretransfer poor and nonpoor groups at a given point in time. Over time, however, mobility into and out of poverty is substantial; families classified as nonpoor in year 1 may well be poor in year 2. Moreover, because of births, deaths, and migration, the population as a whole, and hence the nonpoor population, is composed of quite different individuals over, say, a decade. Our discussion proceeds as if there is a constant group of individuals who are the official pretransfer poor over the 1965–1980 period. A reasonable, though crude, interpretation would be to think of a constant group of individuals who are at

[8] Victor Fuchs, *The Concept of Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1965), 88–89; Barbara Bergmann, "The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment," *Journal of Political Economy* 79 (April 1971): 294–313.

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the bottom of the distribution of some long-term (or permanent) measure of income or earnings capacity.

Gains and Losses to the Nonpoor from War on Poverty-Induced Increases in SWE

Table 3 presents some numerical estimates of the gains and losses to the nonpoor population from the growth in public social-welfare spending that we have attributed to antipoverty concerns. These estimates are for a single year, 1980, the final year covered by our analysis. They are presented for both the generous and the conservative assumptions of the 1965–1980 growth in SWE attributable to the antipoverty initiative which began in 1965—Scenario A and Scenario B.

Consider first the gains to the nonpoor from the increase in SWE motivated by antipoverty concerns. Much of the impetus to the 1965–1980 growth in SWE was motivated by the question, "What does it do for the poor?" But not all of the increased spending went for income support to the pretransfer poor. Robert Plotnick and Felicity Skidmore, and later Robert Plotnick alone, calculated antipoverty budgets—estimates of the proportion of expenditures in each of the SWE programs that went to pretransfer poor families—for the 1965–1974 period. They estimated that about 41 to 45 percent of total social welfare expenditures went to poor families. An update of their calculation indicates that in 1980, 45 percent of total spending went to the pretransfer poor; conversely, 55 percent of these benefits spilled over to the nonpoor. Assuming that the benefits to recipients of these programs are equal to their budgetary costs, we enter gains to the nonpoor from these spillovers of \$63 billion (.55 × \$121 billion) for Scenario B and \$107 billion (.55 × \$206 billion) for Scenario A as item G1.

The second component of gains to the nonpoor can also be roughly quantified. The actual level of education and training expenditures in 1980 was \$120.6 billion. If in the absence of War-on-Poverty and Great-Society policies, these expenditures had grown so as to maintain a constant ratio with GNP over this period, they would have been about 15 percent lower in that year. A similar calculation indicates that *over the entire 1965–1980 period* aggregate education and training expenditures were about \$126 billion higher than they would have been in the absence of the antipoverty initiative. These direct public expenditures, however, account for only a portion of the total increase in human resource investment costs attributable to the post-1965 antipoverty policies. Studies indicate that foregone student (trainee) income is about equal to the direct expenditures on these programs and that this foregone income is also to be included as a component of the total social investment in these programs. The sum of the direct expenditures and the value of the foregone income totals about \$252 billion of additional investment in human capital over the post-1965 period attributed to the War-on-Poverty and Great-Society initiative. Assuming that this additional human capital investment existed in 1980 and that it earned a real rate of return of 5 percent, personal income in 1980 was about \$13 billion higher with these antipoverty policy

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TABLE 3

1980 Gains and Losses to the NonPoor from Antipoverty Policy (1980 $ billions)

Item	Gains to Nonpoor: Scenario A	Gains to Nonpoor: Scenario B	Losses to Nonpoor: Scenario A	Losses to Nonpoor: Scenario B
Gains to the Nonpoor				
G1 Gains to the nonpoor from the spillover to them of transfer income and education, training and medical care services from increase in SWE due to antipoverty concerns.	$107	$63		
G2 Increase in nonpoor incomes due to more rapid economic growth from more productive low-income workers.	$10	$10		
G3 Increase in security of nonpoor from unexpected job or income loss or extraordinary expenses.	X	X		
G4 Gains to the nonpoor from reduced poverty, inequality and insecurity of poor.	X	X		
G5 Increase in leisure and home production outputs due to reduction in labor supply of nonpoor (see L2 below).	$28	$20		
Losses to the Nonpoor				
L1 Increased taxes of nonpoor required to finance increase in SWE due to antipoverty concerns.			$196	$115
L2 Reduction in nonpoor labor earnings from reduced labor supply due to higher tax and benefit reduction rates.			$37	$27
L3 Reduction in nonpoor income from increased job competition due to more trained and educated disadvantaged workers.			X	X
L4 Decrease in well-being of nonpoor from reduced "status rewards."			X	X
TOTAL	$145 plus G3 and G4	$93 plus G3 and G4	$233 plus L3 and L4	$142 plus L3 and L4

measures in place than without them. With 80 percent of this increased income retained by the nonpoor, $10 billion is entered as item G2.[9]

For two reasons, this is a very conservative estimate. First, studies of education

[9] About 80 percent of total public education expenditures over the 1965–1980 period went to the nonpoor. See Robert Plotnick, "Social Welfare Expenditures: How Much Help for the Poor?" *Policy Analysis* 5 (Summer 1979): 261–289. Hence, we assume that 20 percent of the incremental education

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investments during the 1960s and 1970s concluded that these expenditures were competitive with private sector capital investments. These latter investments were producing real rates of return of up to double the 5 percent figure.[10] Second, these studies counted as benefits only the returns to education in the form of *earnings increases*. In fact, the benefits of education include numerous nonmarketed, yet valued, impacts including improvements in one's own health, the quality of one's children, the efficiency of one's consumption, fertility, and migration choices, and so on.[11]

Both the increased taxes and benefits attributable to the rapid growth in SWE contain incentives that tend to erode labor supply and work effort. While these supply-side reductions entail losses in earnings (see item L2), they also convey gains in the form of increases in time available for home production, schooling, or leisure (for example, early retirement). However, because individuals make the choice of fewer work hours because of the work disincentives associated with the higher taxes, the value of these increases in leisure and home production time is not equal to the foregone earnings. In the face of existing taxes and other labor market distortions, the net wage rate at the margin will be less than the gross wage rate, and it is the former at which increments of nonmarket time are appropriately valued. Assuming a wedge between the gross and net wage rate of 25 percent,[12] the value of the increase in nonmarket time of the nonpoor is estimated to be about $28 billion (.75 times the $37 billion of earnings losses in item 2 of losses) for Scenario A and $20 billion (.75 times the $27 billion of earnings losses) for Scenario B. These appear as item G5.

Items G3 and G4 are unquantifiable. The gains to the nonpoor from reduced poverty, inequality, and the insecurity experienced by the poor (item G4) may be large, but no reliable estimate exists. Similarly, the increase in economic security that is experienced by the nonpoor because of the social safety net created by welfare state policies (item G3) is real and substantial, but again difficult to measure.[13]

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expenditures attributable to War-on-Poverty and Great-Society concerns were targeted on the poor and that they retained the additional returns generated by the additional human capital.

[10] See W. Lee Hansen, "Total and Private Rates of Return to Investment in Schooling," *Journal of Political Economy* 71 (February 1963): 128–140; Jacob Mincer, *Schooling, Experience, and Earnings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Henry Levin, "A Decade of Policy Developments in Improving Education and Training Programs for Low-Income Populations" in Haveman, ed., *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs.*

[11] Robert Haveman and Barbara Wolfe, "Schooling and Economic Well-Being: The Role of Non-Market Effects," *Journal of Human Resources 19* (Summer 1984): 377–407; the authors suggest that the value of these *nonmarketed effects* are likely to equal the value of the marketed returns measured in the standard, returns-to-education studies. These benefits, if added to those estimated in the text, would double the benefits from the initiatives credited to the nonpoor in item G5.

[12] Joseph Pechman, in *Who Paid the Taxes, 1966–1985?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985) estimates that in 1980 the effective rate of federal, state, and local taxes was about 25 percent over deciles 3 to 10 in the income distribution, irrespective of the incidence assumptions used. Assuming that marginal and average tax rates are not widely divergent, the net wage rate will equal about 75 percent of the gross wage rate.

[13] See Y. Aharoni, *The No-Risk Society* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981).

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The largest component of the losses experienced by the nonpoor due to the antipoverty-induced growth of SWE is the additional tax burden required to finance the increased spending. While it is impossible to know with accuracy how this added revenue requirement was financed, some reasonable estimates are available.[14] Because of the growth of social insurance expenditures, a sizable share of the increase clearly came from payroll taxes. Given the relative decline in importance of corporate taxes as a source of general revenue, another sizable proportion probably came from personal income taxes. During the 1970s, the poor were largely exempt from federal income taxes, though they probably accounted for a greater share of payroll, sales, property, and excise taxes than their income levels would indicate. Hence, it seems reasonable to allocate to the nonpoor 95 percent of the $121 (Scenario A) or $206 (Scenario B) billion increase in revenue required to finance the growth in SWE attributable to the War-on-Poverty initiative.[15] These estimates—$115 billion and $196 billion—appear as itemL1.

Both the increased taxes and the increased social welfare benefits attributable to the growth in SWE that we are considering contain incentives that are likely to decrease labor supply. A recent study examined the combined effects of a reduction in social-welfare program spending and a proportional reduction in personal income tax rates on aggregate labor supply in 1980.[16] Extrapolating the results of this study to the question addressed here results in an overall estimate of about a 2.5 percent (Scenario B) to 3.5 percent (Scenario A) decrease in labor supply in 1980 attributable to the post-1965 antipoverty policy measures and the taxes required to finance them. We take $12,904, median full-time, full-year earnings in fiscal 1980, to be the earnings lost from a reduced person year of full-time work in 1980. A 3.5 percent (2.5 percent) reduction in labor supply is about 2.9 (2.1) million worker years, which implies a loss in earnings of $37 billion for Scenario A and $27 billion for Scenario B, recorded as item L2.

Item 3 in the losses category concerns the effects on the structure of wage rates and hours worked due to the new or expanded training and education attributable to the War-on-Poverty and Great-Society initiatives, and to the associated affirmative action efforts to reduce labor market discrimination. Much of this increment in human capital investment and equal-opportunity activities was concentrated on low-skilled, disadvantaged workers. Because of their increased productivity and opportunities, they became better able to compete with higher-skilled workers for available jobs. This increase in competition tended to reduce the wages of the more-

[14] See W. Lee Hansen and Burton Weisbrod, "Who Pays for a Public Expenditure Program?" *National Tax Journal* 24 (December 1971): 515–517, for a discussion of the difficulties of identifying the counterfactual constellation of taxes in the absence of a public expenditure program.

[15] Pechman in *Who Paid the Taxes*? reports that in 1980 the lowest fifth of all families received about 4 percent of pretax, but posttransfer, income. Given his finding that the tax system is basically proportional across the income classes, allocating 5 percent of incremental taxes from antipoverty concerns to the poor population would be a practical upper bound.

[16] See Robert Haveman, "How Much Have the Reagan Administration's Tax and Spending Policies Increased Work Effort?" in C. R. Hulten and I. V. Sawhill, eds., *The Legacy of Reaganomics* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1984).

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skilled individuals who had held such jobs. Because the magnitude of this effect is difficult to ascertain, we simply identify item L3 for the nonpoor population, which contains the more skilled workers who would be adversely affected.

Finally, the loss in status rewards by the nonpoor attributable to antipoverty efforts (item L4) is claimed to be substantial by some,[17] but again the magnitude of the effect is unknown.

Conclusion

What have we learned from these calculations and how do they contribute to the current debate over social policy? Perhaps as at no time before, the debate on federal social-welfare policy is a highly polarized one. Analysts on the right argue that the post-1965 policy initiatives have simultaneously won the war on income poverty (Martin Anderson, *Welfare*), created increasingly serious problems of black youth unemployment, family disintegration, economic dependency, and a loss of status rewards (Charles Murray, *Losing Ground*), and led to reductions in work effort, savings, and innovation, which have stifled economic growth (George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty*). Others have emphasized the serious poverty, inequality, and hardship that still exist (Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg, *Fighting Poverty*) and show that the adverse labor supply, savings, and family structure side effects that have been created are less serious than is often asserted (Robert Lampman, *Social Welfare Spending*).[18]

If those holding the first view are correct, the implication is that the poor have gained income at the expense of the nonpoor because of antipoverty measures, and that these policies have at the same time harmed the nonpoor by retarding economic growth, fostering a disintegration of traditional values of independence and family stability, and eroding the satisfaction from escaping poverty by one's own efforts. Perceiving these effects, it is suggested that the nonpoor withdraw their support for existing social policies and, in the resulting process of dismantling, seek to induce more socially beneficial work, independence, family responsibility, and legitimate behaviors on the poor.

The framework and calculations that are presented here indicate that this view is based on a partial accounting of the full impact of social policies on the nonpoor. On the basis of our examination, the increase in SWE induced by the War-on-Poverty and Great-Society initiative does not appear to have imposed large net losses on the nonpoor, on whose political support such efforts rely. For the year 1980 we have identified a quantifiable gross economic loss to the nonpoor from the Great-Society measures of from $142 billion (Scenario B) to $233 billion (Scenario A). This loss was offset by a total quantifiable gain to the nonpoor in 1980 of from $93 billion (Scenario B) to $145 billion (Scenario A), plus the nonquan-

[17] See Murray, *Losing Ground*.

[18] Robert Lampman, *Social Welfare Spending: Accounting for Changes from 1950 to 1978* (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984).

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tifiable gains reflected in items G3 and G4. Assuming that the effects associated with item L3 are negligible, the $49 and $88 billion of *net* losses to the nonpoor represent from 2 to 3 percent of personal income in 1980. Moreover, this amount—less than one year's *growth* in personal income—will be reduced to the extent that the *net* gains experienced by the nonpoor from their contribution to reducing both the hardships faced by those less well off and their own long-run uncertainty (items G3 and G4), exceed whatever loss in status rewards they may have experienced (item L4).

This framework contributes to setting the single-impact claims made by some into a wider perspective. If our crude estimates are anywhere close to being correct, they suggest one reason why U.S. citizens—in particular, the nonpoor—have not supported wholesale dismantling of War-on-Poverty and Great-Society measures, in spite of calls for such retrenchment from political leaders. They also suggest that with reorientation to improve integration, administration, incentives, and efficiency, existing social policy could be made to yield net gains to both the poor and nonpoor.

The tentative nature of the quantitative estimates should again be emphasized. They represent "order-of-magnitude" impacts on the nonpoor of a broad spectrum of policy changes and in many cases deviate from estimates consistent with the principles of applied welfare economics (benefit-cost analysis). Given the magnitude of the policy shift, no formal benefit-cost analysis could be undertaken without a full general equilibrium model. Moreover, the programs grouped together are too diverse and too complex (with contradictory incentive effects and alterations of budget constraints) to warrant a full benefit-cost evaluation. Indeed, obtaining reliable estimates of the efficiency gains and costs of any single program is a major undertaking.

Indeed, our accounting framework, it should be noted, neglects a variety of economic effects on the nonpoor that could be attributable to War-on-Poverty concerns. First, we have neglected the potential effect of the growth of public social spending and associated taxes on the aggregate savings rate. This effect has been much researched and debated in the literature, especially in the context of increases in social security benefits. A reasonable, and perhaps consensus estimate is that the dissavings effects at issue are positive but small (see Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, "How Income Transfers") and would primarily alter the well-being of the nonpoor.

Second, we have only considered the changes in public social spending attributable to War-on-Poverty concerns. These concerns also generated substantial changes in regulatory policy, primarily in the affirmative action-equal opportunity area. These regulatory changes also carry gains and losses to the nonpoor. On balance, the losses are likely to exceed the gains, although probably not for nonpoor blacks and women.

Finally, some have asserted that many public social-welfare expenditures were undertaken largely to subsidize producer interests—food programs for agricultural interests, housing programs for construction industry interests, research pro-

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grams for consulting firm and university interests. We have neglected the implied gains to producers in our accounting, nearly all of which would have gone to the nonpoor.*

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Puzzles and Confusions: Political Realignment in the 1980s

DAVID G. LAWRENCE
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Few concepts in the social science literature have aroused as much controversy and discussion in recent years as party and electoral realignment. The term conjures up images of sharp dramatic changes in the nature of political conflict, upsurge in mass political involvement and participation, sharp alteration in the political agenda and the nature of political outputs. Realignment has attracted attention because it was thought to be topical as well: Walter Dean Burnham's elegant argument for the periodicity of realignment suggested that the United States was "due" for realignment in the late 1960s, precisely at a time at which many of the warning signs (ideological tensions within the parties, third-party campaigns, breakdown of traditional party loyalties) were becoming obvious.[1]

But what has become clear by 1986 is how divided scholars are on the status of the "current" realignment. Recent years have seen assorted scenarios for creation of an era of electoral dominance by a conservative Republican majority, for reconstitution of a Democratic majority (in traditional New Deal or modified form) and, most popular of all, for the end of party systems and of realignment itself as we have traditionally perceived it, due to a possibly irreversible deterioration of party loyalties that produces perpetual *de*alignment.

To some extent, the disagreement centers on how to interpret specific events

[1] Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970).

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that occur in the political process: did Ronald Reagan's first victory indicate popular rejection of a failed incumbent or the gathering of a new conservative majority; did Ronald Reagan's second victory indicate popular ratification of a conservative political agenda or simple support for a popular individual during whose administration the misery index had, for whatever reason, been cut in half? To some extent the disagreement centers on differing predictions of future events: did Reaganomics represent a genuine solution to the problems of stagflation or did it produce only temporary recovery likely to fade by 1988?

More significant than either of these is the possibility that conceptual and theoretical problems with our notion of realignment itself produce difficulties in applying the concept to current developments. The point of this article is to suggest two related ways in which such problems have hindered the development of our understanding of realignment.

First, the very richness of the concept of realignment has caused difficulties. Realignment has come to be associated with so broad a range of developments that the original phenomenon that attracted the interest of scholars seems to be lost in a mass of associated, but not necessarily related, factors. What started as a relatively simple observation about patterns of presidential election outcomes has expanded to encompass mass pyschological attachments to political parties, subpresidential voting election results, control of governmental institutions, and contents of policy outputs. Realignment has undoubtedly in the past been associated with all of these and more. But insistence that realignment itself encompasses the full package may cause problems should the package that held together in the past fail to do so now. The result would be that those searching for clues to understanding current electoral developments look for tangential components of past realignments. Not finding them, they fail to recognize or to fully appreciate the very real changes that have occurred.

Second, scholars have been unable to separate realignment from the package of which it is a part, because the existing literature has confused the *outcome* of realignment with the *process* of realignment. The literature assumes a particular relationship between the micro and macro aspects of realignment: changes in party loyalties have generally been used to explain both the initial sharp change in the pattern of presidential election results as well as the trickle-down effect on party-based subpresidential voting, thereby producing unified control of government and enactment of a coherent legislative agenda. Refocusing attention on the outcome of realignment allows us to investigate the potentially large number of different processes that can produce it.[2]

Realignment: Core Components

Two fundamental aspects of realigning elections were identified in the early literature. First, V.O. Key, Jr. identified elections in which the composition of party

[2] See Kristi J. Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority: 1928–1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and David W. Brady, "A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 79 (1985): 3–18.

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coalitions changed in a way that persisted over time.[3] Second, Angus Campbell identified elections as marking sharp and persisting changes in the overall balance of party forces in presidential elections.[4] Walter Dean Burnham integrated the two elements, linked them to each other, demonstrated that the increase over time in incongruity between partisanship and underlying social and economic realities explained periodicity, thereby producing the most comprehensive and elegant general explanation of realignment.[5]

V.O. Key, Jr. in his seminal 1955 article identified critical elections as elections in which

> voters are . . . unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate.
>
> Moreover, and perhaps this is the truly differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections.[6]

Key makes clear that the change in political cleavages he refers to consists of differing patterns of change in voting behavior among different social groups: some segment of the population moves towards one of the two major parties, while other groups either move in the opposite direction or maintain a previous pattern. Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale refer to such outcomes as "differential" or "interactive" change.[7] Key explicitly excludes from his concept a situation in which all segments of society change their behavior in the same way, which Clubb et al. call "across-the-board" change or a "surge." For example, an election in which all groups move towards the Republicans (like 1896 in Massachusetts) is not a critical election, whereas an election in which some groups become more Democratic while others become more Republican or do not change at all (like 1928) clearly is.

Although the initial quotation from Key suggests that there are three characteristics of a critical election (voter concern, electoral involvement, and alteration of cleavage patterns), the second quote clearly refers to alteration of cleavage patterns alone; it is the realignment of party forces, not voter intensity, that persists over time. And the later discussion of the case of Massachusetts in the late 1920s clearly focuses only on cleavage patterns as well: Key deals with how voting patterns of different kinds of towns changed in 1928 and persisted in the New Deal party system. There is no discussion of party identification in Key's account, which predates *The American Voter* by five years.

[3] V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *The Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 3–18.

[4] Angus Campbell, "A Classification of the Presidential Elections" in Angus Cambell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, eds., *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), 63–77.

[5] Burnham, *Critical Elections.*

[6] Key, "Theory of Critical Elections," 4.

[7] Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, Nancy H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980), 78.

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Angus Campbell's "Classification of the Presidential Elections," an expansion of ideas first advanced in the last chapter of *The American Voter*,[8] first introduces the concept of realignment. In such an election, "popular feeling associated with politics is sufficiently intense that the basic partisan commitments of a portion of the electorate change, and a new party balance is created."[9] Realigning elections are to be distinguished from maintaining elections, in which the absence of powerful one-sided short-term forces allows the majority party to win. They also differ from deviating elections, in which short-term forces produce outcomes different from the underlying balance of party forces but which represent only temporary disruptions of the previous stable pattern that later reasserts itself. In a realigning election, short-term forces actually change the underlying party loyalties of at least some citizens, producing the basis for continuation of the new pattern in later electoral contests.

The genius of the "Classification" piece is that it explicitly links the powerful new microtheories of individual vote choice developed in *The American Voter* to the macrolevel phenomenon of party-system change that was increasingly attracting scholarly attention, introducing party identification as the psychological mechanism that explains the process of realignment. Realigning elections differ from deviating elections because the short-term factors that cause partisans to temporarily defect from the party they identify with in a deviating election are powerful enough to cause the citizen to *change* party loyalties in a realigning election. Deviating elections involve defection; realigning elections involve conversion. And it is the newly converted who provide the stable basis for the new pattern of electoral outcomes. Yet, for an article that had tremendous impact on the subsequent literature on party systems, the "Classification" piece is surprisingly lacking in detail. The lack of attention to the mechanics of electoral change is particularly striking given the much more developed analysis of microconcerns in Campbell's and his coauthors' articles on the concepts of a "normal vote" and "surge and decline."[10]

Walter Dean Burnham's 1970 contribution to the realignment literature is twofold. First, Burnham articulates the most elaborate explanation of the microlevel process underlying the macrolevel outcome of realignment, a process that explains the periodicity of realignment. Second, Burnham develops a straightforward empirical device for determining when realignments have occurred. Both contributions have significant implications. Burnham's means of determining when realignments have occurred is extremely simple, focusing solely on the replacement of one stable pattern of electoral outcomes by another such stable pattern during a brief period of sharp change. Burnham's initial discussion of realignment refers to factors such as increased intensity of political discussion, high levels of intraparty and interparty ideological conflict, and changes in the coalitional bases of the

[8] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[9] Campbell, "Classification," 74.

[10] Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" and Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change" in Campbell et al., eds., *Elections and the Political Order*, 9–39 and 40–62.

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parties.[11] All of these factors had been mentioned in earlier studies, and all prove important in Burnham's explanation of the *process* underlying realignment; but they are irrelevant to Burnham's measurement of realignment.[12]

What Burnham does is simply chart the Democratic percentage of the popular vote for president over time. He then begins with the first ten elections, divides the forty-year period into two twenty-year segments (with a midpoint between elections five and six), and conducts a test to determine the significance of the difference in mean Democratic percentage in the two parts of the period. The resulting statistic (t) is low if the two means are very close to each other or if the difference in means is small compared to the standard deviation of percentage voting Democratic *within* each five-election segment. The statistic is large when the two periods are internally consistent but differ markedly from each other. Burnham then drops the first election, adds an eleventh, and repeats the calculation with a new midpoint between elections six and seven. By examining the magnitude of the test statistics for each of the midpoints, Burnham is able to identify when the pattern of presidential election outcomes changes. The technique identifies the same elections as Campbell had already discussed, 1896 and 1932, as taking high values of t and therefore constituting realignments. The technique will always detect surges, but interactive change of the type that originally interested Key will be missed to the extent that the interactions offset each other and produce no overall surge in the percentage of the popular vote Democratic.

Burnham's second contribution is to further develop the process underlying realignment to which Campbell has already referred. The role of partisanship in producing realignment is made explicit in Burnham and is used to explain the prerealignment period of stability, the postrealignment period of stability, *and* the transition between them. Burnham accepts the argument by Campbell et al. that party identification, once established, is extremely resistant to change.[13] Citizens who have developed a party loyalty are in fact likely to maintain it, says Burnham, even as social and economic circumstances change and create tension between the citizen's current political interests—objective and subjective—and his party identification. Over time, the gap between these two factors increases. If, after some extended period of time, some salient political problem or national crisis makes clear that party loyalties no longer provide a reliable guide to current political concerns, the potential for a sudden change in party identification develops. The precipitating event sparks adoption of a new party identification consistent with concurrent socio-economic circumstances. This identification demonstrates both considerable staying power and inevitable incongruity with socio-economic reality, as reality continues inexorably to change. If the national crisis causes large numbers of citizens to change their party loyalty simultaneously, the result is realignment.

[11] Burnham, *Critical Elections*, 6–10.

[12] Interestingly, Burnham argues that the transformation of competitive areas into areas of one-party dominance may in fact depress turnout, as occurred during and after the realignment of 1896.

[13] See Campbell et al., *American Voter*.

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The time period necessary for a sufficient gap between party loyalties and socio-economic reality defines the life expectancy of party systems and seems to be approximately forty years.

Another element underlying the forty-year periodicity of realignment is generational replacement.[14] Time creates incongruence between party and socio-economic reality, even for those whose partisanship was formulated in the aftermath of the previous realignment. Although party was again a good guide to understanding and interpreting events in the immediate aftermath of that realignment, its ability to do so decreases over time. But for young partisans whose experience of the previous realignment was indirectly obtained through the socialization process rather than experienced first-hand, the likelihood that short-term events will be sufficient to overpower party identification is even greater. One of the things that happens during the normal forty-year life expectancy of a party system is that the number of people who remember the previous realignment era and whose partisanship was forged in the intense political events of the time decreases. Those who know the previous realignment only indirectly are more likely to be affected by the short-term increases. It is not accidental that forty years is approximately how long the average citizen remains potentially politically active.

Realignment: Applications and Modifications

Recent literature on realignment began with attempts to apply this concept of realignment to the current party system. Numerous authors, aware both of the likelihood that a party system born in the 1930s should be nearing the end of its expected lifespan in the 1960s and 1970s and of the emergence of expected protorealignment phenomena such as ideological tensions within the parties and the emergence of third-party candidacies for the presidency, have investigated whether current developments constitute a realignment of the kind that Key, Campbell, and Burnham would lead us to expect. The most general conclusion that they come to is that realignment has not in fact occurred. Despite presence of many of the protorealignment phenomena and a clear weakening of Democratic electoral performance at the presidential level, the nature of current public opinion on policy questions and the failure of the Republicans either to gain a party identification majority or to do well below the presidential level has convinced most authors that the current package of political changes fails to constitute a realignment of the traditional kind.

One of the most thorough attempts to apply the logic of realignment to the

[14] See Paul Allen Beck, "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment" in Richard G. Niemi, et al., eds., *The Politics of Future Citizens* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974); and Paul Allen Beck, "The Dealignment Era in America" in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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current political situation is made by James L. Sundquist.[15] He applies the general logic of realignment theory to the realignments generally acknowledged to have occurred in the past and develops an elaborate sixteen-point overview of the process that he applies to the current party system. At the heart of Sundquist's concept is the idea of societal cleavage on a particular policy question on which the parties take clear opposing positions, a combination that provides the basis for stable mass allegiances to one of the parties and for a stable pattern of electoral outcomes over time. Realignment becomes possible when a new issue arises that cuts across the issue that dominated the old system: such an issue splits the preexisting coalitions and puts pressure on some voters to choose between the old issue that has traditionally formed the basis of their party preference and a new issue that pushes them toward defection. If the parties take clear and opposing positions on the new issue and if the new issue assumes greater importance to voters than the old one, the realignment occurs. Each old voting bloc fragments as some of its components find their traditional party no longer acceptable; a new set of party coalitions is created. Because the movements from party to party are not necessarily the same in magnitude, one party may gain a net advantage in voter support and become the new (or increased) majority party.

In applying this scheme to the period since the New Deal, Sundquist finds little basis for seeing realignment as imminent. Political change has certainly occurred since the 1930s, but Sundquist for the most part attributes it to the slow spread of the New Deal cleavage based on social class. Penetration of class-based politics into the white South and the disappearance of monolithic racially-based Democratic dominance are simply delayed aftershocks of the New Deal realignment analagous to aftershocks that have occurred following other realignments as well. The new effect has of course been to damage Democratic electoral performance at the presidential level, but that was an inevitable result of the nationalization of the New Deal system itself. Since the mid-1960s, there is no particular evidence of substantial party change of the kind that occurs in realignment. Vietnam and the social issue provided the Democrats with considerable short-term difficulties. But the passage of time and Republican assumption of responsibility for pursuing the war after 1968 reduced long-term damage from the Vietnam war, and movement of Democratic party leadership to the right after 1972 avoided lasting damage from the social issue. The failure of the parties to take clearly opposing positions on these and other recent political controversies makes them unlikely bases for realignment.

Sundquist believes that the basic class-based New Deal system is likely to continue. The crises of the 1960s and 1970s have produced some *de*alignment, a general weakening of party loyalties and rise in the number of Independents because of the emergence of genuinely cross-cutting new issues and the failures of successive administrations of both parties to deal satisfactorily with the problems they faced.

[15] James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983).

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But the failure of the electorate to develop integrated liberal or conservative belief systems about these issues and the simultaneous failure of the parties to take clear and opposing positions on them suggests that *re*alignment is unlikely.

An even stronger statement of the case for de- rather than realignment is made by Everett Carll Ladd and Charles D. Hadley.[16] Increased availability of political information from the modern mass media makes citizens less dependent on parties than was the case in the past. And increased mass education levels make voters more able to deal with political complexity without being dependent on parties to provide guidance. The result is a rise both in Independence and in split-ticket voting. Candidates only loosely linked to parties are now able to construct personal election-specific coalitions around the issues of the day and to win nominations by using decentralized candidate-selection procedures dominated by self-selected unrepresentative activists. These activists have little interest in party organization in the long-term, and they are unwilling to sacrifice current-issue concerns to create stable long-term alliances. Traditional party supporters are often alienated. On the system level, the result of this process is a succession of (probably alternating) landslides, in which neither party is able to construct the stable basis for an era of electoral dominance; some candidates succeed while others fail to mobilize a national majority in specific elections. The unprecedented succession Democratic and then Republican landslides within the brief period of eight years between 1964 and 1972 suggests that the stability that allowed observers to think of the notion of a party system in the past has itself ended.

Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale add several elements to the argument that help establish some of the problems with current notions of realignment.[17] They first argue that simple analysis of mass electoral data is inadequate to clearly establish the periods of stable party systems usually acknowledged by analysts.[18] Neither interactive realignments of the type pursued by Key nor surge realignments of the kind investigated by Burnham can be clearly identified simply by looking at changes in patterns of electoral outcomes over time. Clubb et al. argue that identification of the standard party systems is due to the fact that certain electoral changes produce elite-level activities that in fact make realignment eras unique. Mass changes in voting patterns produce realignment when they create unified control of government (the presidency and both houses of Congress) by a single party and, as a result, consistency and clarity in governmental policies that is lacking in a period of divided control. The result is a stability in elite politics that provides stable referents and, therefore, encourages stability in mass attitudes and behavior, which helps to prolong the new mass electoral outcomes. Clubb et al. produce the clearest

[16] Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. with Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s* (New York: Norton, 1975).

[17] Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, *Partisan Realignment*.

[18] Clubb et al. make exclusive use of aggregate voting statistics—returns by states and counties—to analyze both interactive and surge aspects of realignment. Appropriateness of such data and of such units of analysis is something we doubt, but our criticism is not directly relevant to the use we make of their work here.

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statement of realignment as a *package* of changes in which mass-level behavior plays only a part.

Furthermore, realigning eras tend to last but a short time and to weaken significantly before the subsequent realignment. Clubb et al. argue that each of the three consensually-defined realignments (1856, 1896, 1932) has ended within twenty years in blurred patterns of electoral outcomes, divided control of government, and an end to clear-cut policy agendas. The remaining years of a party system produce closer electoral outcomes, occasional out-party victories, divided control of government, and policy stalemate. Clubb et al. identify 1946 as the year in which the New Deal realignment ended and the later stages of the declining New Deal party system began.

Current Developments: Puzzles and Confusions

The evidence about change in the pattern of outcomes in American presidential elections since the New Deal is striking and overwhelming. The Democrats have now lost four of the last five presidential elections, two of them (1972 and 1984) by considerable margins. The only exception to the rule of Democratic failure since 1964 is 1976, when Jimmy Carter, running in the immediate aftermath of Watergate against an unelected incumbent, managed to win with a bare 51 percent of the popular vote. The two other Democratic defeats in this period (1968 and 1980) both saw the Democratic percentage of the popular vote under 44 percent.

Yet one would be mistaken to assume that this failure was solely a post-Vietnam phenomenon. In the five presidential elections preceeding 1968, the party's record is only marginally better. From 1948 through 1968, the Democrats received a majority of the national popular vote only once—in 1964. In two other cases they lost to Dwight Eisenhower, and in 1948 and 1960 they managed to elect presidents despite receiving slightly less than 50 percent of the popular vote. The Eisenhower victories looked like aberrations at the time, clear examples of deviating elections due to the personal popularity of Eisenhower; but placed in historical perspective they might have larger significance. The Democrats have in fact managed to receive more than 51 percent of the popular vote in only one presidential election since the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The data are even more interesting if we look at averages for the three most recent five-election sequences. In the presidential elections of 1928–1944—the Roosevelt years plus the last pre-Depression election—the Democrats averaged 53.4 percent of the popular vote for president; for 1948–1964 the percentage fell to 49.4 percent; for 1968–1984 it fell further to 42.4 percent. Dealignment theorists stress the volatility of recent presidential outcomes, a point that is particularly appropriate for the 1948–64 period, when the standard deviation for the Democratic popular vote was 7.4 percent. But volatility has decreased in the most recent five-election sequence, along with the percentage voting Democratic; the standard deviation fell to only 4.6 percent for 1968 to the present. John R. Petrocik maintains that election outcomes are too volatile and too idiosyncratic for vote totals to be

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TABLE 1

Replicating Burnham (five-election sequences)

year	*t*	*year*	*t*
1886	1.29	1930	4.07
1890	2.10	1934	1.80
1894	3.12	1938	.60
1898	2.07	1942	.11
1902	2.22	1946	.85
1906	1.35	1950	1.79
1910	1.24	1954	1.21
1914	.16	1958	.13
1918	.14	1962	.29
1922	1.13	1966	1.78
1926	2.83		

The entry for each year is the t produced by breaking each ten- or eight-election segment into five-election segments and analyzing the difference of means. The year indicated is the midpoint between the first and second five-election segments.

useful indicators of realignment.[19] But the data above are impressive, because volatility has fallen to relatively low levels *despite* the inevitable idiosyncracies of individual elections. This is neither the weakening of a party system identified by Clubb et al. nor the alternation in power of candidate-based coalitions; it is a *reversal* of the pattern of Democratic electoral dominance at the presidential level.

The pattern is confirmed if one looks at an updated version of Burnham's t-test analysis of presidential outcomes. Table 1 presents the pattern of t's produced for total percentage Democratic in presidential elections through 1984. As we explained earlier, high ts indicate the kind of discontinuity between periods suggestive of realignment, whereas ts approaching zero indicate that the two periods are essentially the same. One can clearly see peaks in the value of t in 1984 and 1930, exactly where Burnham found them and where Campbell led us to expect them. Each of these peaks is followed by a considerable decline in the value of t. If one looks at the recent pattern in the data, however, one finds an interesting and unexpected result. From a low of .11 in 1942, t increases to 1.79 in 1950 before falling off again. This t is clearly lower than the two clear-cut realignments of the past, but it nonetheless marks a real peak in the curve considerably higher than any other midcycle figure. 1950 is, of course, the year that marks the midpoint between the four Roosevelt elections and Truman on the one hand, and the Eisenhower through Nixon elections on the other. Here is evidence that the fifth-party system changed considerably, if not entirely, shortly after the death of Roosevelt. Those pursuing the fate of the Democratic-dominated New Deal party system in the late 1960s are clearly missing some interesting signs of its partial demise as early as 1952.[20]

[19] John R. Petrocik, *Party Coalitions: Realignment and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 25–26.

[20] See also Clubb et al., *Partisan Realignment*, 104, 165.

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TABLE 2

Replicating Burnham (four-election sequences)

year	*t*	*year*	*t*
1882	.06	1930	3.87
1886	.71	1934	2.16
1890	2.30	1938	.45
1894	2.19	1942	1.20
1898	3.09	1946	3.99
1902	1.50	1950	1.09
1906	.50	1954	.33
1910	.96	1958	.07
1914	.79	1962	.26
1918	.40	1966	1.30
1922	.61	1970	1.26
1926	2.38		

Furthermore, t rebounds from its low value of .13 in 1958 to another minipeak of 1.78 in 1966, the last midpoint for which we can calculate it. 1966, of course, separates the Truman through Johnson elections, which already marked a weakening of Democratic performance from the immediately preceeding period and from the Nixon through Reagan period. The value of t, again, is not as large as for 1894 or 1930, but the pattern suggests a change in election pattern of the type, if not quite of the magnitude, that Burnham focuses on. The cumulative effect of the 1950 and 1966 midpoints should make very clear the extent of change from the Roosevelt years. The fifth-party system, in other words, seems to have undergone considerable change around 1950; another minirealignment, reinforcing and extending the first, seems to have occurred around 1966.[21]

If one relaxes Burnham's requirements somewhat and looks at sequences of eight rather than of ten elections, using a four-election sequence as sufficient to establish a baseline for electoral change as Clubb et al. and Brady and Hurley did,[22] the findings are even more at odds with what dealignment theorists might lead one to expect.

In this case, the t for the transition from third- to fourth-party systems peaks in 1898 at 3.09; the peak for the transition from fourth- to fifth-party systems peaks at 3.87 in 1930; and the t for 1946 is actually 3.99, highest of them all. The 1966 and 1970 midpoints are lower than these, at 1.30 and 1.26 respectively; but they still mark a clear-cut peak in values of t and are higher than for any other year not associated with realignment. Reducing the length of the period required in the analysis of course makes it more vulnerable to being affected by short-term events. But the continuation of previous peaks at more-or-less the same intervals

[21] See also William Schneider, "The November 6 Vote for President: What Did It Mean?" in Austin Ranney, ed., *The American Election of 1984* (Durham, N.C.: American Enterprise Institute/Duke, 1985), 239.

[22] See Clubb et al., *Partisan Realignment*; and David W. Brady and Patricia A. Hurley, "The Prospects for Contemporary Partisan Realignment," *PS* 18 (Winter 1985): 64.

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in the new analysis lends at least some credibility to the finding that 1946 and 1966 do mark a fairly major transition point in recent presidential election politics.

We seem to have here an intellectual puzzle of considerable interest. At the individual level, the evidence suggests a system in which an old party system is falling apart, with little sign of a new one emerging to replace it. At least until 1984, there is no evidence of Republican gains in Republican party identification: the Democrats have maintained their advantage over the Republicans even as voter rejection of or indifference to parties has caused the overall strength of partisanship in the electorate to decline.[23] The extent of the decline is itself considerable.[24] New issues have emerged to crosscut the economic cleavages that defined the New Deal system, but there is evidence of neither a Republican majority on new issues (social and racial) nor of a move to the right sufficient to produce a conservative and Republican majority on the old ones. Social groups have lost their traditional issue-based partisan allegiances, but no current set of issues seems capable of producing clearcut new ones.[25]

If recent individual-level developments seem quite intelligible in terms of the *de*alignment thesis, however, dealignment explanation of system-level events seems to be unsatisfactory. Yet the pattern of *presidential* election results resembles almost perfectly the classic pattern of realignment that caught Campbell's attention and that Burnham so simply yet elegantly measured. It may be the case that we are seeing a series of short-term candidate-based coalitions, rather than the long-term party attachments that exist in a stable party system or that election outcomes represent a series of retrospective judgments on incumbent administrations.[26] But dealignment theorists cannot quite deal convincingly with the consistency with which the successful candidate-based coalitions have generally, since 1952, been Republican. Ladd and Hadley write that recent political developments "surely [have] not, and will not produce a new Republican majority,"[27] but that does in fact seem to be the pattern of recent presidential election outcomes. It is hardly the random alternation of the parties in power or the volatility of election outcomes that dealignment theorists expect.[28] It is precisely the incongruence between what is happening on the level of individual attitudes and on the level of presidential outcomes that makes the recent electoral era so distinctive. A full-blown traditional realignment has certainly not occurred; but the disaggregation that dealignment theorists point to in individual attitudes has clearly not produced what they expect on the system level.[29]

[23] See Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952–1980* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[24] See Beck, "The Dealignment Era."

[25] See Petrocik, *Party Coalitions.*

[26] See Schneider, "The November 6 Vote," 205.

[27] Ladd and Hadley, *Transformations*, 334.

[28] See Ladd and Hadley, *Transformations*, 329; Ladd, *Where Have All the Voters Gone?*, 108; Wattenberg, *Decline of American Political Parties*, 131.

[29] We are not even in Clubb et al.'s second stage of a party system: divided control of government is not due to occasional capture of one of the agencies of government by a minority party recovering

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There are at least two different ways one can respond to such findings. The first is suggested by Sundquist, who argues that the decline in Democratic fortunes is, ironically, the result of an aftershock of the New Deal system. The spread of the New Deal alignment means the decline of New Deal coalitions, as class-based patterns of cleavage break up old regional or ethnic bases of Democratic electoral strength.[30] Sundquist explicitly maintains that nationalization of electoral competition deprived the Democrats of their traditional advantage in the white South and among Catholics.[31] But if this argument certainly identifies a valid source of Democratic decline, it certainly does not account for the extent to which the Republicans have so thoroughly dominated the system at the presidential level.

The alternate possibility is that realignment at the presidential level has, in fact, occurred; but it has done so in ways somewhat different from what we might expect if our expectations stem from realignments of the past. Several possible explanations for the change exist. One possibility is that the significance of valence issues has increased beyond the level expected by Sundquist. He argues that the anti-Republican valence issues of management of the economy would have had limited lasting impact had not the political parties of the 1930s taken clear-cut opposing positions on the legislative proposals that constituted the New Deal. Ronald Reagan has clearly attempted to capitalize on anti-Democratic valence issues related to mass impressions of an incompetent and unsuccessful Carter administration—with surprising success given expectations of most scholars in the immediate post-1980 period.[32] It is still clearly too early to evaluate the impact of valence as opposed to position issues in the current political situation. Democratic leaders are trying to prevent Reagan from seizing a lasting advantage on position issues, as Sundquist reports. But, even if they do so successfully, the fact that the Johnson and Carter Democratic administrations left office widely perceived as unsuccessful may have provided the basis for continued mass perception of Democrats as unable to govern effectively. There may well be considerable negative retrospective evaluations of the Democrats, which contribute, both directly and through subsequent impacts on party identification, to lasting Republican gains.[33]

Furthermore, the very flexibility in defining party positions that Sundquist sees enabling the Democrats to offset Republican policy initiatives since 1968 may cause a problem for a party. The problem is the *credibility* of a party whose leaders appear to be adopting positions in response to popular initiatives of their opponents solely to stave off electoral defeat. A Democratic political system necessarily forces

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from its years in the political wilderness, but by a former minority party that fairly consistently and fairly comfortably wins presidential elections. Ronald Reagan in 1980 became the first Republican since Eisenhower in 1952 to have a Republican majority in even one house of Congress.

[30] Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, 448; see also Ladd, *Where Have All the Voters Gone?*, 90–95; and Petrocik, *Party Coalitions*.

[31] See also Schneider, "The November 6 Vote," 241.

[32] Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Spring 1985): 1–25.

[33] See Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale, 1981).

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parties to adapt to changed mass attitudes and perceptions. The question is to what extent they can do so without appearing to be opportunistic imitators of their opposition. Sundquist argues that the Democrats have successfully positioned themselves to minimize losses on issues initially raised by the Republicans on which they were vulnerable; the question is whether they have merely tried to do so or have actually done so.

Dealignment with continuing Democratic advantage at the mass level is paired with realignment with a Republican advantage in presidential voting. The factors mentioned here represent a possible set of reasons why the standard realignment package may have fallen apart, making the Democrats a minority party at the presidential level without the accompanying and underlying changes at the mass level that past realignments would have led us to expect. One must keep in mind, however, that the package may never have been as "clean" as some of the literature suggests. Several recent authors have suggested that the 1930s realignment, the most studied and most frequently used as a prototype for realignment in general, may in fact have been different in character than those of the 1850s and 1890s[34] or that the 1930s themselves reflected a process of electoral change different from that originally identified in the early literature.[35] It may in fact be the case that using 1932 as a model of realignment per se may cause us to use too narrow and restrictive a notion of realignment in examining the current period. There are, of course, some signs that post-1984 developments are creating a more traditional realignment to the Republicans, as Republicans make gains in party identification, especially among young voters.[36] But even if post-1984 developments resemble a more traditional realignment, the 1946–1984 period represents an extended period in which electoral outcomes differed from what most scholars expected and which is worthy of scholarly attention.*

[34] Clubb et al., *Partisan Realignment*, 91; Brady, "Reassessing Realignments," 47–48.

[35] See Andersen, *Creation of a Democratic Majority*.

[36] Laurily K. Epstein, "The Changing Structure of Party Identification," *PS* 18 (1985): 48–52.

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Pluralism, Elitism, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act

ERIC S. MOSKOWITZ

Pluralism and elitism are the two prevailing theories of policy making in the United States. The purposes of this article are to suggest an alternative framework—linkage political economy—and to evaluate that framework against both pluralist and elitist policy explanations. The evaluation will take place within the medium of a case study on housing policy.

The linkage political economy framework addresses some of the weaknesses evident in both pluralist and elitist studies of public policy. For example, in the housing policy field, elite theorists assert that policy making is dominated by a cohesive, politically powerful corporate bloc made up of the construction, finance, and realty industries.[1] But the elite theorists are then hard pressed to explain policy failures of this dominant coalition such as the passage of the 1937 public housing program or the original low-income thrust of the 1949 urban redevelopment program. On the other hand, pluralist analysts find a much more open and balanced policy process with a wide spectrum of interests able to be heard through multiple channels available in a decentralized political process.[2] Yet, this pluralist analysis cannot adequately explain the consistent bias in U.S. housing policies and out-

[1] Examples of U.S. housing policy analysis that adopt this elitist perspective include: Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); Ralph Nader Congress Project, *The Money Committees* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1975); and Lawrence Friedman, *Government and Slum Housing* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

[2] Pluralist accounts of housing policy include: Daniel Elazar, "Restructuring Federal Housing Programs—Who Stands to Gain?" *Publius* 6 (Spring 1976): 75–94; and Harold Wolman, *Politics of Federal Housing* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971).

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comes. More than forty years after the initial passage of New Deal housing programs, the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies found that over 20 percent of all households still suffer from one or more forms of housing deprivation.[3]

The major premise of this article is that many of the gaps evident in both pluralist and elitist analyses of public policy can be traced to their failure to consider adequately the influence that social and economic structures have on the policy process. The linkage political economy approach is more sensitive to such structural impacts, while still cognizant of the internal workings of the policy process. This framework uses the belief systems of policy makers as a linkage mechanism between the structural environment and the policy process. After briefly sketching the linkage political economy approach, all three frameworks will be evaluated by applying them to the case of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. The case analysis will show that adding the structural linkage component contributes appreciably to our understanding of policy making in a complex issue area like housing.

Linkage Political Economy

One problem with both the elitist and pluralist perspectives is their mutual tendency to focus only on the interaction of individuals in the policy process. Both schools overlook the linkage between the socio-economic structures of society and the housing policy process. This failure to include the structural context of policy making may account for the incomplete policy explanations described above.

Structural Marxism is more sensitive to the impact of social and economic structures on the political process.[4] Like elite theory, the structural approach rejects the pluralist conclusion that policies are basically a representative resultant of group demands. But, unlike elite theory, a structural explanation does not simply assume that government policy makers either are members of the controlling economic elite or are directly controlled by that economic elite. Structural proponents point out that such individualistic, instrumental theories of power cannot explain government actions that are opposed by economic elites. Instead, this perspective argues that it is the function of the state to be the stabilizing force of the full society. Within an advanced capitalist society, this requires that the state encourage private economic growth and preserve social harmony. To the extent that these functional requisites of the state coincide with the needs of the corporate sector of society, the state will automatically protect corporate interests.

However, an important gap exists in this structural analysis of policy making. While there is a lengthy discussion of the functional requisites that the govern-

[3] Cited in Chester Hartman, *Housing and Social Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 14.

[4] See James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures," *International Journal of Sociology* 2 (Spring 1972): 73–108; and Claus Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State" in Klaus von Beyme, ed., *German Political Studies*, vol. I (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), 31–57.

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ment must provide for society, there is little concrete description of the political process that produces the required policies. Given the rejection of the proposition that economic elites directly control government officials, an alternative proposition is necessary to explain why government officials perform the required functions for society.

The work of Claus Offe provides a useful pathway to probe this problem. Of particular relevance is his conceptualization of selective mechanisms within the policy process.[5] Offe asserts that "selectivity means that a configuration of selection rules is in operation, which firstly always actualizes only one section of an area of possible results and, secondly, produces a uniformity or consistency of actualized events."[6] At the base of this selective process is a governmental goal of "cautious crisis management and long-term avoidance strategy."[7] The government's understanding of what is essential for the stability of society will help explain what problems are recognized and how they are treated.

One can see in Offe's assertion a resemblance to studies that emphasize the role of cognition in decision making. Like Offe, the cognitive literature focuses on the problem of selectivity. These studies indicate that given a very complex, uncertain environment, decision makers "depend on pre-set cognitive images to process information, to order, understand, remember, and interpret it, and to reach judgements quickly."[8] For the purposes of the ensuing analysis, these sets of cognitive images used by an individual to arrive at policy decisions will be labeled policy maps.[9]

Policy maps can be thought of as sets of mental images (including concepts, beliefs, and attitudes) that help individuals to orient themselves in a complicated policy setting. As used here, policy maps are not sophisticated guidance instruments—for instance, maps with precise sets of mathematical coordinates—but rather they are like crude hand-drawn maps with just a few key landmarks to orient the lost wanderer. The content of these policy maps plays a crucial bonding role between the socio-economic structure and the policy process in the linkage political economy perspective. Scholars as divergent as Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi have maintained that economic structures have the ability to shape the predominant belief systems in a society.[10] Schumpeter, referring to the cost-profit calculus of capitalism, went so far as to argue ". . . thus defined and quantified for the economic sector, this type of logic or attitude or method then starts upon its conqueror's career subjugating—rationalizing—man's tools and philosophies,

[5] Offe, "Structural Problems," 31–57.

[6] Ibid., 38.

[7] Offe, "Political Authority," 99.

[8] Glenn Stassen, "Individual Preference versus Role-Constraint in Policy-Making," *World Politics* 25 (October 1972): 99.

[9] For an overview of cognitive maps, see Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[10] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); and Karl Polanyi, *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).

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his medical practice, his picture of the cosmos, his outlook on life, everything in fact including his concepts of beauty and justice and his spiritual ambitions."[11]

If some basic policy beliefs are shaped by the socio-economic structure and if these beliefs link the policy process to that structure, there should be some evidence of this relationship in the policy maps of government officials. Certain key cognitive images should be commonly held by most policy makers. This would provide some confirmation that these common cognitive elements are transmitted to policy makers by the broader environment. These commonly shared portions of the policy maps, termed the core policy map, thus act as a linkage mechanism between the policy process and the socio-economic structure.

The content of the core policy map, in turn, influences the policies that flow from the political process. These core beliefs not only provide access channels to the policy process for certain issues, but also filter out other policy issues and certain policy alternatives from the policy process. Focusing on these images as a linkage mechanism thereby provides the opportunity to combine insights about the intricacies of the political process with the recognition that the social and economic environment of a political system consistently influences the policies of that system. The content of core beliefs may thus help explain why certain systemic functions like economic growth and social stability are performed by the government even without any instrumental control of the government by economic elites. This conceptualization of a core policy map connecting the socio-economic structure to the political process is the crux of the linkage political economy perspective.

Given the importance of capitalist organizations in the American economic structure, it would seem reasonable that the image of the market plays a vital role in the policy maps of government policy makers. One might expect that these officials have been socialized to appreciate the value of the market approach.[12] However, this market affinity is not likely to be the sole core component of the policy maps. Offe, for instance, argues that selective mechanisms are sensitive not only to the needs of the economic sector but also to social legitimacy.[13] In the context of housing policy, a healthy neighborhood environment is one likely manifestation of that social concern. Nonetheless, the linkage political economy perspective anticipates that market-oriented images will usually prevail over socially-oriented images when the two conflict in an important policy dispute. This prevalence is expected on the basis of the perceived importance of the private economy to the stability of the full society. Thus, in terms of the map analogy, such images as the well-functioning private market mechanism, the slow and inefficient government allocation mechanism, healthy community neighborhoods, and deteriorated ghetto neighborhoods act as key landmarks to guide policy makers in the housing-

[11] Schumpeter, *Capitalism*, 123–124.

[12] For elite consensus on capitalism, see Allen Barton, "Consensus and Conflict Among American Leaders," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 38 (Winter 1974–75): 507–530.

[13] Offe, "Political Authority," 98–99; also see Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, *The Ruling Elites* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 148–156, on elite codes of political conduct.

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policy wilderness. The private-market image is simply the most prominent landmark in the policy map. While the content of policy maps cannot precisely predict the choices of policy makers, it should indicate the general paths likely to be taken and those paths will be marked off by important landmarks.

A Case Study in Housing Politics

The case-study approach of this article has been chosen for two general reasons. First, at its core, this article is an exploration of the process by which policy decisions are made. As Harold Stein observes, a decision is not simply an act but rather an intricate process. Stein maintains that case studies are useful because they permit "the awareness of the complexity and delicacy of the considerations that affect and underlie administrative decisions."[14] In addition, the case-study approach provides a convenient format for communicating, refining, and evaluating a theoretical framework like linkage political economy, which is still in its early stages of development.

More particularly, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 has several characteristics that make it an apt case to assess each of the three perspectives of concern here. The original bill required financial institutions to disclose the geographical source of their deposits and the location of their home mortgages. It produced a clear-cut dispute between community groups and financial institutions. This conflict provides an opportunity to reevaluate the pluralist/elitist debate over the influence of corporate interest groups in the housing-policy process. The content of the issue also provides a chance to explore the precise interaction between private economic growth goals (mortgage markets) and social stability goals (neighborhood protests) postulated in the linkage political economy perspective.

A Pluralist Interpretation

A pluralist explanation of the policy-making process is composed of several basic components. It must show that access to the policy process is relatively open. Open access is indicated by evidence that competing sides in the controversy are able to have their views taken into account during the policy process. Frequently, this access will be achieved by having different politicians or bureaucrats willing to represent the interests of the various petitioning, competing groups in society. The diversity of the policy process is further accentuated by the organizational fragmentation of the government. Government policies will be chosen not only for their impact on external social groups, but also for their impact on the balance of intragovernmental power among, for instance, competing executive agencies and legislative subcommittees. These "turf" battles provide additional leverage points in the process for a variety of interest groups.

[14] Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), xxvi.

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The result of an open-access system with intraorganizational competition is a very decentralized decision process. Pluralists contend that a bargaining style of decision making is used in this decentralized policy system to coordinate the many centers of power. Few groups are able to win outright. Instead, contending groups resolve conflicts by offering either their opponents or third parties rewards for joining their potential majority coalition. These rewards may involve concessions on the issues at hand, logrolling on collateral issues, or trade-offs based on jurisdictional authority.

Multiple Access Points to the Policy Process for Competing Groups

In the early 1970s, community groups like National People's Action (NPA) began to complain about the destructive effects of the arbitrary reduction of mortgage lending (often called redlining) on older urban neighborhoods. They sought a mandated disclosure of mortgage-lending patterns. Communities could then restrict their patronage to financial institutions that adequately invested in the neighborhood. Both the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) refused to cooperate on disclosure regulations.

Rebuffed twice by the executive branch, the NPA in late 1974 turned to William Proxmire (Dem.-Wis.), incoming chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. Proxmire agreed to sponsor disclosure legislation (S. 1281). In the House, Fernand St. Germain (Dem.-RI), chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institution Regulation, sponsored a similar bill. Thus, Congress acted as an alternative access point in a multichannel policy system.

Meanwhile, an antidisclosure coalition led by Jake Garn (Rep.-Utah) in the Senate and John Rousselot (Rep.-Calif.) in the House also evolved. The financial industry was able to inject its views into the policy process through this countercoalition. Hence, as pluralists would anticipate, both sides of the issue were represented in the policy process.

Bargaining and Compromise Strategies as Conflict Resolution

Not only were there competing forces evident on the disclosure issue in Congress, but as pluralists would expect, the strategies used by both sides were predominantly based on bargaining and compromise. After the committee hearings, Proxmire was not sure his own committee would report the bill. As a result, Proxmire modified the bill to garner the support of two ambivalent senators on the committee. Thomas McIntyre (Dem.-NH) was willing to support disclosure if it would not disturb the financial industry in New Hampshire. To accommodate McIntyre, Proxmire offered to limit disclosure coverage to standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). Almost all of New Hampshire lies outside the bounds of an SMSA.

Proxmire also sought the support of Edward Brooke (Rep.-Mass.). Brooke was sympathetic to industry complaints that the administrative costs of disclosure were

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too high. Proxmire agreed to exclude savings data. Since savings accounts far outnumbered mortgages, this exclusion offered considerable relief to the industry. With a bolstered S. 1281 coalition, Proxmire felt that one vital part of the bill could be strengthened. He switched the disclosure unit from zip codes to census tracts. The smaller census tracts would provide a more precise form of disclosure.

Across the aisle, Garn felt that simple opposition to S. 1281 would not succeed. The sympathetic image of declining neighborhoods presented in the Senate hearings was too overwhelming to ignore. Instead, Garn offered a demonstration of mortgage disclosure in five urban areas. The Senate Banking Committee rejected the Garn alternative and voted to report the modified Proxmire bill.

Both Proxmire and Garn then began to focus on the floor vote. Brooke's concern about costs was now exacerbated by the switch to census-tract reporting. Most data kept by financial institutions were on a zip code basis. Census-tract disclosure of past mortgages would thus require recoding. To alleviate this cost concern, Proxmire agreed to start disclosure only from the year the legislation became effective.

From prior contact with the trade associations, Proxmire knew they were most adamantly opposed to savings-data disclosure and retroactive disclosure. Thus, Proxmire's two cost-cutting amendments were not only an attempt to attract ambivalent senators, but also an attempt to keep mortgage disclosure from becoming a top lobbying priority of the financial industry. In the case of the U.S. League of Savings Associations (USLSA) and the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks (NAMSB), Proxmire succeeded in dampening active opposition to the bill. Nevertheless, Proxmire was unable to avoid a strong challenge to census-tract disclosure on the floor of the Senate. Richard Stone (Dem.-Fla.), a cosponsor of the Garn bill, proposed an amendment reverting to disclosure by zip code. Proxmire sought to compromise by offering his own amendment limiting census-tract disclosure to large cities. Proxmire's compromise failed by a vote of 36–49.

Proxmire had hoped to attract the floor votes of moderate northern Democrats from nonurban states by exempting nonurban areas from disclosure. This would reduce their home political risks on a bill perceived predominantly as a response to an urban problem. Nonetheless, six of these Democrats opposed Proxmire on the census-tract amendment. Similarly, Proxmire sought the support of moderate eastern and north-central Republicans with his cost concessions. These were Republicans who came from states with older urban centers marred by neighborhood deterioration. But these Republicans were also concerned that business not be overburdened by regulations. Proxmire lost three Republicans in this group on the census-tract vote. Full support from both groups would have produced a Proxmire victory on census tracts. Meanwhile, Garn was also attempting to attract more supporters to his demonstration program. He increased the number of demonstrations to twenty-seven to prove his good faith. Nevertheless, a coalition of northern Democrats and moderate Republicans defeated the Garn bill by one vote, 40–41.

Proxmire won this second battle because he was more successful with the two target groups described above. Eight senators opposed Proxmire on census tracts

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but then supported him on nationwide mortgage disclosure. Seven of these eight senators (five nonurban northern Democrats and two moderate frostbelt Republicans) were from Proxmire's target groups. An analysis of their *Congressional Quarterly* Conservative Coalition Support Scores reveals that these seven vote switchers were ideologically centrist relative to their partisan cohorts who voted consistently. This pattern suggests that these centrists felt crosspressures on disclosure and sought a personal compromise. A Senate aide sympathetic to Garn described this vote switch as a way of "hedging their bets by those caught between the Garn and Proxmire positions. They gave Proxmire his bill, but they took Garn's warning about the cost of census tracts into account."[15]

Thus, one sees in the Senate's handling of the mortgage-disclosure issue a decentralized decision process reconciled by competing concessions offered in an attempt to build a winning coalition. Committed proponents and opponents must bargain to gain a majority bloc, while the uncommitted who are being courted ask for compromise outcomes in order to avoid generating future political opposition from either of the committed camps. The result is a policy that incorporates a diverse set of views including those of the eventual "losers."

Logrolling as Conflict Resolution

As in the Senate, the major test of mortgage disclosure on the House floor came on an amendment to set up a demonstration program. It was narrowly rejected, 165–167. Like the Senate, supporters of disclosure were predominantly northern Democrats while opponents were southern Democrats and Republicans. Nonetheless, there were other aspects of House action on disclosure that did not resemble the Senate. In the House, there was much less evidence of bargaining over the content of mortgage disclosure legislation. The lack of bargaining in the House, however, did not indicate a closed, centralized decision process. Instead, the proponents sought to build a winning coalition by logrolling on collateral issues. They chose this option because most of the internal trades had already been made in the Senate. Moreover, St. Germain believed that interest in disclosure was insufficient in the House to generate coalitions by marginal changes in the bill. St. Germain's goal was to strengthen the Senate version on two counts. He wanted disclosure by census tracts and a national mortgage information system (NMIS) within HUD to evaluate the data. NMIS would enable HUD to use mortgage flow data in its housing policy.

Mortgage disclosure was made Title III of the Depository Institutions Amendments Act by St. Germain. The other titles became his strategic weapons. St. Germain sought to take advantage of divisions within the financial industry. The industry was differentiated by the types of assets held as well as the services performed. Savings and loans (S&Ls) and savings banks predominantly had housing mortgages in their portfolios, while commercial banks had a more varied portfolio.

[15] Confidential interview with author.

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Similarly, at the time, banks provided both savings and checking accounts while S&Ls were only permitted to offer savings accounts.[16] The omnibus bill focused on this division in two important ways. It permitted the nationwide acceptance of negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and extended the duration of Regulation Q. NOW accounts are drafts written on savings accounts. Commercial banks strongly opposed NOW accounts because not only would they encourage interest to be given on checking accounts but they would also allow S&Ls to offer a service functionally equivalent to checking accounts. Regulation Q places a ceiling on the interest rate that depository institutions can offer on savings accounts, and it allows the thrift institution ceiling to be .25 percent higher than that of commercial banks. S&Ls believe that Regulation Q is necessary to balance commercial bank advantages with regard to a more profitable portfolio and a more extensive array of consumer services.

St. Germain used the NOW accounts to distract and occupy the American Bankers Association (ABA) and its allies in the House. The safety of Regulation Q was used as a threat against the thrift industry. The industry was informed that should disclosure be defeated, Regulation Q would never get out of the House. This approach helped St. Germain moderate USLSA and NAMSB opposition in the House. St. Germain's use of this particular strategy affords some confirmation of the pluralist thesis that business is not treated as a cohesive and dominant interest in the policy process. Even within one sector of business—the financial industry—there was competition for political favors. This business competition provided the potential for maneuvering through Congress a bill that the financial industry, as a whole, opposed.

Intragovernmental Jurisdictional Disputes

The fluidity and decentralization of the policy process is enhanced by intragovernmental jurisdictional disputes. The fate of the NMIS was determined by such disputes in both the House and the conference committee. Under pressure from congressional Republicans and HUD at both the subcommittee and committee stages, St. Germain was forced to weaken NMIS. NMIS' mandate went from providing an "evaluation" of the data to a "summary of findings" to a "summary of data." In this way, NMIS' potential for policy evaluation was steadily undercut. St. Germain was forced to make these concessions, not simply because of Republican opposition, but rather because William Barrett (Dem.-Pa.), chairman of the Housing Subcommittee, saw NMIS as an infringement by the Financial Institutions Subcommittee onto his turf. To preserve harmony among Democrats on the full committee, St. Germain retreated. Moreover, HUD, which did not want to be burdened with a national evaluation of mortgage flows, was able to use this committee jurisdictional dispute to weaken such an evaluation.

The NMIS was further damaged in the conference committee. For the most part,

[16] See Roger Starr, *Housing and the Money Market* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chaps. 6–8.

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the conference committee was nonconflictual. The Senate proponents of disclosure were quite willing to accept Titles I and II from the House bill.[17] They were even happier to accede to the House bill's use of census-tract rather than zip-code reporting. But St. Germain was not able to protect the NMIS from continued attacks by HUD and its Republican allies. Though he felt that NMIS was an important part of the bill, he was forced to abandon it. Proxmire had no strong attachment to NMIS and felt that he had already accepted as much as he could from the House bill. Proxmire believed that further concessions to the House would endanger the conference report in the Senate. St. Germain reluctantly concluded that NMIS would threaten the passage of mortgage disclosure. Thus, HUD and the Republicans were able to exploit interhouse rivalry to force another concession.

This series of jurisdictional interplays involving congressional subcommittees, the two houses of Congress, and an executive agency provides more support for pluralist expectations. The competition within the government provided further opportunities for a variety of interests, even those outside the winning coalition, to be heard.

Summary of the Pluralist Interpretation

Much about the passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act fits the pluralist model. Not only were there competing interest groups—community groups versus financial trade associations—but there was further interest differentiation within these major blocs. The antiredlining coalition was an uneasy alliance between white ethnic and civil-rights organizations. The financial lobby was divided among banks, savings and loans, and savings banks. Each financial interest had varying levels of opposition to mortgage disclosure and had different positions on such related issues as NOW accounts and Regulation Q.

The fragmentation in the private sector was matched by fragmentation within the governmental sector. First, each competing group in the private sector found spokespersons within the government. In addition, policy making in the government was further differentiated by competing governmental institutions seeking to protect not only their clientele but also their own organizational interests. The result of interactions between a diffuse private sector and a diffuse governmental sector was a pluralistic policy process. Political strategies and public policies were shaped by a series of bargains and concessions among the competing interest groups and governmental institutions.

An Elite Theory Interpretation

Both pluralism and elitism attribute government action to pressures placed on the government by groups and individuals in society. Pluralists argue that this pres-

[17] The final version of Title I extended Regulation Q for 15 months. Title II extended the life of a presidential commission to study electronic fund transfers. NOW accounts had been deleted from

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suring process is basically open, decentralized, and representative. Elite theorists, however, argue that the process is unrepresentative because it is relatively closed to most groups. Furthermore, because most groups are closed out, the decision process is more centralized. Policy decisions are controlled by a cohesive bloc of corporate interests. These corporate groups have a sufficiently large advantage in access, information, and material resources to dominate the policy process. The resultant public policies consistently favor the material interests of corporate groups. Those policies passed in the name of the nonelite segment of society, on the other hand, tend to involve merely symbolic rather than material rewards.

Corporate Interests as a Cohesive Power Bloc

Elite theorists would emphasize the basic consensus that exists within the financial industry on disclosure policy. Despite some disunity on marginal issues, all financial trade associations strongly and consistently opposed government allocation of mortgage credit. These trade associations continually argued that mortgage and savings disclosure would be the first step toward such government credit allocation.

This financial sector consensus against disclosure was translated into power in Congress. Under the onslaught of industry, Gerald Ford's administration, and congressional Republican pressure, the disclosure bill was continually weakened. By the time disclosure was passed, it excluded institutions outside metropolitan areas, savings-account information, and data prior to 1976. These omissions were not without costs to the antiredlining movement. For instance, the loss of savings data made it more difficult to apply consumer pressure to change institutional lending patterns. This strategy had been an essential element of the community-group program to halt redlining.

Information Advantage

One factor that helped financial trade associations dominate the congressional policy process on disclosure was the advantage they held on information. One of the overriding issues in Congress was the cost of mortgage disclosure. Much as the elitist model would predict, the financial trade associations were able to produce more information about the costs of disclosure than either Congress or the community groups. Proxmire was forced to use the data supplied by the American Bankers Association, the National Savings and Loan League, and the trade journal, *American Banker.* Evidently Proxmire's staff was unable to develop cost data on its own. The power of the cost argument led to important concessions on savings disclosure and retroactive disclosure.

Title II on the floor of the House. In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act authorized NOW accounts and instituted a six-year phased withdrawal of Regulation Q.

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The Federal Reserve Board as a Captured Agency

An elite theorist would also note the importance of the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) selection as the drafting agency for mortgage disclosure regulations (Regulation C).[18] Like the industry, the FRB had testified against the legislation during the House hearings. Nonetheless, proponents of disclosure reluctantly conceded that only the FRB had the expertise to write the regulations. Thus, an agency with strong ties to the financial industry was given the crucial assignment of writing the specific rules for mortgage disclosure. Because it shared the industry's view on the dangers of credit allocation and costly, burdensome regulation, the FRB sought to draft regulations that merely met the bare requirements of the legislation.

The case of reporting by census tract is a good example of the power of the FRB at the regulation stage. St. Germain had succeeded in getting the House (and later the conference) to accept census tract reporting. But to provide a safety mechanism should census-tract disclosure be particularly costly in a few SMSA's, St. Germain included the stipulation that it only be used "where readily available at a reasonable cost." The FRB broadened this limited escape clause to exempt all reporting by census tract for the first year. In addition, the FRB did not require a standardized disclosure form or a centralized depository for the data in each metropolitan area.

These omissions made it more difficult for the data to be analyzed and compared. The limited scope of Regulation C is the result of a policy system marked by an unequal distribution of expertise. The government institution with the greatest amount of expertise on financial regulation also has the closest contact to financial institutions. This situation insures a less than enthusiastic implementation of social regulation of economic institutions.

Symbolic Responses

Finally, an elitist interpretation is likely to emphasize the modest scope of the legislation signed into law as Public Law 94–200 and implemented as Regulation C. Not only were many of the early disclosure provisions diluted, but disclosure was only a limited response under any circumstances. It was a symbolic response to urban ethnic pleas for neighborhood salvation. The bill supplied minimal information to consumers while providing no actual redistribution of mortgage investment to older urban neighborhoods. An opponent of disclosure observed: " . . . there is political value in a symbolic piece of legislation which will appear to respond to a problem. It is just a charade for various constituencies."[19] The restricted scope of the legislation indicates that Congress never intended to challenge the

[18] See U.S. Office of the Federal Register, *Federal Register*, vol. 41, no. 115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1976), 23931–23939.

[19] Confidential interview with author.

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financial industry. A lobbyist for the USLSA summed up his view of the mortgage disclosure outcome with the comment, "We got a good bargain . . ."[20]

A Linkage Political Economy Interpretation

Unlike either pluralism or elite theory, the linkage political economy approach does not treat government action as primarily the result of instrumental pressure by societal groups. Instead, this approach emphasizes the important role played by the policy maps of legislators and bureaucrats. These policy maps consist of sets of cognitive images and concepts that are linked to one another by assumptions about their causal relationships. In some sense they are policy-relevant belief systems that focus on how the world works. The maps as a whole and certain of their prominent images and causal paths provide policy makers with a simple navigation tool for an often complex policy terrain. The policy maps of these policy makers contain guides to what policy goals are desirable and what policy means are feasible. Government officials seek to institute policies partially on the basis of their policy maps and not simply because of political pressure. However, linkage political economy does not presume that these officials separately and autonomously construct their own individual policy maps. Rather, this approach focuses on the effect of socio-economic structures by looking for common images within these policy maps that are congruent with important structural relationships in the environment. These common images make up the core policy map, which is to say, that part of each individual's policy map that reflects basic structural relations in society rather than individual cognitive content. These crucial core images act as commonly accepted landmarks used by most policy makers to orient themselves in their quest to understand and respond to policy problems.

Hence, these core images act as a cognitive linkage between the socio-economic structure and the policy process. Important common images function as both negative filters and positive access channels to the policy process. Policy requests that are not compatible with core images will likely be screened from the decision process, while other policies gain access to the policy process due to their compatibility with those images. Much of the interaction in the policy process concerns attempts by policy makers to evaluate, modify, and present policy positions in terms of these common images. Changes in proposed policies frequently result from actors seeking to reconcile the proposal to competing goals within the core policy map or by actors attempting to relate more clearly the proposal to salient core images so that other actors will receive positive support cues for that proposal.

The Core Policy Map and Neighborhood Preservation

In previous work on the beliefs of neighborhood preservation policy makers, these officials were found to harbor two potentially conflictual cognitive images among

[20] Confidential interview with author.

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their core beliefs.[21] On the one hand, most believed that older urban neighborhoods should be saved because of the social benefits these neighborhoods provide to their residents. Nonetheless, these same policy makers believed that the market was the most efficient means of achieving both economic and social goals. As a result, most policy makers, though concerned with halting neighborhood deterioration, felt that neighborhood preservation programs must not interfere with the basics of the market process and moreover should use that market process for preservation purposes.

This attraction to market solutions did not rule out all modifications of the market. Rather, the operative distinction was between those policies that would merely ameliorate marginal market flaws and those that would replace market allocation of resources with government allocation of resources. Mortgage disclosure could be considered consistent with market principles, since it merely added more information to the basic market process. A government credit allocation policy mandating that a specific percentage of neighborhood savings be returned to that neighborhood as mortgage loans would not be compatible with the prevalent market image.

The Core Policy Map and Community Groups

There were a variety of indications that these neighborhood and market images were present during the evolution of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. As one would expect, industry witnesses in the congressional hearings strongly protested against any government interference with market allocation of mortgage investments. They argued that mortgage disclosure was the first step toward complete credit allocation.

More surprisingly, community group testimony also upheld the market mechanism. They insisted that disclosure was not meant to be the first step toward credit allocation. The reliance of community groups on positive market testimony is indicative of the power of the market image in the policy process. That power is confirmed whether antiredliners supported the market image because they wanted to curry favor with Congress or because the image was part of their understanding of the neighborhood decline problem.

Interviews with selected representatives of the antiredlining coalition suggest their support of the market was at least partially to curry favor. While similar interviews indicated that only one of thirty-four government officials did not rely strongly on the market as a policy solution, four of the seven antiredlining representatives showed a significant tendency to reject market principles. These community activists believed that even a market moderately reformed by government action could not cope with neighborhood needs. Only comprehensive government

[21] Eric Moskowitz, "Neighborhood Preservation: An Analysis of Policy Maps and Policy Options" in Judith May and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *The Policy Cycle, V, Sage Yearbooks in Politics and Public Policy* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), 65–87.

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intervention would be effective. Yet, three of these four conceded that such government intervention was not practical politically.

This combination of economic and political perceptions helps to explain community group testimony. They were not fully satisfied with the market approach, but deferred to the esteem given this concept by others in the political process. Thus, the core beliefs acted as an indirect filter to the policy process. Potential petitioners recognized the cognitive images dominant in the policy process and hence limited the types of demands they made.

The Core Policy Map and Congressional Proponents of Disclosure

As the political perception of community group leaders indicated, government policy makers were staunchly attached to the market. This market affinity was prominent even in the case of congressional allies of the community groups. In public and private, these congressional allies consistently avowed their concern for the market. They continually praised the market's efficiency and described disclosure as simply a small modification to increase information and competition within the market framework. Even many opponents of disclosure conceded that congressional proponents of disclosure were not in favor of credit allocation. For instance, one banking lobbyist noted: "Congressional leaders do not want a mandatory credit allocation system either. Their actions are really meant to prod the financial sector into being more sensitive to their social role."[22] A labor lobbyist who was in favor of both disclosure and credit allocation came to a similar conclusion. Speaking of credit allocation's chances in Congress, he said: "When it comes to such fundamental reforms, there is a difference in degree between the parties, but it is not significant . . . . The Democrats will at least listen to calls for change like credit allocation, but they will not support it."[23]

Thus, the core images acted as a direct filter to the congressional policy process. Congressional allies of the community groups, though willing to aid declining neighborhoods, were only willing to do so with market-oriented solutions. Thus, Proxmire et al. channeled neighborhood preservation demands into a narrow policy solution of mortgage disclosure—a policy that simply provides more information to the market.

Conflict Resolution within the Core Policy Map

An elite theorist might argue that congressional proponents were merely offering community groups a symbolic reward to quiet concerns about neighborhood decline, with no intention of increasing actual mortgage investment in older neighborhoods. Yet, an analysis of the cognitive material suggests that congressional proponents were truly concerned with the health of neighborhoods. This congres-

[22] Confidential interview with author.
[23] Confidential interview with author.

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sional affinity for neighborhoods acted as an access channel to the government for community groups distressed by decline. But nonetheless, certain logically-possible policy solutions were not seriously considered because they violated the core beliefs of the government policy makers. Mortgage disclosure was selected on the basis of its compatibility with the market. Government credit allocation schemes, on the other hand, were filtered out on the grounds of market incompatibility.

This does not mean, however, that congressional disclosure proponents chose disclosure in a cynical, manipulative manner. Quite the contrary, the cognitive map material indicates that disclosure was chosen because it was consistent with the policy makers' positive images of both the neighborhood and the market. But they recognized that neighborhood needs and market protection might not always be congruent. Proxmire pondered such a conflict in the hearings:

> Admittedly, we need to recognize the importance of maintaining a flexible secondary mortgage market and a national pool of mortgage credit. But how can we tell a citizen of Boston, for example, whose neighborhood is redlined, that Massachusetts is considered a "capital surplus area" and that his savings have gone to build condominiums in Arizona?
>
> How shall we reconcile the needs of a national mortgage market with the pressing needs of localities?[24]

Given this cognitive conflict raised by the neighborhood decline issue, the form of the policy solution becomes more understandable. Congressional allies of community groups struggled to derive a solution for neighborhood disinvestment that would also not violate market principles. Mortgage disclosure met those joint requirements. That disclosure would not directly nor deeply intrude upon the market process should not be taken as evidence of cynical symbolic politics.

While congressional disclosure proponents undoubtedly saw disclosure legislation as an expression of their concern for urban residents trapped in declining neighborhoods, they had an additional symbolic goal in mind. They believed that the legislation would convey another message, not to a mass public as in Murray Edelman's theory, but to a specific target – the financial industry.[25] A Democratic aide hoped the disclosure bill would get financial institutions to "question their investment strategies."[26] Furthermore, interview data and public statements from the financial industry and its federal regulators indicate that this message was received. Thus, though the bill was symbolic, it was intended to have a material effect on the distribution of mortgage investments. It was an attempt by Congress to remind the market that urban mortgages were both socially desirable and eco-

[24] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975*, Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st sess., 5-8 May 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 2.

[25] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 2.

[26] Confidential interview with author.

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nomically profitable. This symbolic reminder was made more powerful by the industry's fear that next time Congress might take more drastic steps.

Given the strength and scope of the market image in the policy maps of government officials, it should not be surprising that they chose a materially efficacious symbol to achieve neighborhood preservation goals. Disclosure proponents were very concerned about the fate of neighborhoods. But their market-oriented understanding of the economy made them skeptical of direct government interference in the operations of private business. Congress reconciled this cognitive conflict by expressing symbolically its concern to the private sector in the expectation that this expression would stimulate the sector to contribute "voluntarily" to neighborhood preservation efforts. The choice of a symbolic response was not so much a conniving political move as it was an option that could meet the recognized problem within the bounds of a market solution.

Core Policy Map Cues in the Policy Process

Analytic sensitivity to this cognitive dimension of the policy process also provides the observer with a distinctive understanding of internal congressional communications. Such communications supply crucial cues about a bill's fit to the core policy map. Several in Congress mentioned the battle to categorize mortgage disclosure as an important factor in the outcome of the mortgage-disclosure conflict. A Republican staffer opposed to disclosure concluded, "In the end, the bill passed because it was part of the tidal wave of consumer legislation."[27] Conversely, a Democratic staff member reasoned that disclosure had a difficult time passing because it was not clearly perceived as consumer legislation. This Democrat noted that St. Germain spent much of his time "trying to convince the House that it was a consumer bill, not a credit allocation bill."[28]

The political battle over the labeling and categorizing of mortgage disclosure may be symptomatic of an issue for which legislators are seeking understandable cues to reconcile competing cognitive images. This cognitive mechanism for reducing uncertainty may help explain why there are surges of similar legislation after an initial breakthrough.[29] The initial innovation is evidence of a new policy domain gaining legitimacy. This legitimacy is then available to correlative issues. In the case at hand, mortgage disclosure was unable to cloak itself fully in the legitimacy of consumerism.

Participants on both sides of the issue saw this policy-conceptualization process as a vital part of the legislation battle. A Republican aide described his legislation role in the following terms: "People in Congress who may be captured by

[27] Confidential interview with author.

[28] Confidential interview with author.

[29] Jack Walker, "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate," *British Journal of Political Science* 7 (October 1977): 423–445.

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the issue of the moment . . . forget that at one time the secondary market was a big problem. Its institution has allowed a much greater flexibility on the flow of funds. It is a question of keeping your perspective. There are more problems in the world besides redlining. It is the role of the staff to provide this perspective."[30]

Congressional opponents did not believe that most disclosure proponents supported credit allocation. But opponents did fear that proponents might unwittingly and incrementally slip into credit-allocation policies in their haste to respond to social problems. Disclosure opponents believed their role was to place the social issue of the moment within a fuller economic perspective. Their intent was to render the market image more salient than the neighborhood distress image in the mortgage disclosure debate.

Similarly, proponents of disclosure had to be cognizant of the cognitive cues that their legislation provided. In this regard, the deletion of savings data takes on meaning beyond a cost cutting compromise. Savings data were dropped to remove any implication of credit allocation from the bill. Critics argued that savings disclosure was intended for future credit-allocation schemes based on mandatory neighborhood savings to mortgage ratios. To negate that argument, the Senate proponents removed the savings-data requirement even though they had no intention of using the data in such a manner. The image of savings disclosure simply provided too many negative cues to uncommitted members of Congress.

One policy maker's description of his changing position on redlining is indicative of both the use of cues and the cognitive conflict that was prevalent. Initially, he believed the solution to neighborhood decline meant that "some proportion of lending within the primary service areas was to be required of financial institutions."[31] But the actor conceded that the adverse arguments of the financial industry rapidly "obliterated" his confidence in such an approach. While continuing to insist that financial institutions had an obligation to their service areas, he no longer agreed that mandatory proportional lending was a "pragmatic" economic solution. In particular, this policy maker asserted: "Such a mandated proportion would destroy the free flow of capital in the U.S. It would hurt the secondary market which facilitated that flow of funds. In addition, there was no way to measure the real demand for loans in a neighborhood. How do you know what percentage is adequate for a particular area?"[32]

This individual's explanation of his transition demonstrates that the market principle of a free flow of capital had the capacity to dominate other perceptions of public problems. The original simple image of neighborhood disinvestment and decline as a social tragedy requiring remedy was partially overridden by a noncongruent image of the necessity for relatively unobstructed capital markets. While the goal of stable neighborhoods remained from the initial impression, the boundaries of a pragmatic economic solution were set by the second image. Thus, his

[30] Confidential interview with author.
[31] Confidential interview with author.
[32] Ibid.

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policy preference moved from proportional lending to mortgage disclosure. This incident illustrates a major conclusion of the linkage political economy approach. Corporate interests are likely to be protected in the policy process because of the frequent domination of market-oriented images in that process. In effect, linkage political economy emphasizes that access to the policy process must be studied not only in terms of social groups but also in terms of cognitive images.

Conclusion

An analysis of policy making on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act finds no simple verification of any one perspective. The elitist perspective finds some support in the content of the policy. As elite theory would expect, a comprehensive and profound regulation of the financial industry was never seriously considered. Moreover, even the minimalist approach of disclosure was continually weakened as it wended its way through the policy process. Furthermore, at the implementation stage, the Federal Reserve Board acted more as a representative of business than of society.

But an elitist explanation is not fully satisfactory. While it predicts policy to a certain extent, it does not offer a substantiated explanation of how that policy evolved in the political process. The policy process showed very few indications of a dominant, cohesive elite. Even conceding that the Federal Reserve Board acted in the interest of the financial industry, nonetheless, the FRB's behavior was constrained by other government institutions. In particular, Congress's passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act forced the FRB to draft regulations (weak though they may have been) that the FRB would not otherwise have even considered drafting.

In general, as pluralists would expect, the policy process was marked by multiple actors with varying goals and interests. Even within coalitions and institutions, there was goal differentiation. This goal differentiation was based on race for the community group sector, industry variation for the financial sector, and organizational turf and constituency relations for government institutions. Bargaining and compromise among these varying interests was the prevalent mode of decision making on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. There was little evidence of a dominant elite with cohesive goals and a determinant amount of power resources.

Yet, the pluralist explanation is not completely satisfactory either. The boundaries of the bargains were set prior to, rather than during, the bargaining process. While the bargaining process was open to a variety of interest groups, it was not as open to a full consideration of policy issues and potential remedies. Nonmarket alternatives were almost completely screened from the policy process. Much of the bargaining that went on revolved around less basic questions such as the cost of disclosure, the use of census tracts, and the inclusion of Regulation Q and NOW accounts.

The limits of the bargaining game were set by the content of the core policy map. A linkage political economy perspective thereby places the bargaining pro-

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cess within a fuller context. This approach assumes that the core set of cognitions is at least partially derived from the socio-economic structure, thus permitting these cognitions to act as a linkage from the macrostructure to the policy process. In this manner, the framework provides an alternative explanation for the relative protection of the corporate sector in the policy process.

Nonetheless, the linkage political economy perspective should not be confused with elite theory. There is an important distinction between elite theory's assumption of elite cohesiveness and the concept of the core policy map. Elite cohesiveness encompasses an elite consensus on goals. The most important components of the core policy map involve a consensus on means. These core components are common understandings of how society functions. Thus, it is quite possible for the linkage political economy approach to recognize a plurality of group goals (even within the corporate sector) and yet still note that a common understanding of means constrains the policy process. In addition, unlike elite theory, the linkage political economy approach more readily accommodates noncorporate policy responses. Linkage political economy accomplishes this with its recognition of both social and economic components of the core policy map. Nevertheless, under most circumstances, basic economic images will prevail over social images if the two conflict.

Finally, the political economy perspective is not necessarily incompatible with a pluralistic version of the policy process. It is quite feasible to meld pluralistic findings about decision-making processes with the linkage political economy approach. Political economy, therefore, provides an opportunity to explain how a pluralist policy process may nonetheless frequently protect the corporate sector.*

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Book Reviews

American Approaches to World Affairs: The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership *by Inis L. Claude. Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1986. 67 pp. Cloth, $16.50; paper, $5.75.*

This brilliant, iconoclastic tour de force rudely snatches away two of the favorite pacifiers used by generations of American internationalists. The first is that the United States used to be *isolationist* (or multilateralist); the second is that the principle of collective security presents an as-yet imperfectly attained, but perfectly realizeable and valid, goal of enlightened western policy.

Claude demonstrates that, except perhaps for the first few decades, the United States has been neither internationalist nor isolationist but, rather consistently has chosen "the position of the auxiliary." By this he means that Americans have *never* really, consistently, in their hearts and minds, committed themselves to a global role. They have gone to war to defend a salient national interest; and sometimes they have been caught up in a spirit of wartime can-do that has stretched commitment, or what appeared to be commitment, for prolonged periods beyond the end of the actual conflagration (from 1941 to about 1970, for example). But America's preferred role, Claude argues persuasively, is to keep its distance, protect its options, and act in the world only "when and as it thinks necessary to uphold interests and values that concern it, acknowledging no obligation to be systematic about this but treasuring the right to be unpredictable . . ." (p. 16).

The trouble with this consistent posture of high, pragmatic inconsistency is that it undermines both deterrence strategy and its cousin, collective security. Alliance politics and restraint of aggression rely on a credible threat to go to war, even when someone else's interest is threatened. That, after all, is the point of NATO and, at the beginning, was the centerpiece of the United Nations Charter. But these threats, or promises, accord neither with national self-interest (at least, in the *short-term* sense) nor are they in harmony with a right to be unpredictable and "pragmatic."

But why do Americans still cherish their "auxiliary" status as an interested but undependable bystander over a policy of steady commitment to the international equivalent of law and order, especially after having learned by rote, if not by heart, the costly lesson of Munich? Why, since 1945, has the United States entered into misleading commitments in which it

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does not really believe and which, in a crunch, will turn out to be worth nothing unless the United States itself feels directly and vitally threatened, in which case the prior commitment is redundant?

Claude's answers to these questions are as unflinchingly incisive and painful as a sharp scalpel slicing through the unetherized body politic. The United States has simply lost its way. The national will to stand up to aggression is befuddled by the effective intrusion of aggressor governments and their American public relations mercenaries into the political process. Politicians have come to fear the quagmire of involvement in "foreign" wars, but even more the quagmire of domestic strife now seemingly attendant upon every effort by the United States to defend its allies against aggression.

Not only is its open democracy all too easily divided in the age of media manipulation and manipulated media, but America's general moral lassitude welcomes stasis. The existing world order is undoubtedly unjust, which provides a perfectly "moral" excuse for sitting back and doing nothing to protect any less-than-ideal little nation being captured by "progressive" forces of radical reform. As Claude puts it, "Moral self-confidence today is almost exclusively the property of those who are dedicated to changing the world, by force if necessary" (p. 62). American society, by contrast, has become indifferent. Affluence has shrunk the sense of moral responsibility to that of the—grudging—taxpayer. Americans contribute cash and "some anonymous entity—government, it usually turns out to be—is supposed to pick up our garbage . . . we will pay for the work . . . but we will not do it ourselves" (p. 65). Unfortunately, Claude reminds us, "we the peoples" are still the only international garbage collectors, or police, or social workers. If we refuse to do our part. . . .

There are two conclusions to the preceding sentence. Either: "no one will," which would be bad enough; or: "others will," which could be very much worse. The book is quite clear-eyed in choosing the latter. Thus, Claude points out that those "Americans who urged American withdrawal from the hostilities in Vietnam demanded, in effect if not always in intent, that Hanoi be permitted to conquer and absorb South Vietnam. . . . To put it bluntly, peace is sometimes less a noble ideal than a political stratagem." Or a filing of moral bankruptcy. In the context of this piercing analysis by a respected liberal internationalist the cry "no more Vietnams" becomes a call to moral inventory and self-reaffirmation.

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The President, the Congress and Foreign Policy *edited by Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth W. Thompson. Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1986. 311 pp. Cloth, $26.00; paper, $14.25.*

Not too many years ago it was said confidently: "The President makes foreign policy." No ifs, ands, or buts. Obviously that was hyperbole even then, considering the express constitutional responsibility of Congress in matters of foreign commerce and tariffs, the Senate's constitutional role in treaties, and the requirement that both Houses appropriate funds

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for foreign assistance and other dimensions of foreign policy. Still, there was a strong belief that in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, the president reigned supreme.

This book argues forcefully that foreign policy is necessarily a joint responsibility of the president and Congress. A product of the Association of Former Members of Congress and the Atlantic Council, the result is a well-balanced, insightful study of executive-legislative relations. In addition to the policy paper presented by Kenneth Thompson, ten essays cover the constitutional framework; the role of Congress and the executive branch; the application of foreign policy to Mexico, Central America, western Europe, the Middle East, and China; and studies of trade relations, foreign assistance, and human rights.

Efforts to amend the Constitution to deal with "deadlock" are discouraged. The present check-and-balance system works reasonably well if the two branches have a "high degree of teamwork and cooperation." The president must accept his responsibility "to work closely with the Congress," and legislators must equip themselves "to respond constructively and effectively in carrying out its [Congress's] share of the joint responsibility" (p. viii). Moreover, the secretary of state must be restored as the "central figure on the stage." Too much power has drifted from the State Department to the national security adviser. Strengthening the State Department requires the government to utilize "more fully than it has in the past the expertise and the diplomatic talents of the foreign service" (p. ix).

Certainly these judgments could not be more timely or more to the point, given the scandal that unfolded from the Reagan White House in November 1986. To supply arms to Iran and funds to the contras in Nicaragua, the White House was willing to exclude Congress, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To carry out this byzantine scheme, the congressional policy to deny funds to the contras was defied and the pledge to keep the intelligence committees fully informed was ignored with studied contempt. Every element of good faith and professional integrity was thrown to the wind. To do what was "right," White House operatives were willing to break the law. They were called patriots by some, but the decision to take the law in one's hands, whatever the motive, creates activity more accurately described as criminal.

Thompson correctly states that the problem "is not one of machinery as much as it is one of attitudes and working relationships" (pp. 3–4). The critical weaknesses are the political culture in the White House, which "tends to look at the world in a four-year time span" (p. 15), the effort to make the national security adviser "a second Secretary of State" (p. 22), and the failure of presidents to recognize "the constitutional responsibility and growing importance of Congress" (p. 24). Elevating the national security adviser—by subjecting the position to Senate confirmation—would make matters worse. One way to build a better relationship between the branches is to cut substantially the number of short-term amateurs and presidential flatterers who operate out of the White House and the executive departments.

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Diplomat in Chief: The President at the Summit *by Elmer Plischke. New York, Praeger, 1986. 518 pp. $42.95.*

"And she came to Jerusalem with a very great train . . . and when she was come to Solomon, she communed with him of all that was in her heart" (I Kings 10:2). Ever since the Queen of Sheba made that famous visit—and no doubt before—chiefs of state have personally engaged in the conduct of international relations. Summit diplomacy, as Plischke observes in his interesting new book, is a new phrase describing a routine as old as recorded history.

Plischke's particular concern is with summit diplomacy as practiced by American presidents. By summit diplomacy, he means a good deal more than face-to-face meetings with leaders of other states. The phrase embraces a wide variety of international transactions, to each of which Plischke devotes a chapter—presidential personal communications, presidential special envoys, visits of foreign leaders to the United States, presidential trips abroad, summit conferences. In each chapter he sketches the general picture and then provides more detailed accounts of salient personalities and events.

Diplomat in Chief illustrates among other things the evolution of the presidential role in foreign affairs. Though George Washington initiated the practice of sending presidential communications to a foreign government (to the sultan of Morocco in 1789), it was nearly another century before President Ulysses S. Grant received the first summit visitor (King Kalakaua of Hawaii in 1874), and a century and a quarter before Theodore Roosevelt became the first president to visit a foreign country (Panama, 1906). Woodrow Wilson was the first president to take part in an international conference abroad, Harry Truman the first to be received abroad on a formal state visit, and Dwight Eisenhower the first to entertain foreign leaders on formal state visits to the United States. Only five presidents before the second Roosevelt set foot on foreign territory, but Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan made nearly 170 foreign visits, averaging five per year.

This evolution was not always painless. When Wilson went to Paris, a former attorney general argued that he ceased to be president the moment he left American territorial waters while Congress was in session and that the vice president could then legally assume the duties of the office (p. 201). As late as 1926, the secretary of state declared, "It is not the practice of the Federal Government to invite Chiefs of State to visit the United States as guests of the Government, as no legal provision for it exists" (p. 138).

Plischke's assessment of presidential diplomacy is moderate and judicious. He notes the conventional criticisms—inadequate preparation, excessive presidential involvements in the details of negotiation, excessive expectations, excessive physical strain, inability to disown results. But he inclines toward Lord Hankey's view that solutions to contemporary international problems often require resources "beyond those of the most competent and qualified diplomatist" and "can only be settled in Conference by persons who have their hand on the pulse of the political conditions and currents of thought in their respective countries" and "who know how far they can persuade their fellow-countrymen to go in the direction of compromise" (p. 266). In fact, much of the criticism comes from secretaries of state and from professional diplomats, all of whom have a vested interest in keeping negotiations in their own hands.

Diplomat in Chief is straightforward and careful, if somewhat repetitious, in style. There

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are a few minor errors. To name Beaumarchais as the "composer" (p. 67) of *The Barber of Seville* and *The Marriage of Figaro* is an injustice to Rossini and Mozart; it was President John F. Kennedy, not McGeorge Bundy, who first called Averell Harriman "the crocodile" (p. 101); Daladier is transmuted into "Deladier" (p. 272) and Edmund into "Thomas" Burke (p. 464). But the compilation of data on presidential diplomacy is extremely useful. The book would be considerably more useful if it contained footnotes—an omission all the more inexcusable in view of the $42.95 the publisher has set as the price.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
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The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options *by Jerry F. Hough. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1986. 293 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $12.95.*

Most studies of the Soviet Union and the Third World focus on Soviet goals and patterns of behavior in particular countries. Interpretation of these goals and patterns by western scholars and practitioners is usually heavily dependent on the analyst's opinion about whether the Soviet Union is inherently expansionist or merely cautiously opportunistic.

In this stimulating study Jerry Hough adopts an entirely different approach. He analyzes in great depth and sophistication Soviet scholarly debates about Third World issues. He argues that an understanding of these debates illustrates how options are formulated, arguments linked, and opportunities assessed and that the United States has failed even to understand that these debates exist (p. 7). Indeed, he maintains that "there is no coherent, uniformly agreed-upon Marxist-Leninist ideology" (p. 7) and that Soviet views have shifted in response to changes in leadership, events in the Third World, and the scholarly debates themselves.

The heart of Hough's study is a series of chapters dealing with the evolution of scholarly views on the central issues of Soviet involvement in the Third World. A consistent theme throughout is the breakup of orthodox Stalinist views and the growth of a more sophisticated and variegated interpretation of Third World developments—with many of the same uncertainties and doubts about what can or should be done that plague western scholars and practitioners.

After a fascinating chapter on the art of interpreting the Soviet debates (which will surely persuade the nonspecialist of the need for an expert guide), succeeding chapters deal with the debates about patterns of historical development, the impact of western investment on economic development, the role of the Third World state and whether the Soviets can promote "progressive" change through such states, revolutionary strategy and the proper stance toward "bourgeois nationalists," the Soviet theory of international relations and the gradual movement away from an entirely class-based analysis, and the evolution of views about Soviet policy in response to developments such as the oil crisis, the economic success of some Third World regimes, and the failures of many radical regimes. Specialists may quarrel with one or another of Hough's interpretations of particular debates, but anyone concerned with these issues will learn much and be required to rethink much.

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Some seemingly relevant issues are not treated by Hough. There seems too little concern with the debate on the Soviet Union's role in the world economy and on the linked issue of whether Soviet scholars view the Third World as in competition with the Soviet Union for access to markets or whether economic interests are more compatible. Perhaps even more surprising is the absence of any analysis of the relationship between Soviet internal problems (especially with its ethnic minorities) and policies toward the Third World.

The concluding chapter discusses two crucial questions. The first concerns whether the debates have influenced policy choices. Hough suggests that through a variety of informal and indirect ways the debates have had some influence. Also, as the Soviets have become more sophisticated and pessimistic about Third World developments, they have or may become less willing to take great chances there (p. 269). Awareness of the diversity of Soviet thinking should also induce greater sophistication in U.S. thinking about Soviet policy. More generally, for the United States Hough advocates a moderate strategy that avoids the extremes of unilateral accommodation or direct confrontation, that seeks areas of cooperation, and that works gradually to integrate the Soviet Union into the world economy (pp. 269–86). These arguments are not new, but the detailed presentation is of high quality. This is a major work, deeply researched and persuasively argued. It will be valuable to scholars and indispensable to practitioners—if only they could be induced to read it.

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN
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Britain's Economic Renaissance: Margaret Thatcher's Reforms 1979–84 *by Alan Walters. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 200 pp. $29.95.*

Walters, a professor of economics at Johns Hopkins, was for several years personal economic advisor to British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. As such he was, if not principal, at least consulting architect of Thatcher's economic strategy. Particularly since Thatcherism has been playing to mixed reviews lately, one might hope that just such an inside outsider would have revealing things to say about constraints on successfully implementing drastic policy changes and the problems of overcoming a hundred years of economic difficulties. Sadly, Walters passes up the opportunity: the result is an overly defensive exercise in self-justification.

There is still much of interest here. Scholars who believe that ideas are important in economic policy will find in the early chapters a fascinating account of how Walters thought an economy worked. Of special interest in his criticism of "fiscalism" is his repeated insistence that the British fiscal policy multiplier (the relative size of the cumulative impact of a unit fiscal shock) must be less than one so that deficit spending less than repays itself. This he argues is partly a consequence of the overuse of fiscal policy in Britain (by medical analogy, the patient became immune to the cure). He also cites a remarkable rule of thumb, that when public borrowing is less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), deficits

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cause economic expansion; but when it is over 5 percent, they excessively destabilize business confidence.

Sadly, the measured tone of the discussion of multipliers, crowding out, and the meaning of fiscal stance disappears when Walters enthusiastically turns to the achievements of the Thatcher government. Ever optimistic about the capacity of a revitalized British economy to provide jobs, Walters writes that "although unemployment remained approximately constant or even on a slight upward trend, employment in Great Britain increased by approximately 260,000 in the year to March 1984 . . . in contrast with the rest of Europe where the number of jobs continued to decline" (p. 180). But his own figures, footnoted on the very same page, show that the improvement was only partial compensation for the disasters of the year before. From 1982 to the spring of 1984, the employed labor force in the U.K. actually falls by 6000 while unemployment rises by over 200,000.

In Walters's view, a major success of Thatcher's policy has been the rapid increase in rates of productivity growth that Britain experienced from 1979 to 1983. Some skeptics have called these gains illusory, attributing them to labor shedding and the elimination of inefficient firms in the recession. Never shy, Walter describes them as "the first signs of a cure for the British disease . . . a minor 'economic miracle.' " His view is "reinforced by many anecdotes from British boardrooms" (p. 172). Sadly for him, the plural of anecdote is data, and recent data show that productivity growth in Britain more or less stopped after 1984. From early 1984 to early 1986, output per man hour increased by about 3 per cent, according to the Department of Employment, delaying the renaissance and prolonging the disease.

Worse than the unjustified optimism is the occasional recourse to misinterpretation. Walters praises the Medium Term Financial Strategy, a device based on monetarist principles for targeting public-sector borrowing over several years in order to control monetary expansion and stabilize expectations, as a major cure for the financial instabilities of earlier administrations. Until this book, everyone else was on record as saying the strategy failed. Targets were repeatedly missed through overspending, revenue shortfalls, and even cost pressure on financing caused by interest rate increases. The embarrassment of frequent upward revisions drove the Thatcher government gradually into more evasive language and diffuse strategy. Not so, according to Walters, for whom the data show that "the government has managed to maintain the strategy remarkably well. True, the projected deficits were pitched higher, by some 1.25 to 1.75 percent, than had been envisaged in March 1980" (p. 81). Nonsense. These errors are over 1 percent of GDP, relative to a forecast of two percent of GDP, or a margin of error of *50 percent*. Indeed, the 1983–1984 deficit, revised upward overall by 117 percent from 1.5 percent of GDP to 3.25 percent, was not accurately forecast until November 1983, half way through the fiscal year!

A more balanced treatment would recognize that the strategy did not work well. It has not produced a fundamental reorientation of economic policy to provide incentives and enforcement to generate coordinated investment and jobs. North Sea oil through speculation in sterling has left Britain internationally uncompetitive for a decade, while its revenues spent on compensating the unemployed have produced a repressed, misdirected boom. Walters mentions competitiveness, but exchange rate policy is hardly discussed. High real

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wages are constantly referred to, but Walters provides no clues about how to forge a political coalition to gain compliance with the sort of market-oriented industrial subsidy policy that would be necessary to reduce high relative real wages in potentially competitive sectors and create investment and employment for the next generation.

JAMES E. ALT
Harvard University

"The Target is Destroyed": What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew about It *by Seymour M. Hersh. New York, Random House, 1986. 282 pp. $17.95.*

The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKSA Countries, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand *by Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball. Winchester, Mass., Allen & Unwin, 1985. 402 pp. $29.95.*

Seymour Hersh has written an extremely valuable but unhappily flawed book about the tragic loss of 269 lives in the shootdown of Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007 on 1 September 1983. The book's value lies in the author's research that is a real contribution to the history of an important issue in international affairs. Hersh uncovers lots of information about U.S. electronic intercept systems and conclusively demonstrates that the Korean aircraft was not on an American intelligence mission as Moscow claimed.

Hersh does not spare, as he seldom does, the U.S. government and the CIA from charges of skulduggery in regard to this episode, and he castigates the Reagan administration's performance without any real justification. Hence, coming from him, this book ought to refute once and for all the energetic propaganda campaign by Soviet authorities to excuse their own barbarous deed of fabricating the story that KAL 007 was on a U.S. intelligence collection task. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov himself received Hersh to give him this Soviet official line. Hersh confronted the Soviet charges head on and demonstrates from his own investigation that they are dead wrong.

Perhaps because the facts obliged the author to disappoint the Soviet hosts on this key point, Hersh buys an equally preposterous Soviet story that partially exculpates them. He argues that the Soviet pilot who reported "the target is destroyed" and his superiors in the chain of command did not know the aircraft was a civilian airliner carrying passengers. Hersh's investigation here is not very thorough or convincing.

The evidence presented in the book clearly shows that the navigation running lights of KAL 007 were observed twice and reported to the ground (p. 233). At one point during the interception of the Korean airliner the Soviet pilot said he could "see it visually." He was then instructed to make further efforts to identify the plane (pp. 228–9). Even if the pilot did not visually distinguish KAL's 747 wide-body type aircraft from the very different configuration of a military KC-135, his ground controllers ought to have taken the fact that it had its navigation lights on to mean the intruder was simply off course and hence probably civilian. Hersh ignores the fact that a clandestine military penetration of Soviet

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airspace deep enough to cross over Sakhalin Island would never have helped interceptors find their target by keeping on running lights.

Hersh says a message from Khaborovsk Air Defense Force to the command center at Sakhalin reminded everyone on duty that rules of engagement required visual identification of the aircraft before shooting it down (p. 232). In the final five minutes of the interception these considerations were disregarded. The reason is that KAL 007 was leaving Soviet airspace, and whoever made the decision to shoot the aircraft down appeared more afraid to let a penetration of any kind get away unscathed than to violate worldwide aviation conventions by destroying an innocent unknown. In other words, they feared their commanders' wrath more than international opprobrium.

The Soviet system has a built-in bias toward erring on the side of shooting first if in doubt. Only in this way can the military operators in the field expect to escape blame from the political high command for permitting any intrusion into sensitive airspace. Hersh himself says it was "a tragic and brutal Soviet mistake—never acknowledged by Moscow." His willingness to accept the Soviet story about not knowing the type of target is inexplicable in view of the facts he himself describes in his book.

Like many of the new breed of academic authors who scan the public evidence diligently but do not know from the inside how intelligence agencies really work, Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball have indulged their preconceived political prejudices to tilt against secret intelligence work. While they recognize the importance of intelligence to the five UKUSA nations (U.K., U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), Richelson and Ball come out strongly for "public debate" on "security and intelligence arrangements," which they feel should "be established through open democratic processes." History suggests that democratic processes are fine, but security and intelligence matters cannot be settled altogether in the open by public debate.

These two energetic professional researchers present from their data files a lot of useful descriptions of technical intelligence functions, a plethora of jargon terms plus acronyms, and many interesting organization and activity charts. These are handy for readers seeking ready references. The authors are not always up-to-date with respect to reports in recent technical journals, but they do represent the better journalists who are the source of most public information about the intelligence world.

Richelson and Ball both proceed from the conviction that the more the public and the legislative oversight committees know about the detailed activities of the intelligence agencies, the better the intelligence community will serve the national interest. Their conclusions on policy reflect this view. In these days of hostile adversarial journalism and intrusive legislative micromanagement in the United States, at least, this proposition is dubious at best. Certainly some valuable intelligence achievements have been ruined by unfortunate publicity. Veterans who know what has been lost want more public understanding and support of the intelligence communities but wish the details on which successful operations depend could be kept secret. The authors pay lip service to protecting secrecy in some areas, but in general they are sublimely innocent of doubt about the desirability of telling a lot more publicly than is now the case.

The Washington and New York news media almost every day present some fact that is

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probably helpful to the Soviet Union and in contradiction of American law prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of intelligence "sources and methods." In the last analysis these breaches of security cause loss of access to code, cipher, and other technical intelligence and damage the security of each of the five UKUSA nations.

Where these academic authors go astray is in cranking into their conclusions judgments about internal security operations that they deplore without being in a position to know much about why they were judged necessary by democratically-elected or legally-appointed officials. In fact, the authors are mostly talking about old cases, such as infiltrations or break-ins conducted many years ago, claiming they may have had "detrimental effect on the national security."

The book would have been far better if the authors had not strayed into this difficult field of intelligence activity where reasonable men differ but had concentrated on the UKUSA technical intelligence world, about which they had something concrete to say. The reasons why these five democratic nations thought they had common security threats mounted against them and why they wanted to cooperate in collecting technical intelligence were valid all these years and are still valid. Hashing the activities over at length in public is likely to cause more confusion than understanding. Hence the authors' conclusions ought to be read with reserve.

RAY S. CLINE
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The Nonproliferation Predicament *edited by Joseph F. Pilat. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1986. 137 pp. $19.95.*

Joseph Pilat has assembled a useful review of U.S. thinking on nuclear proliferation in the mid-1980s. Unlike other recent books on the subject, this volume does not try to cover the issue from A to Z. It assumes the reader is familiar with the issues and the argot. Nor does it try to break new theoretical ground. Rather, in a dozen succinct essays by seasoned observers, the book stakes out the prominent positions in the current policy debate.

These are peculiar times for nuclear proliferation analysts and policy makers. After two decades of waiting for the worst, today's proliferation picture is not as desperate as was previously feared. Virtually every new publication on proliferation—including this one—proudly observes that past prophesies of twenty-five or thirty nuclear powers were mercifully excessive. The emotional diplomacy that characterized proliferation politics for the last decade has suddenly eased. The 1985 review conference for the Nonproliferation Treaty was astonishingly peaceful. But these successes are tarnished by growing uncertainty. There are good reasons to believe that the proliferation problem has not been controlled, but only made more complex. The controversial regime may be increasingly irrelevant. Far from diminishing, the dangers of proliferation seem to have become more subtle and intractable.

Nevertheless, many leading U.S. spokesmen remain loyal to the policies they have advocated for years. Traditional positions cluster around the poles of cooperation versus confrontation with potential proliferators. The cooperative approach is explicated more thoroughly here, in essays by Richard Kennedy and Lewis Dunn, the architects of the Reagan administration's policies. To retain its influence, they argue that the United States must eschew unilateral rampages. They emphasize the need to convince potential proliferators

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that abstinence is to their advantage by assuring them security assistance and civilian nuclear technology. Joseph Nye presents a more confrontational strategy, relatively unchanged from the views he championed in the Carter administration. As Lawrence Scheinman shows in his chapter entitled "The Pendulum Swings," Washington oscillates between these poles.

Or does it? Scheinman readily notes that in practice U.S. policy shifts far less than official rhetoric. In a chapter that stands out like a rogue elephant, Henry David Sokolski argues that the differences between the Carter and Reagan policies are not merely exaggerated, but superficial; both pursued contradictory goals of encouraging U.S. nuclear exports while discouraging military applications. U.S. policy remains unwilling to confront the painful trade-offs that a serious nonproliferation policy requires. Sokolski goes beyond conventional recommendations for stricter enforcement of existing regulations to challenge the very logic of prevailing wisdom.

If there is a gyroscopic force in proliferation policy making, it is the Congress. As Leonard Spector and James Hamilton make clear, congressional oversight consistently thwarted the Reagan administration's effort to ease nuclear exports. In the long run, however, the marketplace may become the most significant restraint. Edward Wonder shows how the United States is losing influence as its share of the international nuclear market declines.

None of the contributors suggests that there is a magical solution to the proliferation predicament. With the noteable exception of Sokolski, most would only tinker with the existing regime. They implicitly agree that Washington can only expect to slow proliferation. Certainly, they do not believe that we can stop *all* proliferation. The optimistic corollary is that proliferation may not be so bad after all. None of the authors endorses the "more may be better" view. Robert Pendly cautiously reasserts the potential dangers of proliferation. But neither his nor Joseph Pilat's chapters on the implications for U.S. security are very satisfying; they acknowledge the difficulties of prediction by simply presenting grocery lists of bad possibilities.

Uniting the book is a recognition of declining U.S. influence and the concomitant deterioration of the nonproliferation regime. The most disturbing part of this picture is how blandly it seems to be accepted. Activists can raise a din now and then, but few can offer anything but tired slogans that fail to address contemporary dilemmas. Unlike strategic arms control thinkers, the nonproliferation community does not show a taste for spinning new formulas and proposals. They still have hope, but precious little imagination.

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition *edited by William V. O'Brien and John Langan. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986. 261 pp. $25.00.*

Eight authors who are longtime students of warfare and just war theories join in this important inquiry. Two prominent scholars are responsible for organizing and editing the volume. They are William V. O'Brien of Georgetown, whose *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* is the most comprehensive treatise on just war, and John Langan, senior research fellow at Woodstock Theological Center at Georgetown. Other leading contributors include James

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Turner Johnson of Rutgers University and Michael Walzer of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.

What is the primary focus of their inquiry? It is to determine whether the just war tradition has meaning in the nuclear age or whether nuclear weapons have rendered such judgments a contradiction in terms. The authors plainly see a continuing place for the tradition. Their contributions are in a sense working papers on crucial issues. They consider theological, political, and military questions perhaps in greater depth than was possible in a single document, the Bishops' Pastoral Letter. The underlying premise of the book is that clarity on just war questions is possible only through an interdisciplinary study and similar cooperation at the policy-making level between technical, military, and political decision makers and those concerned with the moral and religious dimensions of the nuclear dilemma. It is hard to fault such methodological and policy-making assumptions.

Few would question that those who contribute to just war theory in this impressive volume are among America's best minds writing on the subject. Further, their thought is fairly representative of American approaches to international relations in general, with the acknowledged exception of pacifists, realists, and outspoken critics of western democratic institutions. Father Langan explains these omissions saying that all contributors share a common conviction about the defense of freedom and the need to consider the moral quality of the means of defense. By implication, those excluded from the colloquium fail to meet the two criteria. The risk of limiting the colloquium to members of the faith, however, is that the community of just war theorists is tempted endlessly to multiply new constructs and refinements in just war theory without confronting head on the transformation of contemporary warfare and international society. They are fertile in exploring new concepts such as the "supreme emergency" in which just war precepts are set aside, "noncombatant immunity" that is suspended only in the "supreme emergency," "minimal deterrence," and "defense of the innocent."

However, the problem of just war theory is not the lack of intellectual refinements but the intractable character in responding to norms of present-day international politics and war. Nationalistic universalism has supplanted the underlying moral consensus that bound together nineteenth- and twentieth-century nation-states. Warfare itself has become total war with the emergence of the absolute weapon. The restraints that earlier could be effective when national interests dictated are more problematical in the twilight of international morality. It is the international system in the 1980s and the technology of warfare, not lack of scholarly constructs, that stands in the path of just war theory. To examine such issues, the community of just war theorists may someday wish to cast the net more broadly. They may want to draw on international relations theorists and students of diplomacy and diplomatic history. The task of reviving the just war tradition calls, as a colleague once remarked, for "more than a White Russian reunion." Awaiting that day, the present volume contains some of the best available writing on the subject and, as such, merits high praise. Unfortunately, those who ought most to read and follow it, Soviet and American defense ministers are unlikely to do so.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
University of Virginia

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Before Nomination: Our Primary Problems *edited by George Grassmuck. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 146 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $5.95.*

Conference proceedings can drive a reviewer to distraction. To report the content and usefulness of three prefaces, nine presentations, the summation of a rapporteur, and the assorted observations and professional chit-chat of about twenty additional worthies would test the wit and concision of a Samuel Johnson.

Such tribulations pass, but proceedings have a far greater problem intrinsic to the genre. They often lack coherence and focus, or even a common core concern. Happily, that hasn't happened here. This conference at the Gerald R. Ford Library at the University of Michigan had a clear and well defined subject—the pre-convention politics in presidential nominations—and the participants pretty much stuck to it. Moreover, they have largely found a similar idiom: the evaluation of the status quo and some appraisal of the need and/or possibility of reforming it. There is very little original or monographic research and very little bringing of new data or analytical structures to bear on preconvention politics.

Such an approach defines the book's audience. Many of these pages won't seem particularly new to specialists. How much the reader finds new, of course, depends on how much the reader has read. I suspect, therefore, that the natural audiences for this volume will be students, interested nonprofessionals, and academics whose specialties do not include American politics. This is not to denigrate the enterprise; most of the papers and comments are informed, insightful, and to the point.

Not the least of the reviewer's problems in dealing with a conference book is the obligation of bestowing medals on *some* of the participants. So, among the varied presentations I resonated especially to Theodore Lowi's relating styles of politics to types of "regimes" through American history, Michael Nelson's spirited (if not altogether convincing) defense of the status quo in presidential nominating politics, Thomas Mann's willingness to question the conventional opposition to the national presidential primary, Michael Malbin's analysis of campaign finance in the primary period, and Warren Miller's study of the evolution of presidential elites. Other readers with other interests and specialties will surely have other lists; certainly there is not a piece here not worth reading. William Schneider also sums up all the presentations in six masterly pages.

Finally, the conference broke into three panels to make recommendations about reform. The recommendations are, to be blunt, pretty small potatoes. The burden of them is to "standardize or improve the present system through important but marginal changes" (p. 141). Not even the warning of Gerald R. Ford himself that the "endless succession of presidential primaries just bores voters" (p. 4) seems to have moved the participants greatly. There were recommendations for adjusting contribution and spending limits in the funding system, for increasing voter turnout, and for adopting some system of regionally grouped primaries. The idea of a national primary apparently won no support.

Beyond the recommendations, the rhetoric also makes it clear that this group of scholars and practitioners had little confidence in or optimism about reform. Certainly the academics showed little enthusiasm for the kind of crusades in which their predecessors brought us, inter alia, the presidential primary. Scholarly agendas are different now, and recent ex-

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periences with reform have not been altogether happy. Austin Ranney strikes a pervasive note in the discussion (p. 134): ". . . you can be sure that whatever new reforms you adopt may not produce all the results you wanted, and they may produce other results that are almost certain to astonish you." Thoroughgoing reform, in other words, may have to wait until we have collectively forgotten the fruits of earlier reform.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law *by Christopher Wolfe. New York, Basic Books, 1986. 392 pp. $24.95.*

On the eve of the two-hundredth anniversary of the writing of the American Constitution, the Supreme Court's appropriate role in interpreting some of the imprecise language of the nation's basic charter continues to be vigorously debated. Entering the lists, armed and in full battle dress, Christopher Wolfe has taken on those in the establishment—bench, bar, universities, press—who make and defend the constitutional law of our time.

It is Wolfe's thesis that the framers of the Constitution believed that society was based on certain truths—a public orthodoxy—and that a system of government must be rooted in a rational order (natural rights). He contends that John Marshall and the early associate justices whose views reflected those of the framers interpreted the Constitution traditionally; that is, they respected its original intent and did not superimpose their own political preferences. They exercised *judgment*, not *will*. This was "moderate" judicial review, since it acknowledged limits on itself and maintained a balance between judicial power, the other coordinate branches of the government, and the ultimate authority of the people.

A new form of judicial review emerged at the end of the nineteenth century with the raising of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a barrier to economic regulation. During this "Transitional Era" the justices were exercising *will*, expressing a personal preference that was akin to legislating rather than judging. The mid-1930s ushered in the "Modern Era," which is characterized by the judges' tendency to seek freedom *from* the Constitution—freedom from its original intention—in order to validate social policies. Judicial review has now become a vehicle to transform claims into rights through an expansive interpretation of specific constitutional guarantees, especially the open-textured equal protection and due process clauses, with a resulting distortion of judicial and legislative roles and, more fundamentally, a weakening of the Constitution itself.

Causes of the new condition of judicial supremacy are many and varied, but the intellectual elite's new gods—positivism and relativism—worshipped by such eminent jurists as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Benjamin Cardozo, certainly helped to pave the way. Holmes would have had judges draw lines on the basis of policy considerations and social advantage, and his view that cases must be considered not merely in the light of "what was said a hundred years ago" but in that of our experience as a nation suggests a lack of concern for the intent of the framers. Cardozo, who argued that judicial power transcends a fixed Constitution, lost the anchor and, contends Wolfe, had to look for other anchors such as "the spirit of the age." These men were heroes for generations of judges. Equally influen-

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tial were those powerful revisionist historians of the turn of the century, J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard, Vernon Parrington, and Woodrow Wilson, who were "profoundly dissatisfied" with the American Constitution as written and understood, thus giving impetus to a new view of judicial interpretation.

Wolfe builds a compelling case for the framers' concept of modest judicial review and, while admitting that a return to the original mode "would be very difficult," he suggests that if only we would study the nation's founding, we would embrace his view. It may be, however, that judicial legislating and judicial supremacy are simply an institutional manifestation of a deeper pathology in the American polity to which Wolfe alludes but does not confront—the substitution of positivism for natural rights (p. 278), the declining impact of religion (p. 281), and the resulting replacement of a public philosophy with relativism. Perhaps it is asking too much of the justices to support a traditional constitutional order in such a disorderly world. Wolfe also leaves us with Hobson's choice. When the demand for constitutional change becomes overwhelming, we have only one option—to amend the Constitution. And cluttering the Constitution with amendments has implications as serious as continued judicial tinkering with the fundamental law.

It is doubtful that Wolfe will effect any change in the thinking of the current crop of judicial activists, but his superbly crafted plea for a return to the principles so carefully nurtured by those ingenious men of 1787 may yet fall on fertile minds of a new generation.

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The Supreme Court and the American Family: Ideology and Issues *by Eva R. Rubin. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1986. 251 pp. $35.00.*

This book is based on a good idea, attending to interaction between public and private affairs. But the result of Rubin's critique of these interactions is not successful. She lacks cogent theory, including definitions of key concepts. To write that "an ideology is what it is, without question" (p. 80) says little. The impact of patriarchy is understated in favor of influence by biological differences (see pp. 67–68), which seldom elsewhere is shown significant. A definition of socialization might convince readers that cases discussed together under that label belong there.

Court cases about illegitimacy, control of reproductive function, and maternity benefits are said to equitably represent "problems . . . afflicting contemporary families" (p. 25), a proposition with which this reviewer cannot agree. Rubin's claim that *Roe v. Wade* is "the central family issue" (ibid.) seems shortsighted; and treating abortion as a birth control issue alone (p. 56) denies the obvious.

In the introduction, Rubin offers a typology of Supreme Court justices' positions in the "domestic" policy arena (pp. 7–8), unapplied thereafter. She also hypothesizes that the Court worked for a period to tune existing rules governing family institutions to a socially realistic pitch (p. 5), then largely defeats the hypothesis, although she does systematize reform and status quo ante decisions (p. 197).

Rubin finds a due process model ineffective for "multi-party conflicts" (p. 7), except,

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curiously, in *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (see p. 168). She might have looked also at incest cases; victims routinely are denied, but desperately need due process guarantees. Family court, where due process rights are shallow, is a convenience largely for men; nowhere else do judges take so lightly property rights and investments of many years. "Baby Does" also need strong procedural rights (but see p. 116), as do many severely disabled adults. The author has written off these people.

Also of concern is the study's ahistorical character. The author states that "until recently federal courts have stayed largely out of family law" (p. 12; but see p. 14). But, there have been many denials of certiorari, powerful non-decisions. Rubin refers to increases since 1950 in the "illegitimate" birth rate (p. 20). But, these births began increasing at the nineteenth century's end. Other aspects of this early sexual revolution, along with Charlotte Perkins Gilman's ideas, might have entered the discussion (see p. 56). To state that "from the first, abortion rights have been a key issue in the women's movement" (see pp. 64, 60) is inaccurate. And, when NOW (National Organization for Women) did take up the banner, significant numbers of members left in disagreement to form WEAL (Women's Equity Action League).

The author's assertion that "pregnancy has always been used as an excuse for sex discrimination" (p. 79) is what communications expert Vance Packard called a "glittering generality." Nor has abortion facilitated an "egalitarian [family] structure" (but see p. 66).

The social construction and historical context of adolescence are not discussed in the chapter on "Teenage Pregnancy and Adolescent Sexuality." To write that "the immorality of the young and the newer generation's loss of the virtues of yesteryear have always been popular subjects for nostalgic lamentation" (p. 99) is not historical. Discontinuity and misemphasis are among the problems accompanying analyses not historically grounded.

There also are thoughtless references to "the drift of women out of the home into paid employment" (p. 21) or to contraception and abortion "freeing women to leave the home and take jobs" (p. 24). Historically imprecise, these references also offend in degree of imprecision. Some even may be dangerous: no reference to date-rape accompanies one to young women's willing engagement in premarital relations (p. 99), or the discussion of gender discrimination consequential to a statutory rape law applicable to men alone (p. 105). (See also first full paragraph, p. 108).

Case analyses may overlook more than they include. Take *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (pp. 123–31). No mention is made of the Court's denial that a basic education is a fundamental right, a position setting some perimeters with which the Court has to contend in *Yoder*. Reference to *Tinker v. Des Moines* (p. 131) does not include recognition of the clear congruency of children's and parents' interests in *Tinker*, unlike *Yoder*. Surprisingly, only after leaving this subject for another does the author mention that *Yoder's* holding supposedly applied only to students in agreement with their parents' desire to withdraw them from school (p. 168). One wishes, too, that treatment of Amish people in the text were better informed culturally. Unfortunately, *The Supreme Court and the American Family* is a disappointment. One hopes, though, that other such analyses will be forthcoming.

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The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power *by Benjamin Ginsberg. New York, Basic Books, 1986. 272 pp. $18.95.*

This is an important book because it calls into question some of the most hallowed tenets of the democratic creed. These include the beliefs that citizens freely form their opinions about public issues in a democratic society and that these opinions serve to direct and restrain the activities of the state. They also include the axiom that periodic truly competitive elections are the best antidote to tyranny and that the age of democracy is also the age of the common man, whose welfare has become a paramount concern of the state.

Not so, says Cornell University political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg in this carefully argued book that draws its illustrations from a broad historical sweep of European and American events. Ginsberg demonstrates that public opinion is really elite opinion, spawned by a mixture of self-interest and idealism. Elites have the resources needed to successfully peddle these carefully tailored opinions to mass publics through the mass media, which are dominated by elites. Public opinion surveys further solidify and legitimize these opinions because questions cluster around elite concerns, focusing public attention on them and making them the basis for a consensus that cuts across social class lines.

Modern states enjoy historically unparalleled capabilities to communicate with people and shape their opinions through public relations activities. Combined with the belief that public opinion support legitimizes government action, instant access to mass publics has permitted modern democratic states to vastly expand and strengthen their powers. The lives of their citizens are regulated far more intensively and more money and services are extracted from them than ever before. Control over the public has been further enhanced by a universal education system. It indoctrinates citizens to support the state by instilling feelings of love of country and a sense that loyalty to the state and obedience to its laws are sacred duties, rather than fear-induced burdens.

The periodic competitive elections that are the hallmark of modern democratic states, Ginsberg explains, are a weak reed of popular power. Elections occur only at times selected by political elites and focus predominantly on issues chosen by these elites. They legitimize and thereby strengthen rulers and placate public clamors that might otherwise erupt into civil disobedience and genuine power struggles. Elections provide citizens with little actual control over the running of their governments once the new officials have assumed office.

Direct actions, such as riots and rebellions, give citizens far more power and are often more effective. They can be instigated by mass publics whenever they feel aggrieved by the actions or inactions of their rulers. Tellingly, Ginsberg points out that American blacks made their greatest gains when they resorted to violence. Peaceful politicking was rewarded only with benign neglect.

When welfare benefits to average citizens are taken as the measure of government caring for the common man, strongly entrenched democracies do not head the list of benefactors. The enormous powers flowing from the mantle of legitimacy bestowed by election victories allow democratic governments to ignore many public desires. Welfare benefits are greatest in states with weak, nonelected governments who fear that an angry public will take direct action and turn them out of office.

Ginsberg makes a powerful, carefully stated, but by no means airtight case for his views. The very fact that he points to a number of exceptions to the causal sequences that he

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describes indicates that the analysis requires further work. Scholars need to probe why these exceptions occur and develop better theories about democratic processes. They may also need to design new governmental mechanisms to achieve the goals that democracy theory enshrines if, in fact, these goals are achievable. *The Captive Public* is the kind of book that is bound to spur this kind of enterprise because of the exceptionally high quality of reasoning that it displays so forcefully, clearly, and gracefully about issues that are of utmost importance to political life in our time.

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Equal Education Under Law: Legal Rights and Federal Policy *by Rosemary C. Salomone. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 272 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $11.95.*

This is a rather pedestrian, though useful account of recent American educational policy toward various types of underdogs. More precisely—a point that accounts for both utility and lack of depth—it is an account of the federal government's responses to the needs and demands of blacks, linguistic minorities, the handicapped, and women in elementary and secondary education since 1954. In the process it develops, more by organization of the material than by self-conscious analysis, three themes: "the interplay among the three branches of government, the role of interest groups in shaping public policy, and the tension between equality and diversity as policy objectives" (p. 193). It concludes with a peroration against the Reagan administration's "disinvestment in public schooling and . . . retreat from the equality principle" (p. 195) and a call for a federal-state partnership to "put substantive force into *Brown's* mandate of equal educational opportunity based on individual freedom and dignity" (p. 203).

Some virtues of this book are apparent in this brief summary. Its topic is important and timely; it is organized along significant analytic dimensions; it has a strong and carefully-argued normative slant. Other virtues become apparent in the reading. The book presents and always keeps under control a wide array of facts backed by impressive references. It makes acute comments about the political context and legal consequences of actions taken by the courts. It seeks to put American educational policy in a broad philosophical context; we are treated to an intelligent if rambling discussion of the meaning of equality from Aristotle to John Rawls before the actual story begins.

One defect of *Equal Education under Law*—the aforementioned bird's eye view—is more a fault of omission than of commission. With rare exceptions (most prevalent in the chapter on bilingual education), we are told little about the actual process of education. The chapter on race desegregation, for example, has no discussion of changes in achievement scores, white flight, racial tolerance, second-generation discrimination, or school violence, to pick only a few issues affected by the policies that Salomone describes. Thus, despite its emphasis on conflict and change, this chapter has a curiously bloodless quality. The political actors seem to stage their conflicts and produce their changes in a vacuum. That may have

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actually been the case to a disconcerting degree, but if so, that point should be made through explicit argument rather than being conveyed through the same lack of attention to what is going on inside schools. Other chapters are similar: what happened, for example, when girls started participating in sports previously limited to boys? This dearth of information is especially frustrating given Salomone's conclusion, with which I heartily agree, that a crucial consequence of the past twenty years of law making has been to "focus . . . our attention away from futile attempts to equalize inputs (resources) or outputs (test scores) and toward the process of teaching and learning between those two points" (p. 199).

The other major problem is linked to, but conceptually distinct from, the first. Salomone is admirably insistent not only that educational policy must be put in the context of distributive justice, but also that justice has many faces. She discusses the relation between liberty (or individualism, or diversity) and equality, and the slipperiness of the concept of equality itself, as it slides from equal access to equal accomplishment to preferential treatment, and as its subject slips from individuals to groups and back again. But although she tries to do so, she does not succeed in showing how the differing meanings of equality and the concomitant changes in the relationship between equality and liberty do and should drive educational policy. How, for example, should we think about the fact that parents of handicapped children differ on whether mainstreaming promotes or retards equality? Or the analogous point that some Hispanic parents oppose bilingual education? Do these people differ in their understanding of the facts, or do they define equality differently from one another, or do they value liberty and equality differently, or what? Who is correct and why? More generally, on what grounds does Salomone insist that educational quality and equality reinforce one another, but accept that educational diversity and equality sometimes conflict? Salomone sometimes addresses questions such as these, but the book as a whole leaves the reader mystified about the relation between the general norms and their particular manifestations and interrelationships.

In sum, *Equal Education under Law* succeeds admirably as a compendium of events of the past thirty years in the field of federal educational policy from the perspective of a deeply knowledgeable and sophisticated liberal. It does not succeeed in telling us all we want to know about why these events occurred as they did or how to think about their occurrence.

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The United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific: 1965–1985

by W. W. Rostow. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1986. 265 pp. $30.

There are few good studies of the origins of Asian regional organizations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the Asian Development Bank and fewer still of the geostrategic importance of Southeast Asia to the United States. W. W. Rostow, now a professor of political economy at the University of Texas and a former aide to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, has combined both of these tasks in a wide-

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ranging, seminal discussion. Rostow's study opens with President Johnson's speech of 7 April 1965 at the Johns Hopkins University, with its strong emphasis on the need to promote Asian regionalism, and it closes with a provocative account of Southeast Asia's strategic importance to the United States.

As Rostow points out, over the past forty years, nine successive presidents—from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan—have made serious strategic commitments to the independence of Southeast Asia. Rostow begins his account where the Pentagon Papers should have begun but didn't—with the movement by the Japanese from northern to southern Indochina in July 1941 and Roosevelt's reaction to it, which made war between Japan and the United States inevitable despite Roosevelt's deep desire to avoid a two-front conflict. Rostow also points out that from Truman to Nixon there were consistent U.S. security commitments to Southeast Asia and that after the Communist take-over of South Vietnam in April 1975, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations have repeatedly and vigorously reaffirmed America's commitment to the defense of Thailand.

The reasons for these commitments now are not hard to find. With large Vietnamese forces in Cambodia just across the shallow Mekong River from Thailand and dominating Laos as well and with the Soviet navy based in Cam Ranh Bay just across the South China Sea from U.S. bases in Subic Bay and Clark Field, Southeast Asia is not likely soon to disappear from the national security agenda of the United States government.

To those such as J. K. Galbraith, who once thought that the region should be returned to the "obscurity it so richly deserves," Rostow concludes with two pertinent warnings. First, the Communists, unlike ourselves, are patient, persevering, and stubborn in pursuing their long-range strategies. Second, there is no power capable of preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Southeast Asia—indeed all of Asia—except the United States. If the United States were forced to close down its bases in the Philippines, pull the Pacific Fleet back to Hawaii, and announce that its guarantees to Thailand were no longer operative, Asia would probably become quite a different place—one less hospitable to western values and interests.

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Judging the Jury *by Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar. New York, Plenum Press, 1986. 285 pp. $17.95.*

Juries may be the most controversial feature of the American justice system. Hans and Vidmar, psychologists specializing in criminal justice, have marshaled a plethora of social science evidence with which to judge the jury. Their verdict: juries are not nearly as bad as their detractors claim. After tracing the origins and development of the jury system in Anglo-American law, the authors examine jury selection, jury deliberation, and the role of juries in cases involving the insanity defense, rape, and capital punishment. They show that many of our assumptions about juries are erroneous and that social science research can contribute to better understanding of the jury system.

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Theoretically, the law promises a jury of one's peers. In reality, the dynamics of jury selection often produce juries that are neither representative nor neutral. Moreover, lawyers do not want unbiased jurors; they want juries stacked in favor of their clients. Accordingly, unlike nations where juries are selected randomly and with little fanfare, jury selection in the United States has become something of a science with lawyers employing attitudinal surveys, demographic profiles, and mock trials. These sophisticated techniques may not always be reliable, however, and may account less for successful case outcomes than the evidence or skillful advocacy. Even if "scientific" jury selection were effective, the authors warn, it would raise serious ethical questions about trial fairness.

Debate over jury deliberation centers upon whether jurors perform competently and fairly. Critics contend that juries cannot understand complex cases, that they are biased for or against certain litigants, and that they frequently resolve disputes on the basis of their own sense of justice rather than according to law. The authors' evidence indicates that despite differences in expertise, juries on balance are not significantly less competent than judges. Indeed, judges and juries agree in four cases out of five. While prejudice and sympathy sometimes sit in the jury box, neither accounts for much of the disagreement between judges and juries. Similarly, when juries occasionally bend the law, their deviations seem principled rather than lawless or ignorant.

Juries are as affected by controversial cases as are citizens generally. They rarely accept insanity pleas, for example, because they doubt the reliability of psychiatric testimony. Likewise, while jurors share the public's abhorrence of rapists, they are reluctant to convict rape defendants, particularly when the victim has been sexually active, unless the defendant fits the jury's stereotype of a rapist. So too in capital cases can methods of jury selection, the race of the parties, and the facts involved lead to arbitrariness and discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty. Although Hans and Vidmar give juries poorer marks in these three areas, they emphasize that such cases are atypical and would be problematic for any decision maker. Nonetheless, reforms in jury selection, admissability of evidence, and decision-making standards would ensure greater equity in controversial cases.

Herein lies the book's value. Legal reforms that affect juries should be enacted only after reformers carefully consider the impact of their changes upon jurors. Too often, though, changes occur on the basis of either limited or mistaken information about jury behavior. In sanctioning nonunanimous juries of fewer than twelve members, for instance, the Supreme Court made assumptions about jury decision making that social science research has challenged. Hans and Vidmar conclusively demonstrate the utility of empirical studies in thinking intelligently not only about the jury system but about the judicial process generally. Their comprehensive overview of the jury, written in a clear and concise style, merits thorough study. Like Mark Twain's premature obituary, reports of the demise of the jury are greatly exaggerated.

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Soviet Military Policy Since World War II *by William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 263 pp. Cloth, $21.95; paper, $10.95.*

This is probably the most thoroughly researched and documented analysis in support of the contention that the Soviet Union represents a relentlessly mounting military threat to the West. It has the virtue of making extensive use of Soviet military writings combined with information from western sources on Soviet military weapons, programs, and forces.

Regrettably, it suffers from serious vitiating defects. It is highly selective in its use of sources, omitting a mass of information from the very sources used, as well as many others not consulted (or at least not cited), that contradict the authors' theses. A cardinal example is the absence of any discussion of the extensive development of Soviet military thinking, and corresponding development of forces, directed to preparing for nonnuclear war as the preferred alternative to use of nuclear weapons if war should come. This trend, underway for two decades, has in recent years become the center of attention among western specialists on Soviet military affairs and has spawned a considerable literature. Yet both the original Soviet materials and the western expert commentary is blithely ignored, as the authors simply assert in the face of the evidence that no significant revision has occurred in Soviet military doctrine since the early 1960s.

". . . Soviet military doctrine and strategy have not changed" since 1960 (p. 29), and "The Soviets, in contrast [to the West], plan to fight a nuclear war like any other war, for political objectives, and plan to win it by military means" (p. 23). But the authors do not reconcile these conclusions of theirs with authoritative Soviet statements not cited in their book, such as Marshal Ogarkov's discussion of an important divide in Soviet military doctrine between the 1950s and 1960s, when nuclear weapons *were* regarded as another means of warfare, and the 1970s and 1980s, when a "radical reevaluation" of the role of nuclear weapons led to a "break from previous views on their role and place in war" and "even on the possibility of waging war at all with the use of nuclear weapons." (Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti,* 1985, p. 51).

The level of political analysis is illustrated by the argument that "the Soviet world-view excludes any acknowledgments of mutuality or equality of interests in matters of national security" (p. 26). None of the numerous statements by the last six party leaders to the contrary is cited or discussed. Similarly, political-military analysis is illustrated by the unsupported suggestion that "should the balance of forces move too far in the USSR's favor, the Soviets might be tempted to accelerate history along its appointed course by military action," or, alternatively, "If the USSR foresaw that its relative position vis-à-vis the United States or NATO might deteriorate for some time, it could be tempted to take military action," in both cases defined as "a nuclear showdown with the United States and NATO" (p. 196).

The political purpose of the book, apart from no doubt reflecting the genuine beliefs of the authors, is evident in its strong pitch to abandon arms control as practiced in past decades, to pursue a strategy to deny USSR war-fighting objectives (rather than reliance on assured deterrence), and to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative (p. 197). While

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there is a great deal of information in the book, it requires substantial familiarity with the subject to properly evaluate its content.

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Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao *by Robert G. Sutter. New York, Praeger, 1985. 240 pp. $36.95.*

Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development *edited by A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1986. 136 pp. Cloth, $23.85; paper $12.85.*

Analyzing China's development as a global power has been a cornerstone of western foreign policy analysis for over a decade now. The latest cluster of works on Chinese foreign policy is distinguished by a general effort to weigh the implications of Beijing's internal development priorities for its behavior toward other states, particularly that directed toward the superpowers. The writings of Robert Sutter and those found in the concise but provocative text edited by A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough are representative of this general trend. Both books are useful as chronologies of China's recent domestic and foreign policy trends but both fall short in establishing themes or premises that are clearly recognizable and that serve to enrich the analytical framework of an exploratory category in considerable need of greater methodological originality and vigor.

Sutter's effort is, by far, the more ambitious of the two projects. The author offers what he terms a "comprehensive review" of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) diplomatic and geopolitical approaches to the outside world as they have been shaped by a series of remarkable political, economic, and military reforms taking place since Mao Zedong's death in 1976. He does offer incisive analysis on how Zhou Enlai's effort to inculcate into China's decision-making structures a more pragmatic world view withstood the test of ideological dissent and domestic political infighting throughout the traumatic Gang of Four period and the initial false starts experienced by China in its Four Modernizations program through 1978–1979. The book's best sections evolve around a careful tracing of intensified Sino-Soviet regional competition following Moscow's strategic penetration into Indochina and invasion of Afghanistan.

Sutter's arguments are somewhat less impressive, however, in explaining the underlying motives for what he labels China's "tactical adjustments" in occasionally signaling a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets despite their clearly threatening posture along China's borders. Analysis of Washington's perception of such Chinese overtures is less than ample. At times the narrative structure of Sutter's work resembles the outline style often found in *Congressional Prints*, which tends to disrupt the narrative. It is to be hoped, moreover, that Sutter's next work on a subject he has addressed often will include as many resource citations of a primary nature as there are secondary sources listed in this book. *Chinese*

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Foreign Policy, therefore, is a somewhat labored read, but one which is of sufficiently high caliber for assignment to undergraduate seminars on the basis of its wealth of information and its impressively broad scope of policy coverage.

Modernizing China, edited on behalf of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) China Forum, leads off with a short—indeed somewhat cursory—introductory chapter by the editors that offers highlights of what follows without establishing an overall theme for the text (beyond the truism that "China is changing"). Clearly, the best written and most enjoyable chapter in this book is by Perry Link on the PRC's intellectual and cultural policies. While Link tends to overstate the literati heritage as it affects contemporary China, he nevertheless offers very useful observations on the respective "cycles" occurring in Chinese intellectual life since the Cultural Revolution. China's intelligentsia, moreover, had yet to confront and assimilate western culture to its fullest extent, because much of that culture has been introduced in only "cheapened" or diluted forms. As the assimilation of western culture increases to truly significant levels, China's leaders will face more lasting challenges to preservation of the "Chineseness" they so cherish.

Chapters by Harry Harding and Paul H. B. Godwin—on politics and defense respectively—are competent but largely redundant, with their much more extensive writings appearing elsewhere. Harding coins the phrase "consultative authoritarianism" to describe the uncertain effects on the entire Chinese polity of the rivalries between those favoring liberalization in political participation and bureaucratic infrastructure and those advocates of rigid party controls. But he does not offer any hard conclusions or predictions on how or if such contradictory tendencies will finally be resolved. While Godwin contends that China's traditionally topheavy and backward military will be successful in cultivating a new and more modern image by the end of the century, he stops short of really assessing how credible that image will actually be to the PRC's present and future military competitors.

Dwight Perkins argues more convincingly that China's developing market base faces even greater reform if Beijing is to pursue western economic development models more successfully than it has until now. He is less convincing, however, in strongly implying that Beijing will inevitably be better off by pursuing such models. One can ask how this assumption squares with current Chinese initiatives to revive a significant trading relationship with the Soviet Union. It seems doubtful that the PRC, given China's past history, will continue to be willing to risk dependency upon western sources of investment and capital, which provide not only goods and services at comparatively greater expense but which also are not easily integrated with the Soviet-style industrial framework that still constitutes the major part of the Chinese industrial base at present. Finally, Martin King Whyte assesses China's social trends in a fashion that appears largely redundant to points already raised by Harding and/or Link. His notions of "class stratification" in Chinese society, as well as social "inequality" in that country, are in the final analysis semantic variants to the obvious reality that if western influence is to be sustained in the PRC, a satisfied middle class will have to develop over time.

Both the Sutter and Johns Hopkins SAIS texts reflect sincere initial efforts by China scholars in the United States to apply linkage politics theory to their own field of endeavor in a serious way. Such efforts are to be commended, but if a marriage between Chinese

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policy studies and western political methodology is actually desired, its realization is still at best a long-term process.

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Poland 1980–81: Solidarity Versus the Party *by Nicholas G. Andrews. Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1985. 351 pp. Paper, $6.00.*

Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal *by Peter Raina. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1985. 472 pp. $37.50.*

Polish-Soviet relations as well as Communist rule in Poland had supposedly been stabilized by a compromise negotiated in October-November 1956 between Wladyslaw Gomulka and Nikita Khrushchev. Under its terms the Soviets conceded to the Polish regime leeway to pursue a more nationally authentic and autonomous politico-administrative style than had been allowed in the preceding Stalinist years. The Polish side, in turn, committed itself to preserving the Communist monopoly of power domestically and to keeping the country in the military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological network of the Soviet bloc (Warsaw Treaty Organization, Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, etc.). For a dozen years this compromise of 1956 appeared to hold in the sense that the Polish people accepted it as the maximum achievable, though not as inherently optimal. But starting in 1968 and continuing in 1970 and 1976, political explosions characterized by considerable bloodshed and heavy repression exposed the precarious fragility of the 1956 compromise and of the Communist party's true authority in Poland. In each of these three crises, however, the rebellious actors were either the students or the workers or the consumers alone. What was unique about the Solidarity crisis of 1980-81—to which the two books under review are devoted—is that it was pressed by a genuine politico-social alliance among the working class, the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the housewives. Though this coalition was defeated after one-and-a-half years of turbulent confrontation with the regime, when martial law was imposed on Poland on 13 December 1981, it had nevertheless succeeded in crippling the Communist party and obliging it to turn for rescue from utter disintegration to the Polish armed forces—in historic violation of the ideological-operational rules of Marxism-Leninism.

Nicholas G. Andrews, a retired American Foreign Service officer whose several postings to eastern Europe concluded with an assignment as deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy in Warsaw during the critical years 1979–1981, relates and analyzes the confrontation between the Solidarity movement and the regime with admirable restraint. Though manifestly sympathetic toward Solidarity's (and the Polish people's) aspirations, he understands and pragmatically accepts the constraining rules of the game that circumscribe relations between the Soviet Union and its client states in eastern Europe. It is possible that, like other foreign service officers, he was seared by charges that in 1956 American rhetoric had misled the Hungarian revolutionaries into going too far and challenging those rules and that the United States, therefore, bears moral responsibility for provoking the Soviet

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invasion and repression of Hungary. Be that as it may, Andrews's tone and judgments in this book are cool, even-handed, and analytical.

Peter Raina, a Kashmiri scholar who has thoroughly immersed himself in Polish society and culture, covers the same period and events as Andrews, but is more explicitly critical of Solidarity tactics and maneuvers, which he deems to have been gratuitously tactless and unwisely provocative. Raina also reproduces verbatim many of the important documents, editorials, speeches, and laws of the years 1980–1981 that Andrews only synopsizes. Hence the greater length of Raina's book. On the other hand, Andrews's detailed appendectal chronology for 1980–1981 in Poland (pp. 285–93) is itself a valuable research aid.

What went wrong in Poland after the seemingly promising compromise of 1956—a compromise that was even endorsed at the time by the country's Roman Catholic primate? The Gomulka years, 1956–1970, began with the regime's enjoying a substantial reservoir of public good will, based largely on Gomulka's reputation during the Stalinist years as a native Communist who defends Poland while the others sell out Poland (i.e., to Russia). But his crabbed puritanism, his principled preference for austerity over abundance, his ideological rigidity, his intolerance of dissent, his refusal to consider the kinds of market-oriented economic reforms with which his Hungarian counterpart, Janos Kadar, was experimenting, and hence his failure to hold out even the hope, let alone the reality, of improved living standards, eroded Gomulka's popularity and reputation. After riots provoked by food shortages and attempted price rises for meat in December 1970—riots whose suppression entailed heavy casualties—Gomulka was replaced as Communist party leader by Edward Gierek.

In contrast to Gomulka's rigid thrift, Gierek opted for a style of cavalier extravagance. While standards of living rose during the 1970s, so did Poland's hard currency foreign debt—which climbed to $20 billion by the end of 1979, when the bubble burst. Gierek, too, then fell in the summer of 1980 while attempting to repeat Gomulka's fatal move of administratively raising meat prices without consultations or explanations, thereby provoking the Solidarity crisis. Compounding Gierek's belated but predictable economic problems was the utter erosion in the Communist party's reputation for honesty and morality that had occurred during his decade of leadership. Party officials were known to be feathering their own nests and indulging in rampant cronyism and nepotism. The apparat's moral tie to the workers, whose leader it purported to be, was frayed and ultimately severed. Feeling exploited and victimized by a party-governmental elite that claimed to rule in their name but held itself aloof and unaccountable, the workers turned to the clergy and the dissident intelligentsia. The Solidarity crisis was the price paid by the Polish Communist party for its economic incompetence, its political remoteness, and its rampant corruption. That is the implicit lesson of these two fine books.

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South Africa Without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination *by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986. 315 pp. $18.95.*

At first glance one might wonder why a distinguished scholar would compose a third major book on precisely the same subject as his first two. True, the co-authors have varied: on this occasion, Heribert Adam's partner is his spouse, a scholar whose ancestral roots lie in the Indian community in South Africa. But the theme is identical—the political sociology of contemporary South African apartheid.

Before turning many pages one discovers that the tone and focus of the analysis have shifted dramatically. The previous two works highlighted the solidity, durability, and capacity for adaptation of the Afrikaner-led white racial oligarchy. The present work departs from a radically different premise: the historical structures of racial domination upon which the country has been built are no longer sustainable. Thus the challenge to analysis is to grasp the mechanisms of adjustment and change in the face of the tumultuous sequence of events since control over the black townships began to ebb away after September 1984.

Adam derived his initial intellectual nurture from the Frankfurt school in his native West Germany. It was, in the author's words, "an extraordinary mixture of encyclopedic knowledge and socialist commitment, intellectual arrogance and esoteric speculation" (p. xii). His subsequent work has moved far beyond the *marxisant* abstractions of the Frankfurt school and is suffused with a tough-minded (but not apolitical) empiricism. Moodley's intellectual formation weaves together strands of South African liberalism, Weberian sociology, and the daily experience of growing up as a member of an oppressed racial community. Both now teach in Canada.

The book opens with a subtle and interesting exploration of the nature of group identity in South Africa, drawing upon the concepts developed in the comparative study of ethnicity in recent decades. The authors argue for the specificity of the South African case on the grounds that the primordial cultural lines of demarcation are relatively minor. The fact that ethnic categorizations are imposed by state action on subordinated cultural segments delegitimates these categorizations in the eyes of the oppressed and points away from the politicizing of ethnicity as a mode of conflict behavior. The two high-intensity cultural markers of language and religion crosscut the racial segments; most "coloreds" speak Afrikaans, and Africans generally insist upon English as a language of education and social mobility. With the exception of the African independent churches, most Christian denominations have membership across the racial spectrum. Muslims are found both in the Indian and "colored" communities.

Thus, although the authors occasionally employ the term "Lebanization" to concede the possibility (not contemplated in the earlier Adam works) of scenarios leading to progressive political disintegration, they believe the metaphor imperfectly fits. The warring fragments would not be divided by the incompatibilities of *weltanschauung* involved in confessional civil strife in Lebanon. The common cultural framework that embraces all elements of South African society will, they hopefully assert, make possible the ultimate discovery of mutual accommodation.

The patterns of cleavage and range of outlook in the dominant white and oppressed

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racial communities receive painstaking attention. This analysis is dispassionate and well informed. It is perhaps most persuasive in its treatment of whites, "coloreds", and Indians, where the authors have the most extensive contacts and sources of information. Somewhat less convincing is the anatomy of the African National Congress (ANC) and the turbulent, volatile, profoundly angry African youths of the urban townships. Yet it is the action of elements of the latter that has made modernized racial domination unsustainable, and the ANC that must serve as broker to any real settlement that will permit a united South Africa to dismantle racial domination.

The most important contribution of the book is the cogent and insightful examination of formulas for change. Adam and Moodley are harsh in their critique of formulas caressed by certain Afrikaner "reform" milieux, particularly the notion of "consociationalism" (or multiracial compromise) associated wtih Arend Lijphart. Precisely because cultural politics in South Africa are not analogous to those of Belgium, Malaysia, or pre-1975 Lebanon, summit diplomacy conducted by leaders of corporatized communal segments is neither a desirable nor a workable approach. Some readers will regret the absence of any sustained consideration of external vectors that may impinge upon the settlement process and the failure to address the issue of the South African Communist party and its role in the ANC.

Yet this important study deserves careful reading by all those concerned with the deepening crisis in South Africa. Perhaps few will share all of the judgments made by the authors. But all readers will come away with a deepened understanding of the nature and implications of the choices ahead and profit from the level-headed thoughtfulness of the analysis. At a time when many observers contemplate the future with apprehensions tinged with despair, the surprisingly hopeful mood that suffuses the book will be a welcome antidote.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects *by Emile A. Nakhleh. New York, Praeger, 1986. 128 pp. $35.95.*

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional organization founded in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman as a vehicle for coordinating security and economic policy. This book is a useful introduction to the structure and goals of the GCC and to some of the problems it faces in achieving those goals. Its author, Emile Nakhleh of Mt. St. Mary's College, is well versed in the politics of the Gulf, which makes it all the more disappointing that the work does not go beyond the level of introducing the GCC and its problems to analyze the political dynamics of its founding and operation and the political and economic reasons why it has achieved so little progress in developing coordinated policies in the security and economic areas.

The most notable omission in the book is any discussion of the complex politics behind the founding of the organization. Two events in the early 1970's dramatically altered the political map of the Gulf: the withdrawal of the British military presence which led to the independence of Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE; and the 1973 revolution in the oil market.

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Since that time both Iran and Iraq have made efforts to organize the Gulf under their tutelage and have opposed cooperative schemes that ignored what they saw as their natural leadership roles. Nakhleh does not treat the story of how Saudi Arabia circumvented both Baghdad and Teheran, taking advantage of their preoccupation with one another on the battlefield, and persuaded Kuwait and Oman, both anxious to maintain some measure of distance and independence from Riyad, to accept their inevitable status as junior partners within the GCC.

The work concentrates on analyzing the formal structure and public pronouncements of the GCC at the expense of explaining the actual policies of the organization. For example, the author points out that Kuwait has actively resisted a Saudi-sponsored proposal for closer cooperation on internal security matters, but does not explain why. Nor does he discuss the apparent contradiction between the official GCC policy of avoiding superpower involvement in the Gulf and the strong military ties between the United States and both Saudi Arabia and Oman. In the economic sphere, Nakhleh is justly critical of GCC failure to implement plans aimed at standardizing tariffs and promoting complementary development programs, but he does not examine in any detail just what the concrete political and social obstacles to such cooperative steps are.

The most interesting and informative portion of the book is Chapters 4 and 5, where Nakhleh summarizes some of the critiques of the GCC put forward by residents of the Gulf—scholars, businessmen, and the public (as represented in a Kuwaiti opinion poll). There are two major lines of criticism directed toward the organization: its failure to implement cooperative strategies to confront economic, educational, and manpower problems because of inefficiency and vested interests; and the perception that the organization is opposed to political reform because of its member states' unwillingness to foster political development through democratic participation. These critiques represent a long-ignored and important part of the largely hidden political debate in the Gulf. Nakhleh has done a real service in presenting them to the English-speaking audience. It is a shame that the publisher, by fixing such a high price on the book, has in effect severely limited the audience it will receive.

F. Gregory Gause, III
Brookings Institution

Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula *by Mark N. Katz. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 279 pp. $30.00.*

The aim of the book is to observe and analyze Soviet policy toward the various countries of the Arabian peninsula with a view to understanding Moscow's motives, capabilities and achievements in that area and in order to draw conclusions as to what the United States should do to improve and strengthen its own position and influence there. As it turns out from reading the book and from a cursory scrutiny of events that have taken place since it went to print, this is no simple task. On the one hand, the bloody events in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in January 1986 demonstrated the lack of Soviet

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maneuverability as 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was ousted by a rival faction from within his own Marxist-Leninist party although supported by Moscow, which benefited from his moderate policies vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states (p. 43). On the other hand, Oman, the country with which the USSR seemed to be furthest from entertaining relations, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) established diplomatic ties with the USSR in 1985 despite Katz's forecast that "it does not seem likely that Moscow will ever be able to . . . establish diplomatic relations with Muscat so long as Qabus is in power" (p. 123) or with other Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) states "in the near future" (p. 185). The more difficult the analysis of Soviet successes and failures, the more questionable become the sequiturs of that analysis for any American administration.

This is not to suggest that Katz has done a poor job. On the contrary, he has given us extremely detailed descriptions of the political developments in each country by turn and shown their relevance to its relations with the USSR over the years. (Sometimes there is perhaps even too much detail, particularly in the historical descriptions, which are not always pertinent to the topic of the book.) The fortunes of the Soviet superpower in these mostly backward countries are unquestionably of considerable interest for the student both of Soviet foreign policy and of Middle East politics.

Katz demonstrates considerable sensitivity to the intricacies of the domestic scene in each state as well as of the relationships between the various countries in the peninsula. He has also examined carefully the way these have either played into Soviet hands, in the cases for instance of the PDRY and Kuwait, and to a lesser extent of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or aggravated the differences between the local state and the USSR, as with most of the six GCC countries. This is the first serious work to provide a meaningful examination of Soviet policy regarding the peninsula by breaking it up into its component states and looking at the peculiar features of each of these and their significance for the USSR's chances in the area. Katz describes the process by which the Soviet Union gained its position of dominance in the PDRY, the ups and downs it has encountered in the YAR, and how the Soviet position in the former has complicated its policy regarding the latter. Unfortunately, he brings no new material on the Soviet intervention on behalf of Republican Yemen in 1967 and even ignores some of the published works on the Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen in that year.

Katz also dwells on regional issues—in particular the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia—and demonstrates how these have affected Soviet relations with the peninsula states. One of his contentions is that U.S. support of Israel has strengthened the Soviet position in the Arab world, and he recommends that the United States be "less pro-Israeli" because the peninsula is "so important" and ties with a United States that is linked with Israel could bring the GCC states to try "to save themselves" against "internal or external forces . . . by loosening or even severing" these bonds (p. 195). Katz also suggests that Washington sees to it that Iraq is not defeated by Iran in order to retain a significant obstacle to the overthrow by Iran of the GCC governments (p. 196). The extremely volatile nature of most of the peninsula's regimes and the delicate nature of the interrelationship between actual domestic oppositions or potential opposition forces and external pressures, whether within the peninsula or beyond its confines, both of which Katz examines with a marked knowledgeability, seem to make these

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recommendations doubtful. Leaving aside the question whether a strengthened Israel is an American interest in Washington's constant jockeying for regional positions vis-à-vis the USSR, it is uncertain if the United States could meaningfully influence the GCC states, none of which is a confrontation state with Israel, by mitigating its support for Israel. Anything that an American administration would see as evenhandedness would not be sufficient for GCC states, all of which have much more immediate problems than Israel. There seems also to be very little that the United States can do directly to prevent Iraq's defeat once the Iranians have the upper hand, especially since, as Katz points out, it would be most unwise to "intervene against the Iranians" whose "extreme anti-Sovietism coincides with U.S. interests" (p. 195). Nor, indeed, would "the rise of Islamic fundamentalism" in the peninsula be welcome to Moscow as it would threaten the PDRY no less than the pro-West monarchies (p. 187).

One conclusion that Katz draws, however, seems unquestionable: the greater the pressure exerted by either superpower in the Arabian peninsula, the more considerable the likelihood that it will backfire to the benefit of the rival superpower. This does not mean that Katz is suggesting that Washington sit by with folded arms, but that it bear in mind likely local reactions and sensitivities and clarify to itself its order of preferences.

YAACOV RO'I
Tel Aviv University

Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership *by Samuel Kernell. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986. 251 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $10.95.*

With this book Samuel Kernell provides a welcome addition to the growing literature on the public presidency. He has integrated previously published material with new work into a coherent package that is both stimulating and informative. To begin, the author focuses on the need for presidents going public. Outsiders in the White House like Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan find such a strategy attractive and consistent with their attainment of the presidency. Moreover, the many centrifugal forces in Washington frequently require the chief executive to attempt to arouse public opinion. With the demise of the old "institutionalized pluralism" based on bargaining with the leaders of protocoalitions who could deliver congressional votes, presidents have had to deal with individual members of Congress with fewer group or institutional loyalties who are more vulnerable and thus more sensitive to public opinion than their predecessors. This vulnerability provides the potential for a presidential influence based on pressure rather than accommodating varied interests.

Although the basic outlines of this argument are now commonplace and although some readers will find the author's description of the political system hyperbolic, the book is a valuable one. It is the most complete statement we have of the context of going public. Kernell explores its implications, ranging from the difficulties that public posturing pose for later compromise to the increased volatility of policy making that depends heavily on public support.

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Perhaps the most valuable part of the book deals with presidents actually going public. In one chapter the author traces the growth in political travel, public appearances, and public addresses. In another he takes an in-depth look at Ronald Reagan's efforts to arouse the public to support his economic policies in his first three years in office.

Following this discussion is a rich chapter on opinion leadership. An excellent case study of the Truman Doctrine speech and its effects composes much of the chapter. It is a model of a skilled political scientist vigorously employing available data to study an important question in American politics. This chapter also includes a discussion of how the president's prestige among the public influences his professional reputation in the Washington policy-making community in ways it did not when Richard Neustadt first published *Presidential Power.*

It is important to emphasize that the author is careful to state that the influence of going public is on the margins of coalition formation. The president may affect the opinions of a small percentage of the public and change the votes of a few senators and representatives. This is the best a chief executive can expect to do in a typical situation. The casual reader should be cautious about inferring presidential success at going public from the need to do so or the White House's substantial efforts at influencing public opinion.

In the following chapter the author explores "the politics of popularity." Essentially, he is concerned with how the public evaluates the president and what he can do to influence their perceptions and attitudes. This is a crucial matter, of course, since high approval levels increase the probable success of going public. This discussion is less satisfying than other parts of the book, however. Given the nature of our understanding of citizens' decisions and presidents' motivations, it is inevitably speculative and incomplete. In sum, *Going Public* makes timely, informative, and stimulating reading for anyone interested in this important phenomenon in American politics.

GEORGE C. EDWARDS III
U.S. Military Academy

To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law *by Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, with Francis P. Butler. Dallas, Tex., Southern Methodist University Press, 1986. 347 pp. $27.50.*

The subtitle is as suggestive of this book's thesis and methodology as of its subject matter. The authors contend that the Constitution grants exclusively to Congress the authority for both initiating and determining policy for the conduct of hostilities. In most chapters, their argument is a highly legalistic review and interpretation of statutes, case law, and commentary from legal authorities. However, the book is not restrained to expounding a scholarly thesis. It pleads a political cause: antipathy to U.S. military or quasi-military intervention anywhere. Consequently, when American policy does not conform to the preferences of the authors, indolent Congresses as well as usurping presidents are accused of violating the Constitution. For example, after asserting that President Ronald Reagan exercised war power "unconstitutionally" and "unilaterally" (p. 265) when he sent military advisers to

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El Salvador, supported covert paramilitary operations and contra rebels in Nicaragua, invaded Grenada, and sent Marines to Lebanon, the authors conclude:

> Congress, for its part, has been *unconstitutionally* generous in allowing the military advisors to remain; funding covert activities; failing to condemn by resolution or even to *impeach* the President for the invasion of Grenada; and bargaining away its rightful control over the marines in Lebanon (p. 265, emphasis added).

One wonders how the President acted unilaterally when Congress is criticized for financing his actions, or why Congress is constitutionally compelled to condemn or impeach a president for an invasion politically palatable to Congress, if not the authors. Clearly, when disagreement with substantive policy is camouflaged as legal argument, the policy posture not only shapes but may detract from otherwise sound legal reasoning.

The authors are very strict constructionists of both the Constitution and federal statutes. They say the Cuba Resolution of 3 October 1962 had "no legal effect" with respect to President Kennedy's blockade of Cuba (p. 222). The War Powers Resolution is attacked as not fulfilling the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as an overbroad delegation of power that essentially writes the president a blank check and because its consultation provisions are too vague to pass constitutional tests of specificity for delegation of congressional war power (pp. 215–216).

Sometimes evidence of questionable relevance is offered to support a point. To buttress the argument that Congress cannot delegate war powers prospectively, the evidence includes historical examples of when Congress refused to pass legislation delegating war power to President James Buchanan (pp. 201–203). But that was more a political decision of than a legal constraint on Congress.

Contradicted assertions and dubious interpretations also crop up. The authors contend that Congress did not give purposeful consideration to appropriations statutes later construed as legalizing the Vietnam war (p. 219). Besides overlooking or simply disagreeing with lower court decisions that held to the contrary, the authors overlook their own quotation of President Lyndon Johnson's May 1965 message to Congress requesting a $700 million appropriation. The message specifically said the purpose was to "meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam" (p. 221), so Congress had to know it would be financing the war.

The most rewarding aspect of the book is its broad historical and topical scope. Its eighteen chapters cover virtually every conceivable aspect of war powers from Indian wars and border crossings to naval landings, from the ancient world through British history and the origins of the American republic to the nuclear age. One of the most useful chapters discusses the continuing confusion and disagreement over the judicial doctrine of political questions. For those who agree with, tolerate, or can ignore the intrusion of its philosophy of war and law, this book will be a useful reference.

HARVEY ZEIDENSTEIN
Illinois State University

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Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal *by Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, New York, Basic Books, 1985. 258 pp. $19.95.*

Through a subtle interweaving of the historiography of education with an exploration of the history of schooling in two American cities, Katznelson and Weir present an interesting argument for the restoration of American citizens' commitment to equality of access to schooling for all American children. Beginning with the premise that the establishment of common schooling in the United States received enthusiastic cross-class and cross-cultural support in the mid-nineteenth century, the authors focus on Chicago and San Francisco to examine the nature of that support and how it changed over time. They contend that while support for common schools was virtually consensual, that support became less consensual and increasingly conflict-ridden as both cities experienced demographic changes through immigration and shifting residential patterns, as working-class concerns were expressed through labor union activity, and as high schools were established to extend and diversify educational opportunity.

This study presents some problems for historians, problems that detract from the usefulness of the work as historical support for the laudable political aims. The authors' selective use of secondary sources and their minimal reliance on primary sources indicate that they are less interested in probing the actual power alliances and political conflicts of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century battles over schooling than in establishing their political argument. Their too exclusive reliance on union records and publications neglects workers who were not unionized, but who may well have had a voice in the politics of schooling. In addition, they focus on two cities and generalize from them to the whole country. There is much evidence to argue that, in fact, access to common schooling in nineteenth-century cities and towns was not without extensive religious, ethnic, and class-based conflict. On that basis, Katznelson's and Weir's argument that there has been a "decline" in American citizens' support for access to the public schools is far from convincing.

The authors' commendable political aim is to restore the issue of equality to its rightful place in the current policy debates over the functions and goals of schooling in the United States. Their study provides an interesting and useful view of some of the historiographical issues surrounding the recent developments in the history of American education. They portray working-class people as significant participants in political battles over access to schooling and the definition of school programs. Finally, they raise important questions for historians about the politics of schooling. These areas of inquiry include how cross-class and cross-cultural political coalitions have been formed, how changing demographics have affected the framing of educational issues, and how the bureaucratic organization and governance of systems of schooling have contributed to incorporating and limiting the participation of different interest groups in both the framing and problems of school policy and developing a voice to address their solutions. Despite some of its methodological problems, Katznelson's and Weir's work is an important contribution to the literature of the history of the politics of schooling.

MARY ANN DZUBACK
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Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment *by Herbert Kaufman. Chatham, N.J., Chatham House Publishers, 1985. 179 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $11.95.*

On the surface, at least, this book should be easy to review. It is short, pithy, and provocative. The author announces his thesis at the outset and pursues it with tenacity and insight. There is a sense of maturity in the arguments posited, as though the author is summing up years of thought on the subject. The book is at once iconoclastic and yet well within the bounds of scholarly inquiry. All these attributes notwithstanding, Herbert Kaufman's book is difficult to review. It does not fit the contemporary pattern of political science literature. It is really an example of a nearly extinct art form, the Protestant sermon. Like a good sermon, it begins with a Biblical text: " . . . the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the men of skill; but time and chance happen to them all." (Ecclesiastes 9:11)

According to Kaufman, all organizations are mortal. Why some organizations last longer than others is not clear despite the volumes of organizational theory available. There are innumerable organizations, maybe more (according to Chester Barnard) than there are people. They thrive, wither, even die for reasons we little understand. Is the life cycle of organizations similar to that of most organic life? Kaufman thinks not. Actually, few organizations live long enough to go through a full life cycle, because their demise is caused by some outside force, such as war. Organizations try to extend their life through various means, but generally fail because of turbulence in their environment and difficulty in adjusting to this volatility.

Kaufman's approach to the study of organizational morphology is "literary, metaphorical, and speculative." He eschews scholarly theories of leadership, for instance, emphasizing instead "assumptions and hunches." One of Kaufman's hunches is that the survival of a particular organization is not a measure of its organizational superiority or of skillful leadership, but of simple, blind luck. Probability will win out over skill in the long run. "Maybe long organizational life is *not* a product of chance," Kaufman grants, "but if it is not, the specific causes have not been isolated. Unless and until they are, I shall construe it as a result of sheer good fortune" (p. 79).

This thesis is understandably disquieting to scholars who have based their careers on explaining why some organizations flourish more than others. Is Kaufman mocking his professional colleagues? The answer is both yes and no. He implies that the empirical debates over organization types and leadership are sterile and mean little in the grand scheme of things. Hence, he is mocking the pretentiousness of many colleagues in their tedious search for midlevel theories to answer the unanswerable. On the other hand, he is seriously suggesting that the beginning of knowledge about knowledge is to recognize how little we really know, or can know, about our lives as humans in collectivities.

This little book wrestles with the great imponderables of religion; why we live and why we die. What is the point of our brief sojourn here on earth? Why does anything matter when in the long run, to paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, we are all dead? Such questions might easily lead to fatalism, and have for many; yet most humans continue to struggle to better the status of themselves and their organizations. Kaufman is not a fatalist. He

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simply argues that we must recognize the limitations placed upon us by our environment. We are like sailors, he avers, who can't control the wind, but who can, with skill, turn it to our advantage so as to reach our destination.

Is Kaufman's sermon foolish or trite? I think not. It is a profoundly humanistic message reminding us to resist the allure of mechanistic interpretations of our social and political order. There are numerous minor faults to this book, to be sure, such as a penchant toward glibness. These faults aside, the author has asked a significant question and offered a plausible answer. Not bad for a modest volume.

RONALD C. MOE
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The Army and Vietnam *by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 318 pp. $26.50.*

America searches for the lessons of Vietnam. Recriminations abound as military and civilian leaders blame each other and/or themselves for a lost war. Into this increasingly dense debate comes Army Major Andrew Krepinevich with an important and well-crafted indictment of United States Army military policy in Vietnam, which shows that learning lessons from past wars is not easy for the American military.

Krepinevich's analysis is neither complex nor uncommon. The Vietnam-era American army, he contends, slavishly adhered to the traditional army concept—military strategy focusing on conventional wars with high volumes of firepower—and thus was unprepared for insurgency warfare in Indochina. Perhaps out of a hubris developed from past success and technological power, the army believed that its conventional capabilities would suffice in smaller wars as well. Further, the army mistakenly focused its war on North Vietnam's conventional capabilities rather than the principal opponent, the Viet Cong (VC) in the south. "Simply stated," Krepinevich observes, "the United States Army was neither trained nor organized to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict environment" (p. 4).

Throughout the early 1960s the army developed its conventional capabilities while paying lip service to the Kennedy administration's emphasis on counterinsurgency (CI)—a policy well expressed by General Lionel McGarr's claim that "we will 'out conventional' the unconventionalists" (p. 58). Thus from 1961 until American ground troops were committed to Vietnam, army field manuals, service and special training schools, operations plans, simulated war games, and special forces development ignored, diluted, or adapted CI and rigidly followed the concept with regard to Vietnam.

From 1965 until the 1968 Tet offensive the flaws in the U.S. Army strategy became more critical. The army, per the concept, applied firepower and caused heavy enemy losses; despite this attrition strategy, the military situation did not improve. The American Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) hoped to condition the war along conventional lines, but could only react to VC initiatives in both local guerrilla operations or bigger-unit engagements. The army, especially after conventional success in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, continued deploying heavy forces and ignoring CI.

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Concept warfare also led to self-delusion. In 1966 and 1967 MACV declared that Operations ATTLEBORO, CEDAR FALLS, and JUNCTION CITY were successful because of heavy VC casualties. However, Krepinevich notes, the insurgents reoccupied and operated in the battle areas and continued to determine the nature of future conflicts. Moreover, by 1967 over 96 percent of engagements occurred at company strength or less. MACV, by utilizing firepower and eschewing pacification, was "playing into the hands of the Communist strategy of protracted warfare" (p. 191).

The Tet offensive dramatically demonstrated the futility of MACV strategy. VC objectives during Tet, Krepinevich observes, included increasing casualties and further destabilizing the southern government and economy—which were accomplished. Despite heavy casualties the VC thus "achieved victory in the most important dimensions of insurgency warfare" (p. 249). Accordingly, after Tet the civilian establishment clearly lost faith in the concept; MACV, however, did not reevaluate its strategic dogma.

Time and again the U.S. Army reacted to military setbacks by clinging to its conventional warfare concept and ignoring alternatives—pacification, enclaves, a demographic frontier—which Krepinevich believes may have worked. Despite a perhaps unjustified optimism that a well-developed CI capacity could have been successful, Krepinevich's analysis of the manner in which the inflexible American military policy was made is essential to any understanding of the war. And as the United States funds proxy armies and shows an interest in low intensity conflict, Krepinevich's "ineluctable conclusion" is that "if the army has learned any lessons from Vietnam, it has learned many of the wrong ones" (p. 269).

BOB BUZZANCO
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The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan *by John Tebbel and Sarah Miles Watts. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 583 pp. $24.95.*

The Power of the Press: The Birth of American Political Reporting *by Thomas C. Leonard. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 273 pp. $22.50.*

With modern broadcast technology transforming the press into the "media" and creating a class of politicians attentive to mobilizing constituencies via direct communications, one might be inclined to view politician-press relations in the pretelevision era as having little bearing on these actors' current dealings with each other. These authors remind those who hold such a view that conflict between politicians and the press is deep-seated. Conflict inheres in politicians' need for popular consent and the press's constitutional assurance that it can be something other than an organ of the government. Moreover, relations between these actors at one moment will constrain how new opportunities—such as those made available by emergent technologies—are employed the next. The modern, televised press conference is a far cry from Franklin Roosevelt's biweekly "family affairs," but the lineage is clear. The historical tension between the politicians and the press and the impact of the past on modern relations underpin both books.

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Tebbel and Watts entertain a simple historical perspective: the present is a straightforward extrapolation of the past. Specifically, they argue that presidents have, more or less consistently, sought to aggrandize political power at the expense of the press. The effects of presidents' multitudinous activities have recently culminated in the emergence of the "imperial presidency." Their history begins with George Washington and in strict chronological order examines each of his successors.

Early on, one realizes that Tebbel and Watts are not really interested in indicting Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or for that matter any of the lesser early occupants of the White House. They even forgive Abraham Lincoln's arrests of "Copperhead" editors and the routine censorship of telegraphic correspondence from the war front. The circumstances were exceptional, and compared to the rough treatment of the press by some of his generals, which included jailings that Lincoln remanded, the President was a model of propriety. Paying little more than lip service to the imperializing presidency tendencies broached in the introduction, the individual essays for the nineteenth-century presidents lack an organizing theme. Presidential-press relations ebb and flow with personalities and the political circumstances of the moment. Little effort is made to generalize from these anecdotal histories, and in some instances (such as Millard Fillmore), the story wanders far afield. Nor is much they have to offer new.

The first half of the book is familiar; the second half predictable. Once the authors latch on to the imperializing presidents theme (circa Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson), there is no letting go. Virtually every disagreement between the White House occupant and the press is chalked up against the presidency. When the press is taken to task, it is for not being sufficiently diligent in defending its rights. Moreover, the individual essays lack balance. Some are too short; together Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter are given less space than Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. Others are badly skewed toward one aspect of the president's dealings with the press. After informing us what a bright fellow Johnson's press secretary George Ready was, they report his bitter and by now well aired criticisms of Johnson as if they represent the last word on the matter.

To its credit, *The Press and the Presidency*'s nineteenth-century material is well written and might make suitable bedside reading for the lay reader. Unfortunately, the absence of footnotes throughout makes it less valuable to the scholar. James E. Pollard in *The Presidents and the Press* and George Juergens in *News From the White House* remain the authoritative sources on this subject.

The Power of the Press is more ambitious theoretically, and if the case method approach is not altogether satisfying, it remains a historically sensitive and in places challenging statement. Leonard's thesis is that "The inadequacies of political reporting today . . . are built into the ways most of us, inside and outside the profession, think political stories should be told" (p. 8). And our views on this matter, he adds, have been conditioned by a particular reportorial style developed during the turn of the twentieth century. I read Leonard as essentially arguing that despite the early politicization of the press via political party sponsorship, once the newspapers changed to market commodities there was little reason for them to maintain the same intense coverage of politics. For a "penny press" to continue to bash the opposition party would needlessly limit its subscriber base. Instead, a new approach or formula to political reporting needed to be created. The answer turned out to

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be the crime story. Sensational accounts of crime sold papers then as today. Moreover, most reporters learned their job on the police beat. When transferred from courthouse to city hall, they naturally took their acquired techniques with them. It is a plausible linkage. After all, were muckrakers not the "police of politics?"

I have two basic problems with this argument. First, while one can find an affinity between the muckrakers and modern investigative reporting that brought us Watergate, the crime reporting heritage is incapable of explaining the creed of objective journalism that dominated political reporting, especially among Washington correspondents, for the first half of the twentieth century. Some have argued from this that the recent emergence of interpretive and investigative journalism reflects the failure of objective journalism to provide a means for reporters to ward off, if not expose, the Joe McCarthys of the political world. Second, Leonard's thesis appears to require the discovery of the crime formula in order for politics to interest readers. He offers a smattering of anecdotal evidence that in fact editors lost interest in national politics for a time—presumably until the crime formula was discovered. I question whether there was pervasive decline in political reporting with the emergence of the mass circulation paper. We know from a variety of indicators—attendance at political rallies, voting turnout, and the commercialization of politics, the artifacts of which constitute the troves of collectors of political Americana—that partisan politics provided mass entertainment. Moreover, my own content analysis of the Cleveland press during the middle half of the nineteenth century indicates an ever-growing volume of political news. A casual inspection of those stories found relatively few of them adopting an exposé motif.

These and other misgivings arise because the author's methodology is insufficient to make the kind of case needed to sustain his theory. Rather than systematically examining trends in political reporting or reporters' professional development, Leonard offers us a series of disjointed case studies that merely illustrate his point. What he has to say about the strategic ingredients in Thomas Nast's caricatures is fascinating, but the reader is left wondering if Nast's style exemplifies a genre of political reporting practiced by less famous newsmen elsewhere. By recasting the familiar activities of exceptional figures such as Nast, James Gordon Bennett, Joseph Pulitzer, and Lincoln Steffens among others, Leonard offers the wrong kind of information for establishing a linkage across the genres and the emergence of a pervasive reportorial style. What *The Power of the Press* does offer is an original, if not yet convincing, interpretation of the evolution of American political reporting.

SAMUEL KERNELL
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Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service *by Eliot A. Cohen. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1985. 227 pp. $22.50.*

After describing the limited number of ways that nations can raise armies and the historical etiology of these mechanisms, Eliot Cohen discusses their match or mismatch with different geopolitical situations, military objectives, and political ideologies.

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Until he considers the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), America's current method of raising its armed force, he presents a cool and historically usually well-grounded argument that helps explain why the United States has hopscotched among a range of methods of raising armies, especially since 1940. Our military objectives of being prepared to fight large and small wars and the often contradictory republican ideologies of liberalism and egalitarianism preclude any single and stable solution, and our recruitment methods shift as the priorities among conflicting military and ideological objectives shift.

I have a few interpretative problems with the middle chapters. For example, Cohen argues that for the ancient and modern republics, including the United States, military service is contingent on citizenship, but not vice-versa (p. 122). This position ignores an implicit social contract in the United States: the citizen is expected to defend the country; but simultaneously citizenship is conferred—or conferred *more fully*—by virtue of having defended the nation. During the Civil War the Union recruited in Europe, promising citizenship in return for military service. At the end of the Vietnam war the franchise was extended to eighteen year olds, reflecting the belief that those who defend the nation should have the rights of citizenship. Blacks struggled not only to serve, but to serve in combat, explicitly recognizing that it is harder to withhold full citizenship from a group willing to die for the nation. The battle of women to serve in combat can be interpreted in the same light.

More polemic than analysis, Cohen's chapter on the AVF is disappointing. Although economic recovery and demography will indeed finally kill the AVF, Cohen shows little sophistication about how long it takes to implement any major change in an institution as complex as the Defense Department. He does not consider empirically established alternative explanations of the declining test scores of new enlistees, such as the declining test scores of *all* American 18–21 year olds. He dismisses issues of women in the military with a standard and uncritical litany—from pregnancy to the disruption of male bonding.

In his concluding chapter Cohen argues that compulsory universal militia service fits the range of American military and ideological requirements and, therefore, can provide a stable means of raising an armed force. Although he acknowledges that this solution poses formidable implementation problems, he argues that the country pays unacceptable costs for ad hoc and unstable methods of raising armies. This final chapter has three problems. First, it is not clear that the country does not now have a reasonably workable and stable solution. The verdict on the AVF is not yet in, although the next fifteen years will test its durability. Second, I think Cohen underestimates the implementation problems posed by his solution. Third, ironically, his earlier chapters convincingly explain how the inherent conflicts among American political and military requirements have precluded a *durable* solution. These earlier chapters imply that flexibility—*but a deliberate strategy of flexibility*—in raising our armed force may be the solution of choice. It is not clear that, under some circumstances, a compulsory universal militia solution would not also come apart. There may be no solution for all seasons.

In sum, this book lacks the sustained depth of thought and analysis that one associates with a classic. However, it is a serious book that those concerned with the dilemmas of staffing America's armies should read.

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Making Experience Count: Managing Modern New York in the Carey Era *edited by Gerald Benjamin and T. Norman Hurd. Albany, N.Y., Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 1985. 253 pp. $18.00.*

In 1976 the Center for Policy Research of the National Governors' Association (NGA) canvassed former governors and their staffs on their experiences in office. In publishing the findings, NGA expressed the hope that *Governing the American States: A Handbook for New Governors* would prove valuable to incoming chief executives, gubernatorial assistants, and agency heads. *Making Experience Count* augments our insight into political and managerial leadership in a single state during the tenure of Hugh L. Carey, governor of New York from 1975 through 1982.

Historians and political scientists are frequently hampered by the postmortem nature of their research and their exclusion from the inner sanctums during moments of decision. The Rockefeller Institute seeks to preserve the recollections of key state officials while the memories are still fresh. Outgoing executives who served at the pinnacles of power occupy a unique position to explain the policy-making process.

Gerald Benjamin (professor of political science at the State University of New York/New Paltz and co-author of a splendid biography of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller) and T. Norman Hurd (former budget director and secretary to two governors during a four-decade career in state government) had ready access to major participants in the Carey administration. Carey and eight of his principal aides were available for interviews and responses to a prearranged set of structured questions. All of the interviewees were afforded an opportunity to edit their transcripts. The result resembles a hybrid between a free-wheeling oral history and an authorized biography.

Unfortunately, critics of administration policies were not interviewed. Statewide elected officials (attorney general, comptroller and lieutenant governor) with whom Governor Carey had uneven relationships were not consulted. In selecting one commissioner of environmental conservation, the editors contacted Robert S. Flacke, who followed the governor's marching orders, rather than his independent-minded predecessor, Peter A. A. Berle. Other chapters on transportation, mental health, social services, and banking are, by their very nature, apologias for departmental programs and procedures. However, at the end of each section there are useful notes that identify the cast of characters and suggest additional sources.

Hugh Carey was an intelligent, witty, moody, congenial, and complicated man who did not always reveal his inner feelings. In many respects, he was an enigma. A product of the Brooklyn Democratic organization, he was elected governor in 1974 after portraying his primary opponent, Howard Samuels, as the choice of political bosses. He feuded with or ignored two lieutenant governors of his own party. Notwithstanding his reputation for delegating too much authority to his chief of staff, Carey excelled at crisis management with his persistent determination to rescue New York City and the state's Urban Development Corporation from insolvency.

Other Governors have invariably stressed the importance of seeking rapprochement with the legislature. In spite of his fourteen-year service as a member of Congress, Carey as governor remained aloof from state lawmakers who were in a position to decide the fate of his program bills. At times he could not conceal his outright disdain—an attitude that

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permeates other interviews with members of his administration. Thus, the secretary to the governor, Robert Morgado, decries the fact that the legislators have "the ability to frustrate policy" (p. 40). Rarely has the theory of executive prerogative been more bluntly stated.

As relations with the legislature deteriorated, Carey paid the price. He became the first New York governor during the twentieth century to have a veto overturned. The previous successful override occurred in 1872, not in 1870 as Benjamin notes (p. 248). The editor is also in error when he reports that the 1976 measure was unconstitutional. In fact, the state's highest judicial body, the court of appeals, upheld the Stavisky-Goodman law. Other minor corrections should be cited. The Democratic speaker of the assembly, Stanley Fink, previously served as majority (not minority) leader. The Republican minority leader, James Emery, is incorrectly identified as speaker in photographic captions (opposite pp. 145–146).

In other respects, Benjamin's own analysis of "The Carey Governorship" is accurate and incisive. He recognizes Carey's special dependence on a few trusted advisers such as Kevin Cahill on health issues and investment banker Felix Rohatyn in fiscal affairs. A few aides enjoyed proximity to the seat of power. Others were kept at a distance. During the second term, the governor seemed bored with administrative details and operated, in the words of Mario Cuomo, like a "chairman of the board" rather than as "a chief executive officer." Through litigation initiated by the Republican leader of the state senate, the legislature won the right to appropriate federal funds that previously had remained under executive control.

The reader is not likely to disagree with the editors' assessment that Carey's "achievements, often politically difficult, were substantial. Though he left the governorship weaker than he found it, he left the state stronger, with its government still effective but constrained" (p. 250). As the dust settles, even old adversaries will acknowledge that the Empire State benefited from Hugh Carey's stewardship.

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The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America *by Lee C. Bollinger. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 295 pp. $19.95.*

Typically authors set out in their introductions their hypotheses and just as typically concede the limitations of their efforts. Bollinger is no exception. He states clearly in his Introduction his intention to provide the intellectual foundation for a new perspective on free speech: "the primary focus is on how we think or ought to think about free speech"; and he quickly adds "the inquiry is preliminary" and thus "the purpose of this book is simply to contribute to that understanding" (p. 11). If one takes the caveat seriously *and* at face value, one will not be disappointed in Bollinger's book.

The book explores in great detail, although in a more convoluted manner than seems necessary, the notion that free speech should be viewed as a part of a much larger social question. For the author the issue of tolerance and free speech should not be simply one of rigidly defending all speech. Bollinger concedes the role of free (protected) speech for

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democratic purposes—the right of the people to inform themselves, be informed by others—which he labels the "classical model." He also acknowledges that free speech is necessary because we lack the certainty of the worthiness of any idea; we must keep the system open to all ideas, which he labels the "fortress model." Bolinger wants us to see, more importantly, that tolerance of speech is good because it provides the opportunity for citizens (a society) to exercise self-restraint. This is a quality much needed in modern society but difficult to come by because of man's innate nature to restrict that of which he does not approve.

The importance of the notion that free speech really involves something beyond speech is that such a justification for (defense of) free speech opens up the question, "Is infinite tolerance good?" The author's response is, "No." Individuals and society are justified in being intolerant. Indeed, Bollinger points out that absolute tolerance is mere blind obedience—certainly not an admirable quality a society would want to reinforce. The purpose of the long discourse, therefore, is to set up the rightfulness of restricting speech. To return to the author's Introduction, the "new focus" for those considering protecting speech (presumably judges) should be that asking for too much tolerance is counterproductive to the lesson of learning some self-restraint. One must read the entire book, of course, to determine if one is going to be persuaded by the soundness of this new perspective as a reason for restricting, not protecting, free speech.

If on the other hand one takes the caveat's disclaimer in the Introduction of Bollinger's book as simply typical of an author's humbleness, one will be very disappointed in his book. At the heart of the question of free (protected) speech is how can restriction of speech be achieved. Bollinger completely begs the question. The author is hardly alone in being distressed over the uses and abuses of speech. But the issue *always* is, can a theory be devised that allows for prohibiting speech we do not like which will not at another time provide the basis for banning speech we find worthy of protection. His "new focus" may get us to see more broadly the implication of free speech, but he offers absolutely no suggestions about how his new focus can be brought to fruition. His parting comment, on page 247 of a 248 page book, is that we must be less concerned about "the intricacies of the tests employed in the various areas of First Amendment litigation" and look at the broader issue. Judges are called on every day to make decisions. In what ways has Bollinger aided these individuals in making concrete decisions about whether too much tolerance is being demanded? The great disappointment of this book is that the question has to be answered with a profound, "None."

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Intergovernmental Management: Human Services Problem-Solving in Six Metropolitan Areas *by Robert J. Agranoff. Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1986. 199 pp. Cloth $39.50; paper $12.95.*

It is rare to find success stories on implementation of social policy. Over a decade of case research has conditioned political science readers to expect that social policy hopes will fail, and today claims to success appear suspicious or at least unremarkable.

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Robert Agranoff dares to report success in six metropolitan areas that improved the delivery of human services through the intergovernmental system. His focus is on intergovernmental bodies that connect city governments with public and private agencies for the purpose of planning, management, and coordination. These formal structures, called human service "commissions," "coalitions," or "partnerships," lie, Agranoff notes (p. 31), at an intermediate level between legal institutions and ad hoc contacts.

From this vantage point, Agranoff examines the process of intergovernmental management, the daily transactional relationships among component governments. The stuff of action is making social programs work, and the six cases cover seventeen problems including allocations under block grants, planning budget cuts, developing comprehensive information systems, decentralizing and improving access to services, and adjusting grant requirements.

The cast of characters is so numerous that failure would be easy. Each intergovernmental body includes, in addition to a city and county government, at least one state agency, federal agency, public board, or public district. Five cases demonstrate the extensive network of private agencies in human services, including the United Way, foundations, and business, religious, and labor groups.

Agranoff's principle contribution is to demonstrate that these subnational structures are indeed capable of making federal and state programs work in their communities. While the sheer complexity of the intergovernmental system is, as Agranoff notes (p. 176), "almost beyond comprehension," the actors themselves do learn how to cope and conduct business. The book provides important evidence that the U.S. intergovernmental system is workable and has not, as feared by political scientists in the 1970s, succumbed to growth without purpose, overload, stagnation, and the bureaucratic juggernaut. As portrayed in these cases, intergovernmental problem solving is purposive and innovative, and documentation of its success is the remarkable contribution of this book.

Agranoff's methodology escapes suspicion. The book pursues a common conceptual framework for six comparative case studies based on systematic information from structured discussions with elites in Dayton, Columbus, Indianapolis, Baltimore, Seattle, and Pueblo, Colorado. The period of field research is extended, mainly in 1981 with follow-ups in 1983 and 1985. While the case assessments are qualitative, the amount of empirical substantiation is generous.

How generalizable are the findings? These six cases emerge as prototypes of problem solving in intergovernmental bodies, and one cannot assume that the other nineteen known integrative structures also engage in successful problem solving. Separate from their locus in intergovernmental bodies, however, the cases demonstrate how public organizations resolve problems that cut across jurisdictional boundaries. The problems selected are common for intergovernmental managers in all states, and the successes span numerous federal statutory authorities including the Social Services Block Grant, Aid to Families of Dependent Children, Energy Assistance Program, Community Development Block Grant, and General Revenue Sharing, as well as state programs.

The book's main conceptual contribution is toward an empirically-based theory of intergovernmental problem solving, identifying, for example, a sequence of five activities from convening decision makers to monitoring the decision. The principal weakness of the book is its lack of full discussion of various questions that could advance theory building. One

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question is why these metropolitan areas formed intergovernmental bodies while most have not. The political benefits offered participants and the role of the private nonprofit sector as catalyst to intergovernmental problem solving might be explored further. A second question is how the problem-solving process differs empirically and theoretically from other activities of intergovernmental management. Are comprehensive planning, bargaining, coping with the system as it is, and contact and communication distinct from problem solving, or how do they overlap?

Third, what constitutes success in intergovernmental problem solving? Does a successful problem-solving process conclude with decision making (p. 9) or with implementation and monitoring decisions (p. 160)? Can a successful process produce no results that are measurable in terms of client impact? Is the concept of successful problem solving tautologous? If problems are not solved, is some other process at work? Are purposiveness and goal orientation definitional of problem solving? While the study of intergovernmental management focuses on the routine, can't problem-solving projects add up eventually to mitigate or transform social problems? What that takes is news indeed.

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Stability and Change in American Politics: The Coming of Age of the Generation of the 1960s *by Michael X. Delli Carpini. New York, New York University Press, 1986. 374 pp. $40.00.*

The Life of the Parties: Activists in Presidential Politics *edited by Ronald B. Rapoport, Alan I. Abramowitz, and John McGlennon. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1986. 242 pp. $24.00.*

The 1960s was a turbulent time in American politics. The comparative consensus and satisfaction promoted by World War II had been overwhelmed by the civil rights revolution, the Vietnam war, and experimentation with new social and cultural values. The political shock waves, which continued into the middle of the 1970s, produced in turn a decade of analysis and commentary on the period's effect on Americans and their political institutions. Delli Carpini and Rapoport and his colleagues have written two books that return to these earlier themes and evaluate some of them.

In Delli Carpini's view there has not been enough attention to the generation of the 1960s as it becomes a majority and provides now and in the next decade the political, social, cultural, and economic elite of the society. *Stability and Change* is offered as a "detailed case study," which will determine if the 1960s generation differs in its political beliefs and orientations from those that preceded and succeeded it.

The first part offers a conceptual overview of the idea of generations, with an eye to defining the 1960s generation. This part of the book also outlines the method of the analysis. *Stability and Change* does not report percentages, averages, and correlations. Almost all of the reported data are based on a multiple regression analysis of grouped National Election Study data from 1952 through 1980. The distinctiveness of the 1960s generation

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is assessed through a model that simultaneously estimates the effect of age, different periods (1950s, 1960s, 1970s), and selected interactions. Chapters 4 through 11, the heart of the book, examine the uniqueness of the 1960s generation with regard to trust and efficacy, perceptions of the problems facing the country, specific policy preferences, psychological involvement in politics, rates of participation, party preference, and political commitment. The last four chapters assess the demographic distinctiveness of the generation.

I began the book with considerable enthusiasm. The idea of a follow-up analysis of the 1960s generation has great merit. However, the book is disappointing on several counts. Some of them may be matters of taste, but others are flaws. As a matter of taste, I found the exclusive reliance of the regression model unilluminating. Knowing that the very minor (−.104) difference of the 1960s generation's willingness to vote was significant after controlling for age, time period, and various interactions didn't convey much sense of the real-world distinctiveness of the generation. I was always curious about the magnitude of the zero-order correlations but all I ever read about was the artificial world of net relationships. In the matter of serious flaws, the net effect world was made more unsatisfying by the fact that it was usually insignificant. On average, over 53 percent of the generational differences tested were random; period differences (for example, differences between the 1950s and 1960s) were usually larger than generational ones. Further, Delli Carpini alternated between simply describing tables and generalizing beyond and despite data. Page 216, for example, asserts impending major changes for the Democrats as a result of aging and generational replacement, but the central table of the chapter (10.2) shows much larger period effects. Only one of eleven generation relationships is significant. Why Delli Carpini saw fit to discuss the small and largely insignificant generational differences in the face of data that show societal changes that affected all generations and age groups is unclear, but it is typical of the book.

The idea driving *Stability and Change* is large, but the analysis is narrowly structured and the conclusions and interpretations are fodder for specialists who are likely to find some useful ideas of their own from the analysis. This is not a book for most of us.

Life of the Parties is a significant attempt to bring new and extensive data to the study of party activists and cadres. The data come from surveys of delegates in eleven states that used the caucus-convention system to select their delegations to the Republican and Democratic nominating conventions. As a result, the 17,000 respondents constitute one of the largest samples of convention delegates ever available. Beyond the diversity represented by the states, the survey collected extensive data on the political background of the delegates, the origin of their involvement in politics, candidate and policy orientations, their ideological commitments and motivations, and informant data on their parties.

The substantive analysis is directed at examining several conventional, but incompletely documented propositions about party and presidential activists. Particular attention is paid to questions of pragmatism and ideological purity and whether issue extremism is related to the tactical outlook of presidential activists, the number and role of interest group activists in the parties, and the loyalty of the "new" groups that party rules changes have attempted to recruit into the parties. Some of their findings are striking. For example, they find that delegates are prepared to trade ideological purity for winning candidates and that electability has a greater influence on the activists than ideological purity, despite evidence

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(which they also find) that issues and ideological beliefs were a major factor in motivating activity. Further, while single-issue groups are involved in the parties (especially the Democrats), Rapoport and his colleagues find considerable commitment to the party on the part of group members.

Life of the Parties has a lot of intriguing data sufficient by itself to attract readers. There is, however, considerable unevenness among the chapters. The best work is the analysis of incentives for activism; the least persuasive or well done is the work on interest groups within the parties. There were some general flaws in the analysis. Particularly troublesome was an unwillingness to frame any analysis along state lines and too much willingness to use this sample from largely southern and rural states as a base for generalizations about presidential activists across the country. In general, the book suffers from too many attempts to disprove some of the standard conventions about contemporary activists. That activists don't undergo motivational reorientations from purposive to personal incentives, for example, and that there is no relationship between ideological extremism and tactical orientation are based on weak data or flawed analysis designs. Despite these shortcomings, *Life of the Parties* is a useful book, which should inspire more original research efforts on parties and their cadres.

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The Politics of Energy Conservation *by Pietro S. Nivola. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1986. 294 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $12.95.*

Pietro Nivola has produced an elegant analysis of the political economy of our nation's failure to formulate and implement an energy conservation policy. Typically, there are several conditions necessary for major policy shifts and the acceptance of new programs and reforms: scandals, crises, and electoral changes. Yet even after two major energy crises in 1973 and 1979, a scandal (Watergate), and changes in several administrations, the United States has failed to make meaningful progress in energy pricing reform that would achieve significant energy conservation. The need to price energy supplies at their replacement cost has been ignored. Why? This is the central question explored with care and detail by Nivola.

Using oil and gas deregulation, electric utility rate reform, and gasoline sales tax as windows to view our political system, Nivola has assessed the role of regional rivalry, policy leadership by the president, congressional machinations, public opinion, interest-group politics, and ideological precepts about the role of government in the economy. Each of these variables has contributed to policy failure.

This study underscores the importance of the relationship between price and demand elasticity for energy, and the failure of our nation's political leaders to understand the implications of this relationship. But even if national leaders understood these concepts, they confused energy conservation with other societal objectives such as political equity and a concern for the effects of higher energy prices on the poor. The need to add distributive elements to redistributive programs, using Theodore J. Lowi's typology, leads to an inability to formulate a coherent energy program.

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Two major potential reforms for pricing electricity are peak pricing and eliminating declining block rate structures that give large industrial users cheaper rates than domestic users. Thus, for example, Nivola observes: ". . . .Instead of commingling within rate structures the separate objectives of energy efficiency and income maintenance, a better price system would charge everybody the replacement (marginal) costs of generating the power they take. In an independent procedure, there could be compensation for certain disadvantaged groups through energy stamps or cash payments. . ." (p. 192).

Multiple objectives were mixed into omnibus constructions that were doomed to mediocrity and failure. This mixing of objectives was due in part because public utility commissions in most states are mandated to provide cheap power, not to artificially inflate rates to maximize long-term conservation that would eliminate overexpansion and costly facilities in the future.

Another explanation for the lack of policy innovation is the role played by public opinion. As Nivola points out, during the period of 1973 to the mid-1980s, "at no point did a majority of Americans believe that the energy situation was very serious" (page 34). But public opinion alone does not explain the inability of our government to act. In Britain and France the public also imposed gasoline tax increases: "If public opinion is the sole force setting comparative tax rates, it would have to follow that this intolerance is about 750 to 1,100 percent more intense in the United States than in Britain and France (roughly the difference in levels of motor fuel levies between the United States and the two European counterparts in 1980) (page 245).

The conclusion of this book is that cumulative policy stalemates occurred because of the lack of exceptional leadership, regional rivalry, economic interests (though not as much as one would have predicted), partisan ideology regarding the role of government in the economy, and public opinion. This is a major contribution to the field of policy analysis.

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Leadership at the Fed *by Donald F. Kettl, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1986. 218 pp. $22.50.*

The thesis of Kettl's well-researched and useful book is that the power of the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed" in his lively account) traces not to the system's independence but to its success in winning the support of its major constituents (the president, Congress, and the country's economic and financial interests). And, because winning this support is the business principally of the Fed's chairman, the system's power depends on his persuasiveness, that is, on his "leadership." Drawing in a semi-anecdotal way on voluminous evidence (presidential papers, Federal Reserve records, memoranda and letters, oral histories, and numerous interviews), Kettl's conclusion is that "In fact . . . the Chairman is the Fed."

There is a lot to this, but a different thesis, which I would favor, is that the Fed's power derives not from the chairman's skill as a political operative, important as that is, but from the system's congressionally-granted mandate to control credit and the money supply and its exclusive possession of the machinery needed to do that. To put it perhaps crassly, but

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not inaccurately, it is good to control the purse, which is what Congress does, but is it not even better to control the country's money-manufacturing machinery?

True, the Fed chairman, jointly with his colleagues, decides how the franchise is to be used and, naturally enough, has been subject over the years to a good bit of pulling and hauling over how it should be done. Also naturally enough, there is much deferring to the chairman's views and much hanging on his words, but take from the Fed its power over the reserve balances of member banks, which is its essential machinery, and where would the chairman be? Rhetorical skill and a firm footing on Washington's high wires are useful attributes, but in the end power resides in the franchise.

And there is more even than that to understanding the Fed's power, especially to understanding the limitations on it. Consider, for example, the events of 1960, on which Kettl comments briefly. Inexplicably, and I am sure not characteristically, he has the cast of characters wrong. Arthur Burns was not Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) chairman at the time; this writer was the chairman, and had been since December 1956. More important, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not resist accelerating federal spending, as the account alleges (relying on Richard Nixon's memoirs); actually, he set up a task force, of which I was chairman, to speed spending to the extent possible under his discretionary authorities. Partly from the effect of this exercise, the trend of outlays was up throughout 1960.

Then as always, however, it was money policy not federal spending that was crucial, and the economy got some help from that quarter. Credit market conditions moved from severe tightness in mid-1959 to exceptional ease in November 1960, with interest rates, including the Fed's discount rate, dropping throughout the year. To have avoided the mild and short-lived recession that occurred around yearend 1960 this pressure on reserves should perhaps have been started sooner and have been pushed more vigorously. But the Fed's exercise of its power was constrained in 1959 by an industry-wide steel strike that it was feared might usher in a resumption of inflation (it was clear early in 1960 that the fear was unwarranted but not everyone was convinced) and by an outflow of gold that by yearend 1960 had assumed near-crisis proportions. The moral is that while the Fed's power lies in its franchise, how it is used depends not just on the Fed chairman or on other principals in the action but also on the context of the times.

Finally, a few words on a question not dealt with in Kettl's book but on which what he has to say throws considerable light, namely, the merits and demerits of the Fed's present structure and of its unique position within government. Not everyone is satisfied with things as they are. Monetarists would put the Fed on automatic pilot. Others, not willing to go that far, would like a more direct and open channel of communication between the White House and the Fed, perhaps direct participation by the White House in the system's policy-making affairs. After all, if the Fed is to have the major hand in determining how the economy behaves, while the president takes the blame if things go wrong, is it not reasonable that the president should have a hand in setting policy? It was not Kettl's purpose to engage this question, but at some point it will have to be engaged. When it is, his work will make the task immensely easier. This book deserves a wide and careful reading.

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Plant Closings: Power, Politics and Workers *by Lawrence E. Rothstein. Dover, Mass., Auburn House, 1986. 201 pp. $27.95.*

Why, with all of the devastating effects of plant closings, have workers and communities failed to rise up and demand that government prevent closings and/or extract reparations from defaulting businesses? Rothstein suggests that people in distressed communities believe that by siding with labor's demands for job security or compensation, jobs will be lost as industry flees to more hospitable markets. Rothstein concludes that the excessive negative influence of labor demands and the need for competitive business environments are myths propagated by leaders in business, big labor, and government. In reality, big labor has been powerless and unwilling to make demands, and business could be competitive while meeting worker and community needs but chooses not to. People in distressed communities are powerless, then, because they have been duped.

Rothstein prescribes the British/French model of industrial organization as a cure. The model includes strong legislation to prevent plant closings, cushion worker displacement, and penalize firms for shutting down; worker/community ownership schemes as alternatives to closings; a return to activism and militancy; and government bailouts of declining industries. These initiatives would be pursued through the rebirth of powerful trade and political unions and funded by public monies. Case studies of steel mill closings in Youngstown, Ohio and Longwy, France in the late 1970s are used to debunk the prevailing mythology and to support the model.

The work is essentially a polemic only thinly disguised as objective public-policy analysis. Much as a finicky diner at a buffet chooses only those dishes that suit his fancy, the author selects only those few facts that support his position. Such selectivity creates a utopian vision bearing little semblance to economic reality. This vision is not without real costs: had workers and communities followed this program, those Rothstein would most like to help would be much worse off.

As an example, consider the failed community/worker ownership scheme to reopen Youngstown's defunct steel mills, which Rothstein promotes. Had the scheme succeeded nine years ago, would Youngstown be better off today? The answer is no. Here is the counterargument: reopening the mills would have required $500 million, a considerable drain on local, state, and federal resources. The investment was so great that the community's economic revitalization effort would have a single focus. It is clear now, as it was then, that such an investment was foolish. Since 1974, fifteen steel companies have ceased operations entirely, thirty firms have shut down all of their steel subsidiaries, and 560 individual facilities have been closed. The western Europeans, with heavily subsidized mills, have shut down most of the facilities, precipitating massive layoffs. The Japanese, postwar beneficiaries of American technology and a rebuilt economy, are now diversifying out of steel. U.S. Steel, the largest steel producer, has reorganized as USX Corporation and is getting out of steel. Had Youngstown followed Rothstein's advice, it would be presiding over the most costly white elephant—in this case, rust heap—ever built and would find itself with exhausted resources and a new wave of unemployment. Rothstein's band-aid solutions may postpone, but cannot prevent the inevitable.

If my analysis is correct, then people in distressed steel towns have not protested mill

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closings because they were duped, but rather, because they realized that the good old days of big steel had passed and the community must move on to something new. Those who understand economic changes as a natural process of "creative destruction" in which new, healthy enterprise arises to replace old, obsolete activity will find little of value in this work. By contrast, those who believe that the economic clock of change can be stopped or turned back through government intervention, enhancement of big labor unions, abandonment of free market practice, and reliance on failed welfare economics will find a great deal to admire.

TERRY F. BUSS
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The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command *by Burton I. Kaufman. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1986. 381 pp. $34.95.*

This book is one of the first general histories of U.S. policy making during the Korean War to be based on the primary source materials recently made available. It is a comprehensive survey of the major foreign policy decisions made during the war with respect to the South Korean regime, set against the wider domestic and international background. Few would disagree with the author's conclusion that the McCarthyist atmosphere in the United States and America's credibility as a world power were crucial in conditioning the U.S. response at major stages of the conflict.

The author demonstrates a sureness of hand when discussing the political atmosphere in the United States over the period; frequent reference to newspaper and magazine material conveys important features of the public mood. The chapter (one of the best in my view) covering the recall of General Douglas MacArthur and the hearings held to investigate his dismissal thoughtfully demonstrates how the Truman administration won the battle against the Republican right wing over the MacArthur episode, but lost the war against the critics of its Asian policy. Welcome, too, is the discussion of European party politics, in which Kaufman outlines the goverments' attempts to deal with the conflicting domestic pressures emanating from those committed to strong American ties and those who believed that the demands of their U.S. partner were steadily placing their economies and political independence in jeopardy.

Less convincing, however, is the author's conclusion that the military played essentially a passive role in formulating policy in Korea; and he attempts no reassessment of the long-held belief that all in Washington, unlike the commanders in the field, accepted with relatively little argument the need to maintain geographical limits on the area of hostilities. Kaufman repeats, for example, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall's statement, made at the MacArthur hearings, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff only supported MacArthur's recommendations for expanding the war into China in the event of a forced evacuation of Korea. Kaufman, therefore, neglects the extensive policy debates that took place throughout December 1950 and January 1951 about waging a limited war against China, a proposal that even Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt he had to represent at the Harry Truman-Clement

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Attlee summit. Although the author refers to the increased bombing activity in 1952, he fails to note the military role in having various bombing restrictions lifted or to observe the increase in the military's influence with the president that these decisions demonstrated. His discussion of the momentous Eisenhower administration decision to break off the truce talks, probably expand the war into China, and resort to the use of nuclear weapons should the Communist negotiators reject the U.S. terms on the prisoner-of-war issue, is also strangely understated. The analysis at this point seems to be colored by the author's previous emphasis on the cautious nature of American policy during the Korean conflict. The Eisenhower administration's extensive discussion of the potential role of nuclear weapons and the combined belief among the Joint Chiefs that these weapons would have to be used in the event of an expanded conflict rather belie Kaufman's statement that America's leaders saw these as "too terrible to be used" (p. 357). Questionable, too, is the author's suggestion that greater military pressure after July 1951 would have led to an earlier settlement of the conflict given that, as Kaufman notes, the United States dropped more bombs on Korea than in the first two years of World War II.

This study, therefore, despite its use of new source materials and its intelligent analysis of the wider policy-making environment, breaks less new ground than it might have done, preferring instead to confirm the findings of those past studies that emphasised the constraints imposed on the area of fighting and the opportunities missed to press home America's military advantage.

ROSEMARY FOOT
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Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy *by Frederick S. Calhoun. Kent, Ohio, The Kent State University Press, 1986. 333 pp. $28.00.*

This thoughtful book is a significant contribution to the growing new literature on Woodrow Wilson. It is the first book that attempts to show why Wilson thought it appropriate (proper, moral) to use military power to achieve certain objectives, *how* he used that power, and what he accomplished or failed to accomplish by doing so. As President of the United States, Wilson used armed force (intervention) seven times—twice in Mexico, in Haiti, in the Dominican Republic, in World War I, in northern Russia, and in Siberia. The strong, steady theme of this book is that Wilson used force almost surgically, with precise and limited objectives in view, kept the military under absolute control, and then ceased to use force when he had achieved his goals. The author explains Wilson's motives in part as follows: "In the Wilsonian way of war, American democratic ideology defined the goals of force. Throughout each intervention, Wilson perceived his actions as assisting the downtrodden to achieve a democratic way of life" (pp. 245–55). More important, says Calhoun, in this dangerous world of ours, the Wilsonian model should be carefully studied and emulated, for "In the Wilsonian way of war, the limits of force were equal in importance to the power of force" (p. 251). For example, Wilson would have known when to stop in Korea and Vietnam.

Indeed, one of Calhoun's most significant contributions is his fine depiction of Wilson

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as commander-in-chief. If anything, the author could have portrayed an even stronger commander-in-chief, one who not only knew almost every detail of military operations but also personally controlled and directed them. Calhoun's significant contribution to this subject is his discussion of the reaction, I should say early reaction, to this strange commander-in-chief who did not want to carry military operations, once begun, to their logical conclusion (total victory). But most of the generals who really counted during World War I—notably the Army chief of staff, Peyton C. March, and the United States representative on the Supreme War Council, Tasker H. Bliss—and of course Secretary of War Newton D. Baker understood and admired Wilson. John J. Pershing was the notable exception. At the end of the pre-armistice negotiations, Pershing appealed over Wilson's, Baker's, March's and Bliss's head to the Supreme War Council for a march to Berlin and Germany's unconditional surrender. Wilson could not publicly reprimand the popular head of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), but he never forgave Pershing for his insubordination, or for his reckless wastage of American soldiers in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

I admire this book so much that it pains me to have to say certain negative things about it. The discussion of Wilson's two interventions in Mexico are excellent, but Calhoun is simply wrong when he says (p. 246) that Wilson did not understand the causes and nature of the Mexican Revolution. He did indeed, very profoundly. I found the discussion of the background of the interventions in the Dominican Republic and Haiti somewhat tedious. And what does Calhoun mean by saying that ethnocentrism distorted Wilson's humanitarian impulses? Wilson was our least ethnocentric president since Jefferson; compare Wilson with Theodore Roosevelt on this point. Calhoun is excellent on Wilson during the periods of neutrality and belligerency, but he gets in over his head when he deals with Wilson and Russia and Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference.

In addition, the book has many careless errors. For example: "William R. Bullitt" instead of William C. Bullitt (pp. 34, 225); he was Sir Edward Grey, *not* Earl Grey, another person (p. 122); the *Falaba* was sunk off the coast of Africa, not of England (p. 125); *casus belli*, not *causus belli* (p. 140); the Treaty of London did *not* award Fiume to Italy (p. 173); Wilson did not exclude the Allies from the pre-armistice negotiations (p. 182); "Manence" should read "Mayence" (p. 183), the French name for Mainz; he was Austin M. Knight, not "A. N. Knight" (p. 193); the British general (p. 214) was actually *Tom* Molesworth Bridges, not "Thomas Bridges"; there was no "rash of resignations" by junior members of the American delegation at Paris (p. 225)—only Bullitt resigned; Wilson did not surrender to "Japan's insistence on possession of Shantung" (p. 226)—quite the contrary; "General Edward Ironside" (p. 228) was in fact Edmund Ironside; and what Calhoun says about Wilson's infrequency in consulting Bliss at Paris (p. 231) is altogether wrong.

All this aside, *Power and Principle* reveals what progress Wilsonian study has made since Ernest R. May published his chapter on Wilson as commander-in-chief in *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief* in 1960.

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Shi'ism and Social Protest *edited by Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986. 325 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $12.95.*

During the thirty years prior to the Iranian revolution only the barest sprinkling of books on contemporary Islam appeared in English. The assumption that traditional religion was not relevant to modern political, economic, and social development was as well entrenched in the Soviet Union (see Muriel Atkin's article on Soviet attitudes toward Islam in this collection) as it was in the United States. Unseen by outside eyes during those decades, Muslim thinkers were publishing revolutionary new interpretations of Islam, and politicized young Muslims were reading them.

Over the same period, the area studies concept was spanked into life at America's elite universities and grew to a callow adolescence. In response to U.S. postwar involvement in problems in all parts of the world, the foreign-policy community goaded or tempted the academic community into establishing graduate programs to generate useful expertise on such crucial foreign areas as the Middle East.

The Iranian revolution and the Islamic political current it symbolizes represent the most profound failure to date of the area studies concept. Why didn't the hundreds of specialists trained during those years notice what was happening? Why didn't they read what politicized young people in their region of expertise were reading? Why did the few perceptive scholars who did pay attention, such as Hamid Algar and Richard Mitchell, arouse so little interest? Since we are now flooded by books on Islamic subjects, such as the collection of eleven essays under review, the temptation is to forget past failures and get on with the job as it now appears. But if we do so, will we not risk repeating past mistakes and asking the wrong questions?

There is no doubting the high quality of many of the articles in this book. Richard Cottam has written a superb historical summary of the build-up to the Iranian revolution, and Fred Halliday has produced a good analysis of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. R. K. Ramazani's study of Shi'ism in the Gulf and Jacob Goldberg's similar essay on Saudi Arabia are serviceably informative, as is David Busby Edwards's survey of the less well known history of Shi'ite oppression and discontent in Afghanistan.

The best and most needed articles are those by Augustus Richard Norton and Helena Cobban on the Shi'ites of Lebanon and by Hanna Batatu on Shi'ite organizations in Iraq. Rudi Mathee's article on Sunni Egyptian religious attitudes toward the Iranian revolution and Muriel Atkin's on Soviet attitudes are interesting but remote from the book's central concern.

Yet only one contribution, that by Nahid Yeganeh and Nikki Keddie on the gender issue in contemporary Iranian Shi'ism, addresses a significant component on Shi'ite doctrine and thought. It is a distinctly less authoritative and convincing article than the others, but perhaps that is because these kinds of questions are harder to answer. Their article highlights the fact that one learns little about Shi'ism from these essays but a lot about the political postures of national groups of Shi'ites. Shi'ite doctrine and thought may be irrelevant to these postures, or they may be central; it's hard to tell from the information provided.

If the social protest of the civil rights movement were surveyed with an equivalent dis-

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regard for the ideas and vision of W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King, both the reader and the movement would be the poorer.

RICHARD W. BULLIET
Columbia University

Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy *by Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986. 236 pp. $30.00.*

This is an extremely informative book and a valuable addition to the still meager literature on politics and society in the two new democracies of the Iberian peninsula. It should also find a useful place in the increasingly less plentiful recent work on political processes in individual western European countries.

Portugal's role as a fully fledged western European democracy in which the political parties have monopolized public life since the mid-1970s constitutes the central theme of the book. Bruneau and Macleod, in their carefully researched and very detailed description of the Portuguese polity since the 25 April 1974 revolution, convincingly demonstrate the utility and validity of analyzing Portuguese politics in a liberal democratic, "Western European" context as opposed to what they call (p. 5) "previously relevant but somewhat exotic topics, such as corporatism, militarism and 'alternative models of development.' " The three chapters on, respectively, the party system and political participation, the divided Left, and the parties of the Right and Center: Social Democratic Center Party (CDS) and Social Democrat Party (PSD), which form the core of the book—almost half—are exhaustive. Indeed, it is rather difficult at times to see the woods for the trees. Since these chapters precede the very brief chapter on the constitution of 1976 and its revision in 1982 (which even follows a more ample review of the political role of groups and associations), they are quite difficult to follow unless one is already well versed in Portuguese politics.

The constitution in fact gets rather short shrift. A more detailed analysis earlier would have added to the book's clarity. It would have been helpful to know more, for example, about how the Constituent Assembly went about its task and to what extent other western European constitutions were drawn upon. This is one illustration of the inconsistency with which the western European, liberal democratic model is used. Strangely absent, also, is a detailed discussion of the impact of the intensive nine-year negotiations for entry into the European Community (even though, as the authors assert, the subject has been dealt with extensively by other authors).

After the minutely detailed studies of the political parties, all that comes after is rather anticlimactic. In particular, the chapters on the media and the politicized role of the state in the economy do not add very much to the book. This same criticism applies to what is by far the weakest aspect of *Politics in Contemporary Portugal*—the heavy reliance on poll data. Although there is no question that the various polls utilized by Bruneau and Macleod were carefully designed and administered, the information they provide adds little

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to what the authors tell us in the main body of the text. For example, the reader is given several different statistics to illustrate the fact that the Portuguese public is neither well informed about nor particularly interested in politics and, what is more, since it is not politically active, it has little impact on government. This is disconcerting not only because it is repetitive; it also breaks the flow of the narrative.

Despite the mostly redundant statistical material, which detracts from the readability of the book for those from other disciplines or for the lay person interested in contemporary Portugal, Bruneau and Macleod, both of whom have already written widely on Portugal, are to be commended for having done a thorough and useful job in providing the student of western European politics with a wealth of new material organized in an original and interesting manner.

GLENDA G. ROSENTHAL
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The Arab Radicals *by Adeed Dawisha. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 171 pp. Cloth $17.50; paper $8.95.*

Any book that professes to explain Arab radicalism evokes strong expectations. The westerner is anxious to know about the motives and means of those in the Middle East who are so regularly linked with political upheaval and terrorism. In fact, Dawisha's book deals only with the first. At the outset, he indicates that terrorism is but one instrument of radical policy and that his study has a broader scope. He focuses on those states and organizations engaged in undermining and, where possible, transforming the status quo: Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and Algeria, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and various militant Islamic organizations.

Radical states are seen as endeavoring to upset the regional order; radical groups attack established political authority and legitimacy. The differences between radical and conservative regimes are found, according to the author, not in how they formulate and implement foreign policies but in the sources of legitimacy they employ and the importance for the radicals of societal mobilization. As Dawisha claims, his conception of "radical" avoids value judgments. Unfortunately, his analysis also finesses critical areas of inquiry and, despite some perceptive observations, is repetitious and at times superficial.

The book is at its best in discussions of the Arab nationalism and Islam, both needed for understanding the motivating impulses behind contemporary Arab radicalism. Dawisha observes that the personal exercise of power and centralization of authority are particularly characteristic of the radical state and group. The leader becomes pivotal in the absence of institutionalized bureaucractic procedures. He notes that radical leaders are prepared to discard revolutionary zeal, at least temporarily, to pursue moderate and pragmatic policies when these seem more promising. Religious radicalism is seen as only the most recent solution offered to meet modern Arab aspirations. Significantly, Dawisha finds the aura or appearance of success necessary to radical regimes and movements.

Where this book disappoints most is in its conventional lines of analysis and failure to

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extend arguments. We find, for example, rather stock discussions of the PLO and the Muslim brotherhood. The author's explanation of PLO-Syrian relations in the context of Lebanon is incisive, but there is very little new material about or reinterpretation of any of the radical groups. Oddly, the notorious Abu Nidhal organization is barely noted while the largely defunct al-Da'wi movement in Iraq is extensively described.

Dawisha may wish to avoid a discussion of terrorism and practical means of combatting it. Yet the reader is entitled to a more careful examination of the radicals' strategies and tactics. We need to know more about the sociology of radical organizations, especially their composition and basis of cohesion. How mobilization occurs in radical regimes also goes unexplored. The author insists that no united radical movement or tightly controlled radical conspiracy exists. Valid enough. But a more complete study would have described the suspected networks and cooperation among radical groups and states at least in one area of policy—terrorism.

Dawisha concludes that Islamic militancy is no more permanent and no less transient than Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. Judged by its inability to prevail anywhere outside of Iran, the tide of revolutionary Islam is held to have peaked between 1979 and 1982. Although the author admits that the underlying economic and social factors that gave rise to fundamentalism have not diminished, he identifies no other appealing ideology that can offer similar hope and solace. Powerful, even strengthening fundamentalist groups remain in the wings in several countries. Khomeinism may get mixed reviews abroad, but should Iran prevail in its war with Iraq, Islamic radicalism could quickly realize a strong new lease on life. Arab radicals deserve more thorough study. Dawisha's book, though intelligently and clearly written, is only a start.

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM
University of Illinois

Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy *by Joni Lovenduski. Amherst, Mass., University of Massachusetts Press, 1986. 320 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $10.95.*

Women of Europe: Women MEPs and Equality Policy *by Elizabeth Vallance and Elizabeth Davies. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986. 180 pp. $37.50.*

With the International Decade for Women now behind us, we can begin to wonder what lasting impact political action at the multinational level will have on issues related to women's interests. The two books under review remind us of important factors that shape political action by and for women. Lovenduski focuses on historical and cultural factors within which women acquire political consciousness; Vallance and Davies focus on the interplay between national and supranational institutional factors in the development of policies for women. Both sets of authors ultimately acknowledge the overriding significance of the nation-state as a context within which women's concerns are voiced and heard.

Lovenduski examines the development of feminism and, therefore, the role of women themselves in placing feminist issues on the political agenda in several European countries.

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She first presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the first wave of European feminism (from the industrial revolution to the mid-twentieth century), comparing the form and consequences of different feminist strategies (for example, liberal, socialist and radical) in different countries, including Britain, France, Germany, the Nordic countries, and state socialist countries. What is most admirable about Lovenduski's study is the structural framework within which she captures and makes good use of a considerable amount of information. Lovenduski argues that the mix of and interaction between certain key social structural factors (conditions of industrialism, significance of religious and class factions, legal institutions) within each country explain the strength of feminist sociopolitical action. She ably presents national similarities and differences with reference to these factors. Hence, in Britain and other countries with some form of constitutional power and predominantly Protestant cultures, feminism was stronger than in economically backward, Catholic countries such as Italy. Lovenduski then compares the past with the new movement for women's liberation that began in the 1960s. She analyzes the second wave of feminism with the same attention to contextually-based explanation within an appropriately new set of categories. For example, patterns of interest representation in political parties and unions facilitated the inclusion of women's concerns on the political agenda of the Nordic countries earlier than elsewhere.

Lovenduski seeks to highlight constraints on progress posed by and for women. She makes brief reference to the most common explanation for women's passive political behavior: a universal pattern of sex role socialization. Her own elaborations indicate that socialization patterns are themselves part of a broader framework. We find in her book, though, that each new historical configuration of political and social factors carries increasingly complex forms of constraints. Lovenduski offers little sign of where the possibilities now lie for continued progress by and for women. Her presentation of current national strategies for handling policies related to women's prospects, such as equal employment measures, is too brief to substantiate her pessimism. This small caveat aside, Lovenduski's book greatly enriches our understanding of women's social and political activism.

The book by Vallance and Davies considers women's political activity within a specific, contemporary setting. The authors open their book with an interesting question: why is it that women have much greater representation in the European Economic Community (EEC), as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), than in national legislatures? Their answer, while simple, is revealing of contemporary political dynamics. Competition for seats in the European Parliament is less intense than that for national legislatures because the European Parliament is, frankly, not considered to be as important to either the electorate or the candidates. And yet, the authors argue, the European Parliament is more than an inconsequential political arena that men have allowed women to enter—it also has a positive attraction to women politicians. In the words of one MEP, "We have built a house in the modern style. Maybe we are altogether more in the modern style here" (p. 1). That is to say, the EEC potentially is above the constraints of normal politics, and it has taken bold new approaches in its policies on women.

Toward the middle of the book, Vallance and Davies begin to ask a different question: why is it that the EEC is so much more active in promoting women's issues than national legislatures? Their answer to this question is also revealing. It is not because of the involv-

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ment of women MEPs—they have not formed a united, coherent action group. Some individuals have been visibly feminist; others, however, have been more concerned with their own constituency interests. Hence, to understand the progressiveness of the European Parliament, Vallance and Davies return us to its uniqueness as a political forum spanning twelve nation-states, potentially capable of finding common ground and cultivating it. We discover, however, that the European Parliament is not supranational—it can do no more than individual member-states are willing to let it do. The European Parliament has issued several directives on various issues related to women (equal opportunities, part-time work, parental leave). While they have been readily implemented within the institution of the EEC itself, member states, even though they are required to comply, have done so only inconsistently. Recalcitrant member states can be taken to the European Court of Justice. In some cases, modifications in national legislation have been mandated by the Court (for example, Britain's Equal Pay Act was much more narrowly conceived than the EEC directive). But national footdragging is common. Given the indifferent national responses, and given the increasing number of cases being heard before it, the Court is becoming "obviously tentative about encroaching on national sovereignty and domestic legislation in such a sensitive area as women's rights" (p. 150). In the end, then, the limitations of the EEC vis à vis nation-states reduces the potential of this institution to realize an alternative political arena—a new political "home" for women.

Lovenduski's book is a tome of information, but well worth the effort for all those interested in feminist concerns in the advanced industrial countries. The book by Vallance and Davies is clear and concise, but may be too focused empirically for those not interested specifically in the EEC context.

MARY RUGGIE
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Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer *by Joan Barth Urban. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1986. 370 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $14.95.*

The Italian Communist party, the largest in the West, is deeply rooted, regularly carrying one out of three Italian votes at every election. It exercises a great deal of control over university chairs and unions; and it still enjoys a significant and special prestige among writers, film makers, and a large segment of national opinion leaders. Yet the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano) has never attempted to seize power, to control the government, or to use its strong thrust from the outside to bend and force the "inside" (the coalition of democratic, non-Communist parties, which in various different groupings, has governed Italy since 1945) to make it comply with its will. The few occasions in which the PCI found itself in control were very short periods, always ending in retreat.

Of course one explanation for this is a self-evident geopolitical fact: Italy is a western country, part of the NATO alliance, a country with a democratic constitution inspired by

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the American model, with strong ties to the United States and western Europe. This was the direct effect of the Allies' invasion, the liberation of Italy, and the timely military action that in 1943–1945 foiled the advance of the Red Army just outside Trieste.

Yet communism in its Italian incarnation is still ideologically linked to a political philosophy and an organization which is responsible for such events as the assassination of Trotsky, the extermination of the Kulaks, Stalin's crimes, the systematic elimination of European Communist party leaders in the 1930s, the Communist-organized genocide in Cambodia, the treatment of "refuseniks." There are, therefore, several unanswered questions about the PCI. *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party* poses, explicitly or implicitly, those questions and proposes the right answers in an extremely accurate, detailed, excellently-researched work.

I do not believe that such a book currently exists in the massive Italian and European bibliography on the PCI. One reason for this is that almost anyone capable of writing it in Italy is either too close (or was) to the Communist party, or is known for his or her opposition to it. Joan Barth Urban has been able to position herself at the right distance and has avoided another problem that has made impossible the Italian production of critical studies on Italian communism: she has not been brought up on the myths that in Italy, surround PCI leaders, such as Palmiro Togliatti, the first internationally known PCI secretary, or Enrico Berlinguer, who during his lifetime commanded the presence of millions and whose funeral in 1983 was given hours of live television coverage.

Urban accomplishes her work through attentive analysis of thousands of documents, notes, diaries, statements, and interviews. All of her material is either first-hand information, little known or unpublished works, or material that was previously used in a different context. For many reasons, this is a book of revelations and discoveries, not so much because the facts are new as because the facts and evidence have been gathered and assembled with a critical and well-focused mind that never loses touch with the basic questions, not even when the reader is asked to follow the intricacies of minor details.

The cultural, moral, and ideological dependency of the Italian communists on Moscow is the first question discussed. The second is the network of organizational ties and its evolution, bizarre at times, surprising and unexpected at others. The third is the human and moral qualities of the leaders, how they bowed to Soviet power, yet resisted total domination in an elusive and clever way. The fourth is the ability demonstrated, in particular by Togliatti, to act in the best Machiavellian and Catholic tradition, using passive resistance while trying to establish an autonomous, yet undeclared power. Since so much of Italian contemporary history is tied to the "Communist question," this book becomes a relevant document on contemporary Italy. One question, perhaps, remains unanswered. This is not a failing of the book, but rather the peculiar character of Italian Communism today: why, having gone so far as to rid themselves of Soviet influence, have they never renounced Marxism-Leninism as the matrix of their envisioned way of governing? And is it not this immense contradiction (the refuting of Moscow, yet retaining that part of the Soviet doctrine that made possible and "legalized" so many horrors) and the tension it created, the root of Italian terrorism?

The Italian Communist party has never encouraged terrorism and has actually joined forces with Italian institutions against it. But this book offers intriguing evidence that the

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tension within the texture, history, and life of the Communist party has been a spawning ground of extremism from the beginning. This is the problem that Italian Communism has never solved, the best documentation of which can be found in Joan Barth Urban's book, making this an extremely relevant work.

FURIO COLOMBO
Columbia University

Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico *by Roderic A. Camp. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1986. 279 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $10.95.*

Roderic Camp seeks to describe and explain the relationship between Mexican intellectuals and the post-revolutionary Mexican state through an extensive study of the definition of an intellectual in Mexico, the structure of intellectual life in Mexico, and the terms on which intellectuals and politicians have interacted since 1920. His basic argument is that the relationship had been close, though not entirely harmonious, from 1920 until 1968, after which it has become more strained and potentially hostile. Camp also argues that such a distancing between intellectuals and the state could have a significant negative impact on the politicians' ability to confront current political and economic crises.

Unfortunately, his book suffers from serious analytic problems. In demonstrating the complexity of issues, Camp marshals many explanatory variables but fails to develop the relationships among them. For example, he gives several explanations for Mexican intellectuals' service to the state: historical precedent, economic necessity, culture, moral commitment to improving society, state resources, and personal power (pp. 213–215). Analysis requires more than a mere list of such broad categories.

Interpretations are often contradictory or not supported by the data. Camp notes "some scholars believe . . ." but doesn't tell us how many in his sample do. He claims a position for the group as a whole, cites Octavio Paz as evidence, and then says that Paz is probably more sensitive to the issue than other intellectuals (p. 65). When Paz notes that all ambassadors (Paz was ambassador to India at the time) were asked for an opinion, Camp says it shows that intellectuals' opinions are valued (pp. 66–67). And although a definition of Mexican intellectual is central to his discussion, Camp is inconsistent (pp. 34, 66, and 86 disagree on the distinction between intellectual and intelligentsia; p. 109 does not agree with any of the lists of intellectual elites developed in chapters 3 and 4).

Interpretations of key events in Mexican political history are also too simple. The 1968 student massacre is presented as a turning point in the intellectual/politician relationship (pp. 208–212). But without a comparison with other major political crises (such as the 1929 and 1940 elections and labor strikes in the late 1940s and especially in 1958–1959), I am unconvinced. Camp claims that the contemporary state is repeating its mistake of overlooking intellectuals in the prerevolutionary period (p. 226), but he ignores differences in the conditions of the two periods.

Has the relationship between the Mexican intellectual and the state changed? We cannot tell from this study. The theme of Camp's book is that younger intellectuals are increas-

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ingly distancing themselves from the state (as measured by government service). But Camp claims that informal channels of influence exist because 86 percent of the intellectual elite maintain friendships with politicians (p. 87), and the younger generation follow their mentors among the elite (chapter 7). In what appears as a serious contradiction of the book's theme, he later states that there is no difference between the 1970s and the 1950s–1960s (p. 220). So why is 1968 so important?

In sum, the analysis of the book is muddled, but the subject is important. Camp's bibliographic data bank on Mexican intellectuals (500 individuals, 64 variables; similar to the compilation he made for Mexican politicians) makes the book worth skimming for anyone dealing with these issues.

DAVID R. MARES
University of California, San Diego

Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System *by Muhammad Anwar. New York, Methuen, 1986. 182 pp. $39.95.*

As the nonwhite population of Britain (now approximately 5 percent) grows and becomes increasingly native-born, its role in politics evokes greater attention. Although the title of this book suggests a broad overview, in reality the focus is narrow, concentrating on how ethnic minorities, especially those of Asian and Afro-Caribbean descent, relate to political parties, particularly in elections.

Anwar, head of the research department at the quasi-governmental Commission for Racial Equality, has long been the foremost proponent of the "ethnic marginals" thesis, which holds that ethnic minorities constitute an important voting group in a large number of constituencies whose support can be crucial in general elections. This argument has been challenged by political scientists such as Ivor Crewe, Zig Layton-Henry, and the reviewer on the grounds that ethnic minorities are loyal Labour voters, usually reside in safe Labour inner-city seats, and have social characteristics other than their ethnicity that influence their vote. Although not directly acknowledging this criticism, Anwar argues in more muted tones for the mutual benefits to parties and ethnic groups of encouraging their conventional participation in British electoral politics as voters, party members, and candidates.

There are few surprises in either the argument or in the data. The evidence consists of simple percentage tables based on primary research on the electoral behavior of ethnic minorities over the last decade, along with secondary citations of other work. Anwar is relentlessly optimistic about the prospects for integrating ethnic minorities into the mainstream of British politics. Their voting turnout is supposedly increasing, and their views on issues resemble those of whites. In selected areas parties other than Labour have been able to make inroads on the ethnic vote; white attitudes towards nonwhites are improving; and more nonwhites are being adopted as candidates. Most of this is true, but the picture is more complex and problematical than Anwar acknowledges. There were riots in inner city areas in 1980, 1981, and 1985. The integration of Afro-Caribbeans into the British political system is substantially less than that of Asians. Police-nonwhite problems, especially con-

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cerning Afro-Caribbeans, are mounting. Tensions among different ethnic minority groups are manifest.

The most fundamental theoretical shortcoming of the book is that it rests on an unarticulated assumption of the beneficial effects of political pluralism for nonwhites. But continuous strong nonwhite support for the Labour Party has not yet resulted in any nonwhite members in the House of Commons. Residual xenophobic sentiments in the Conservative party are much more threatening to ethnic minority interests than was the short-lived 1970s heyday of the fascist National Front. The party most consistently supportive of nonwhites, the Liberals (now Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance) has not been faced with the test of office. When Labour has been in power, its actions in regard to ethnic minorities have often fallen short of its words. In short, encouraging conventional political participation by nonwhites may have done more for the parties, especially the Labour Party, than for the ethnic minorities.

But what are the alternatives? Threatening the system through sporadic violence calls attention to ethnic problems, but it also invites reprisals. Petitioning the government bureaucracy can result in gains for nonwhites, but it depends on organizational skills and sympathetic office holders. Nevertheless, focusing on electoral and party activity may not be the most effective way for nonwhites to achieve political goals. Anwar's views are certainly influential, but they are far from being convincingly demonstrated.

DONLEY T. STUDLAR
Centre College

The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide *by Robert Jay Lifton. New York, Basic Books, 1986. 561 pp. $19.95.*

This study of the major role of Nazi doctors in the destruction of "life deemed unworthy of life" contributes fresh perspectives on the Holocaust and adds further distinction to Lifton's work on "extreme situations." The book opens with an analysis of the progression of medical killing from enforced sterilization through the killing of "impaired" children and adults to the mass killings of the extermination camps. He comments that "psychologically speaking, nothing is darker or more menacing, or harder to accept, than the participation of physicians in mass murder" (p. 3). But is it more horrifying than the role of the Dominicans in the Inquisition, or the incitement of pogroms by Christian priests, or the involvement of Communist cadres in the mass starvation of Ukrainians during the man-made famine of 1932–1933? All these are sustained by systems of belief that motivate or rationalize or justify the mass killings. Lifton analyzes in depth the Nazi bioracial or biomedical vision that provided the ideological context for the transformation of killing into healing. The ideology portrayed the German or Aryan race as an organic unit in need of curative care by purification and revitalization. And since it was exposed to the debilitating influence of the impaired, and since its survival was threatened by the Jewish antirace, the eradication of these elements was perceived as a curative service, healing by killing.

In reading accounts of the joyous abandon or callous indifference with which mass murder

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is often perpetrated, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the inhibitions against committing these crimes may be readily surmounted. One would hardly anticipate that highly motivated Nazi doctors in the elite SS unit at Auschwitz would experience strain in the execution of their killing duties. Yet it appears from the interviews conducted by Lifton that generally speaking, the participation in the killing operations was indeed stressful. Many mechanisms and supports, institutional and psychological, were available to ease adjustment into the killing operations. The ramrod discipline of the SS corps, the organization of the killing center, the routine pattern of activities, and the emphasis on the professional role of the doctors provided a firm institutional structure for the medicalized mass murder. And some distancing was also possible. Most of the killings took place on the immediate arrival of the transports, lending a measure of impersonality to the selection of victims. An organizational division of duties provided some slight insulation from direct involvement in the actual killing.

At the psychological level, the Nazi doctors would have started with a preconditioning to the annihilation of Jews. But in addition, Lifton argues that there had to be a transition from feeling to nonfeeling, a process of psychic numbing. Detoxification of the language used would have assisted this psychic numbing by rendering murder nonmurderous. Then there was the ethos of healing, of purification, of killing as a difficult, but necessary, personal ordeal. Finally Lifton invokes the psychological principle of "doubling," that is the division of the self into two functioning wholes so that the part-self acts as an entire self.

However, one may question whether one really needs so powerful a mechanism as "doubling" to interpret the dedication of ideologically motivated Nazi doctors. Is this an expression of Lifton's humanism, a quality that permeates his writings and that I personally admire? Could it be somewhat misleading in the present context? Or does one feel uncomfortable with the humanizing element in his characterization of the doctors because of one's own desire to see them portrayed as demonic and totally removed from the human condition?

LEO KUPER
University of California, Los Angeles

Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia *by Charles Bergquist. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1986. 397 pp. Cloth, $39.50; paper, $14.95.*

This set of historical essays attempts to recast Latin American political development by focusing on the role of export production workers in state formation and economic development. Bergquist argues in a volume of ambitious scope that traditional Latin American historiography has underestimated labor's role in Latin American political development, particularly ignoring the export sector. This volume contributes greatly to our understanding of the formation of "poles of growth" in Latin America and their varied effects on overall socio-economic development.

The quality of Bergquist's thinking on these subjects is apparent throughout the book, with interpretive nuggets ranging from the abdication of the Argentine Radical Party's middle

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class compromise in the 1930s (p. 141) to the vexing independence of the Venezuelan Communist party in the 1930s (p. 232) and the destructive aspects of Colombian smallholdings (p. 275). Many such observations sprinkled throughout the book are worthy themselves of separate book-length treatment.

While these case studies—especially Venezuela and Colombia—are inviting by themselves, the volume falls short of its ambitions. Perhaps because of the tremendous scope of the study, the bibliographic treatment of important historiographical issues is incomplete. This is particularly glaring in view of the promising arguments the author makes on such important questions as the preeminence of socialists among anticapitalist unions in Chile (p. 62); the shortcomings of Peronist historiography (p. 151); the culpability of Peronism for the hardening of post-Peronist governments (p. 182); and the skewed definition of the Colombian proletariat (p. 281), among others. These stand in stark contrast to thorough and imaginative treatments of other historiographical matters, such as the conceptualization of the Venezuelan working class in liberal histories (p. 227). Not only is the reader frustrated by not finding cited major secondary works on Peronism, populism, or the Great Depression; the editors chose not to include a complete footnote format (the publisher is missing) or a bibliography at the end of the volume. Other scholars' use of the works cited will be more complicated as a result.

The range of the analysis must also bear some blame for loose or weak conceptualizations of ruling class, revolutionary workers organizations, and "the tide of Western history." While most readers will recognize these shorthand terms, occasionally the author uses such labels too seriously to make loose prescriptions for "left scholarship" (p. 281) or to blame liberal historiography repeatedly for ignoring labor (esp. pp. 74, 117, and 151). Less useful to the study are murky asides on the Argentine tango and the emasculation of the working class (p. 137), or assertions that coffee smallholders in Colombia are "rural Renaissance men" (p. 328).

But if the book falls short, it is because the author sets an impressive and important goal for the analysis. In thoughtful introductory and concluding essays, Bergquist admits that this volume is a prolegomenon to future labor historiography and an enjoinder to comparative method. The interested reader will be impatient for more comparative treatments of the Mexican working class riding the copper skyrocket at the turn of the century or the political consequences of Venezuelan oil on Mexican petroleum workers in the 1920s. Analysts of Vargas's Brazil will glean much from the analysis of Peronist populism in the late 1940s. And historians of smaller countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay have rich frameworks for guiding their future analysis of labor relations and economic development.

In the end, Bergquist has thrown down the gauntlet to other "new social historians," who, in my view, should also include political scientists interested in Latin American affairs. His challenging arguments will have to be taken into account in any thorough labor history in the future.

STEVEN E. SANDERSON
Ford Foundation, Brazil

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Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions *by Sidney I. Ploss. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1986. 182 pp. Paper, $29.50.*

The author, a senior Soviet analyst at the U.S. Department of State, offers the plausible hypothesis that a careful analysis of the media content in a controlled society like the USSR should yield valuable clues in the one area where western intelligence is typically the weakest: predicting the Kremlin's course of action on important foreign policy dilemmas. The logic of the hypothesis is that even though the likely or agreed policy may for a time be kept secret, the authorities tend to influence the media to manage the news so that the domestic public will react properly when the selected course of action is announced.

Much of the book is an extremely detailed, almost day-by-day analysis of articles in the media, trying to reconstruct the Soviet leadership's hidden objectives and means for managing the Polish crisis of 1980–1981. While the wealth of details will be of interest to specialists on Polish-USSR affairs and on media in Communist countries, this reviewer would have preferred a more synthetic description of the method of analysis and a more plausible case that Soviet and Polish actions—that is, the imposition of martial law—could have been predicted from media analysis.

PAUL MARER
Indiana University

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984 *compiled by the U.S Department of State. Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 1174 pp. n.p.*

Biographical Dictionary of the American Left *edited by Bernard K. Johnpoll and Harvey Klehr. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1986. 493 pp. $65.00.*

Cities of the World: 2nd ed. supplement *edited by Margaret Walsh Young and Susan L. Stetler. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1986. 758 pp. $84.00.*

City Employment in 1985 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 42 pp. n.p.*

City Government Finances in 1984–1985 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 123 pp. $6.50.*

Communist and Marxist Parties of the World *edited by Charles Hobday. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1986. 529 pp. $70.00.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1986, 2 vols. *Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1986. 1592 pp. $110/set.*

The Europa Year Book 1986: A World Survey, 2 vols. *Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1986. 3089 pp. $235.00/set.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2: China, 1955–1957 *compiled by the U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 706 pp. $23.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 3: China, 1955–1957 *compiled by the U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 689 pp. $21.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 4: Western European Security and Integration, 1955–1957 *compiled by the U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 659 pp. $30.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 54: 1919 *edited by Arthur S. Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986. 579 pp. $50.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 55: 1919 *edited by Arthur S. Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986. 570 pp. $52.50.*

Public Employment in 1985 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, 39 pp. $2.75.*

1787: Drafting the U.S. Constitution, 2 vols. *edited by Wilbourn E. Benton. College Station, Tex., A&M University Press, 1986. 1574 pp. $85.00/set.*

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World Human Rights Guide *compiled by Charles Humana. New York, Facts on File, 1986. 344 pp. $35.00.*

World Weapon Database, vol 1: Soviet Missiles *by Barton Wright. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986. 701 pp. $65.00.*

1986 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs *edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 608 pp. $49.95.*

Correction: In the No. 3 issue of 1986, a production error caused a mistake in one sentence of Shaul Bakhash's review of *Arms and Oil* by Thomas L. McNaugher. The sentence should have read "They have dealt with more serious regional threats—Gamal Abdel Nasser in Yemen, the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, rebels in Oman, religious zealots in Saudi Arabia—by seeking help variously from other Arab states, the Shah of Iran, England, and France, with ad hoc U.S. support."

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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